Why is there is no lending in crisis?

On LinkedIn, Callum Thomas has shared a post detailing tightness in lending standards and gradual shifting to tight credit conditions.

Lending standards tighten at the exact wrong time in a crisis. Also in a crisis the ratings get downgraded en masse. When we want banks to lend, banks do not want to lend. When we want banks to stop lending, banks get busy making risky loans. This is one problem of banking regulation that has not received enough attention. 

Markets and particularly rating agencies need to appreciate the difference between Macro risk (where all aspects of the economy are impaired) v/s corporate risk (where particular company suffers impairment because of its own actions or inactions).

Credit cannot be pushed - it needs to be pulled. To achieve this, a better mechanism is interest subvention. It seems to be a much better tool when macros risks are prevalent.

An SPV which guarantees interest rate up to X% (ranging from 30-50% of lending rate - so for India it will guarantee 3% interest cost for US it could 0.75%) it should cause firms to pull credit and deploy it for productive uses.

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Rahul Prakash Deodhar, Advocate, Bombay High Court is also a private investor. He can be reached at rahuldeodhar@gmail.com, on twitter at @rahuldeodhar or at his website www.rahuldeodhar.com.

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Will US Dollar collapse? What will be an alternate currency? What about Gold?

At this point I am not sure Dollar collapse is closer. 

A dollar collapse needs to have three points - 

1. The fundamental weakness in USD (we have this more or less) 
2. a World not reliant on US consumer demand 
3. A strong challenger

Last 2 conditions are not met - at least not yet. Euro has its flaws and needs to iron those out before it can become a challenger. Yuan will not be a challenger. SDR is closest option we have but there are issues there too. I am not confident of the blockchain currencies that exist presently.

IF Dollar is really stressed we may go back to a gold-peg rather than other currencies. In fact, gold peg may be quite a good Fed policy for the short term.

If we correct the SDR structure then eventually even the US would love to have a 2-level currency system. 

Previously I have discussed views on US Dollars here:
Dollar, the International Currency system and the Ghosts of Connally

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Time Travel effect of Debt

Generally in Time Travel movies the actors go back in time to change some minor thing to alter the future dramatically. Debt does this in reverse.

Debt pulls value from future and alters the present in such a manner that more value is created in the future than estimated.

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Interesting Readings 11 June 2018 = Is Debt Jubilee lurking?

I came across an article titled Some ways to introduce a modern debt Jubilee at Vox. The article is in line with the recent discussion about debt. John Mauldin has highlighted this problem generally and more specifically in the last Thoughts from Frontlines. A few months back Christopher DeMaria had written about debt jubilee on Seeking Alpha article titled The American (Debt) Jubilee, And The Current Correction.

Debt Jubilee may be lurking in our future. It is not as bad as it sounds. For some kinds of debt, when prevalent in excess, needs to be written down. I have highlighted the difference between good debt and bad debt earlier - i.e. productive debt and unproductive debt.

Productive debt creates an asset of higher value than the debt itself.

A large part debt currently outstanding is unproductive debt. All consumer credit is unproductive, except educational loans or student loans. It does not create a means to pay the debt back. Thus, debt jubilee may be a proper solution to problem of unproductive debt. Productive debt in trouble can be repaid by extending more productive debt.

The alternative could be to extend and inflate it away. But will there by appetite for that?

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Interesting Readings May 14 2018 - Development Finance Institutions.

Financing reindustrialization: bring back development banks

Deepak Nayyer talks about capabilities created in Development Financial institutions (DFIs) for longterm lending. 

These DFIs are very important in creating a capability for lending to special investments. India, till 2000, had developed the capabilities to lend to infrastructure, sector-wise capacity creation etc. We need the concentration of skills in one place. This way, special knowledge reduced the risk for lending.

The commercial banks decided to reduce the lending risks by consortium lending. That is a statistical approach to risk mitigation.

Now Deepak Nayyar wants to create a National Development Bank. That I think is a bad idea. Though there may be some merit in creating a network of professionals who can lend to industry and towards infrastructure. These professionals can be monitored using DIN-like number (Director identification number) and their investments performance tracked. These people may be employed with commercial banks but without sign-off from these persons, such loans will not be approved.

Note:

What we are creating is attribution chain. I have discussed the importance of attribution in both of my books - Subverting Capitalism and Democracy and Understanding Firms. Please use the links below to check out the books. 

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Revenue Deficit vs Fiscal deficit and Fiscal responsibility

"Ballooning Revenue Deficit is far more worrisome than nominal slippage in fiscal deficit" said Mythili Bhusnurmath in ET. Her views are correct. But how to curb Revenue deficit. Let us understand the terms a bit more in detail.

Revenue deficit is amount by which Revenue expenditures exceed Revenues. 

What are revenues or Revenue receipts?

Revenues can be tax or non-tax. Tax component includes share of tax of Union Government in general taxes and "cess" or specialized taxes accruing to Union Government alone. [Refer Note 1]. Non-tax revenues includes interest on loans to various entities (state governments, etc.),  profits and dividends from enterprises, duties and fines received, grants from multilateral agencies or other governments etc.

What are revenue expenditures?

Revenue expenditures includes:

1. Salaries and pension paid to government employees
2. Subsidies
3. defense expenditure (relates to national security)
4. Government procurement from stationery to vehicles to arms and ammunition for police (internal security)
5.  Expense required for running government schemes and programs
6. Interest paid on borrowings - domestic and external.
   

Fiscal Deficit is more like capital account deficit.

Capital Account Receipts side includes recovery of loans to States etc., receipts from disinvestment or privatization and borrowing (external and domestic). Capital expenditures includes investments in Public sector companies, investments in public projects, etc.

Further, accounting 101 will tell you that revenue deficit accumulates in the Fiscal side and it has to be financed through borrowing which sits on the capital account. The servicing of this borrowing is done through revenue expenditures. These twin deficits thus, are quite interlinked. Mathematically, it is true that we can reduce Fiscal deficit (FD) while Revenue Deficit (RD) remains high. But it is true only for small values of RD. But a more ideal situation is when FD is higher (though less than the 3%) and RD is zero or lower. Then, one presumes, your excess FD would be mostly because of high quality capital expenditure. This capital expenditure will yield more Revenues and thus lower RD in the future. [Refer Note 2].

The Problem

For past decade or more, reverse is true. Most of borrowing is used for revenue expenditures - i.e. payment of salaries to bureaucrats. In return, bureaucrats and government employees have stifled any possible revenue growth for citizen or companies thereby reducing the revenues. This widens the revenue deficit and pushes the system into a negative spiral.

It is clear that the present malaise is largely self-inflicted. Imposing FRBM target without first having a RD at zero or lower is a recipe for disaster. At present, government appears to throw disinvestment money after revenue expenses and that is very bad idea. It erodes the structure of the economy.

How to kickstart the positive spiral?

The government is now required to first ensure that RD is reduced to zero but using revenue receipts. That requires expansion of tax base which is impossible without taxing agriculture. Thereafter, using asset sales i.e. disinvestment or privatization route, reduce the lower quality borrowing. Most of the borrowing by the government should be directed towards investments that yield revenues in the future and thus create structural zero- revenue deficits or revenue surpluses. This is the improvement in quality of budget is what prudent observers seek.

Notes:

1. Indian federal structure implies that both center and states have power to tax and they have share in the tax. Most of the taxes are shared and go into "consolidated fund of India" for central share and "consolidated fund of the state" for state taxes.
2. Ideally, the any borrowing or loan or debt should create more revenue than expenses required to service it. To do that, borrowing must be invested in revenue boosting ventures. Companies borrow to buy new machine that can increase production. Similarly nations should invest in those assets that will increase profits for citizens and companies and thus improve tax receipts.

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Counter intuitive = Low rates / ZIRP/NIRP policies are actually bad for economy

We are told that when interest rates are too low, they are encouraging entrepreneurs to take risk. So we have low interest rate policy LIRP, Zero interest rate policy, ZIRP and negative interest rate policy NIRP.

However, these policies impacts the business models differently. At one end are business models, like infrastructure projects, that cannot add threshold value in the initial years of the venture. The low interest rate regime, allows a valuable gestation period for such business models. Often, government artificially lowers interest rates for such projects. At the other extreme, there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. These business models, however, die out once the interest rates start rising. In between, there are experimental and innovative business models. Some of these use the low interest rate period to forge better, more robust models. Such businesses thrive later. Others, however, end up going bust. The role of banks is to identify each of these business models and fund them while appropriately mitigating the risks. 

How low interest rate leads to mal-investment 

A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. Ideally, even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed. 

However, in reality, lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures. Typically, such irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. 

First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Intelligent investors will find that this contradicts with the "diversification as risk management" strategy. But being with herd has a stronger lure and is treated as risk mitigation (though wrongly).

Further, at lower interest rates, debt starts being used as an instrument to amplify equity returns. With unchanged return on capital employed, you can have higher return on equity when return on debt reduces. Return on debt is function of interest rates and lower share it claims from the total returns made by the firms. 

Thus the second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy. 

In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios.

This is particularly true when there is some demand in the system.

What happens when there is no demand?

When there is no demand in the economy, low interest rates / ZIRP / NIRP etc are said to stimulate this demand. This, to my simplistic mind, sounds like offering desserts to the already overfed diner  (AOD) with the hope to eliminate world hunger. Let me explain.

We hope this AOD, when offered with a free desserts will take them and pass them along to the hungry. In this method we depend on the magnanimity of intentions of our already overfed diner. Then we presume he shall act on his instincts and find worthy hungry who can transmit the benefits to others. It is quite possible our Glutton may pass the desserts to his friends or family and each can be a little more fatter. Are we, then to wait for all the gluttons to be severly beefed up or porked up before the trickle down starts to the hungry?

It sound like bull-shit method to me. Particularly I cannot understand why you are preventing the hungry from feeding themselves - either by employing them or letting entrepreneurs do it by financing them with reasonably priced debt/credit. These entrepreneurs are left to finance their ventures with credit cards, overdrafts and other very high cost financings at considerable peril. Now since these financing schemes are not on the business side, they are paid out of the post-tax income generated by the firm (but they should have been tax deductable at firm stage itself). This is doubly onerous for the entrepreneurs. 

Treat Interest rate like friction

A better model is to think of interest rate like engineers think of friction. Some is good, too much is bad, too little is bad too. In fact friction analogy should be best suited for determining neutral rate of interest. 

Economist too think of interest rate as friction. To the economist - road mileage of the car represents growth, fuel represents capital availability or liquidity. The economists' metaphor of friction is flawed. They need to get their metaphor right.

Engineers will tell you - you need to maximize friction at the tyres and eliminate it from the engines. At the clutch and brakes too you need friction. So you need interest rates high at some places and low at some others. So Economists better figure out where you want low interest rates and where you want high interest rates. Note the question is where not when. 

In Sum

The hazards of the LIRP, ZIRP and NIRP far outweigh the benefits. These policies do not pass the smell test. We need a better understanding of interest rate as a tool for improving economic growth.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". A version of this argument was made in Subverting Capitalism back in 2010 and also posted on this blog in 2012. Nothing, it appears, has changed.

Why is resolving Non-Performing Loans (NPL) is so difficult?

The management/resolution of NPLs has acquired renewed focus with banking sector under stress for many years. The Economist comments on it this time about Italy's NPL problem. More significant is the commentary on various approaches, IMF recommendations, KKR's Pillarstone initiative etc. making it a must read. But it misses some quite important issues with respect to NPLs in general.

Failure of NPL liquidation - some blame lies with Accountants

The PwCs, EYs, Deloittes and their ilk must take some blame. Many of the bad loans have accounting folly at its heart - some deliberate and some not, some before loans are made and some after. Time and again, accounting firms have washed their hands off their audit responsibility and liabilities arising therefrom. Recently some firm has sued PwC for their failure to report material issues. If auditors completely trust the company managements they are auditing, then the purpose of the audit is not satisfied. 

The shady entrepreneurs

The proportion of shady, shifty characters in this distressed assets pool is quite high. Some distressed loan assets are deliberately impaired on the books for tax fraud or money laundering. Data mining algorithms cannot detect this - even analyst cannot easily detect this. Such frauds have to be sniffed out - at least till Artifical intelligence becomes more robust.

Slow courts and costly Alternate Dispute resolution (Arbitration, mediation etc.) mechanisms

Invariably, a fair proportion of the distressed asset pool goes for legal resolution. NPL problems are higher in countries with weaker judicial controls, higher cost dispute resolution. The process of dispute resolution quickly unravels both the ability to pay and gives a remarkbly clear insight as to the intention to repay. However if the process is too slow and too costly, it defeats the purpose. This is a problem in Italy and also in India.

Much blame lies on Incompetent Banks

The substantial blame though must lie with the bankers:

1. Lack of accounting analysis skills: Many banks which make loans cannot make proper assessment of accounting statements. Data mining algorithms are good at assessing the "ability to pay". They cannot assess the "intention to pay". Lack of Intention to Pay has created many NPLs.
2. Illogical the use of collaterals: Banks are notorious in having collateral that is highly correlated with loan asset itself, over-valued or pledged in part to many. This is a childish mistake to make for a professional setup. At times, an intellectually superior form of syndicated lending (the whole syndicate holds one collateral) is used. When trouble strikes the legal disputes arise within the syndicate itself. 
3. Poorly-constructed contracts with borrowers: Such contracts make the payments unpredictable in quantum and timing thus surprising the borrower. It quickly cascades into penalties and surcharges and it goes downhill from there.
4. Too Centralized decision making as to loan eligibility: Most borrower eligibility tests are done centrally these days. Thus it leaves no incentive for the bank manager / officer to dig deeper into the borrower's records. It makes the incentives wrongly aligned.
5. Flawed loan portfolio construction: Loan portfolios are too correlated This is a result of too much market focus. Banks push certain products that they find easy to sell - consumer loans, credit cards, personal loans etc. When the lending starts concentrating they do not quickly take corrective actions to balance the portfolio. If the banks' entire portfolio comes under stress at the same time, it cascades into more distress.

Basics of borrower assessment

Any borrower assessment has two component - ability to pay AND the commitment or the intention to pay. Sometimes the last two differentiated. The ability to pay is well understood which refers to  the capacity to bear the repayment of the loans. The intention to pay tries to determine if the borrower intends to cheat or not. The commitment to pay points to whether the borrower intends to pay  but disputes the computation of the payment and hence may have withheld the payments - committed but not paying, or the borrower does not intend to pay at all and is finding loopholes to delay the foreclosure process.

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Should banks create money?

Bloomberg has a post about centralizing money supply - whole money, as they call it. It is not a very good idea. This is not the first time such suggestions have come up. As mentioned in the article, Irving Fisher first proposed a similar plan in the wake of the great depression. Since then many have proposed this idea but not many understand money creation.

Taxonomy of centralized money creation idea

The money creation ideas are varied:

1. Gold money: This is natural money creation. No one has any control over the money creation. Previously, gold, silver, diamonds, precious stones and other valuables (and sometimes sea shells too) were used. Many serendipitous discoveries of valuables created havoc with the money supply. Discovery of Potosi in South America and thereafter further discoveries of gold and silver had the effect of expanding Spanish money supply. 
1. Not under any control: Neither governments nor banks, no one has any control over the money creation process.
2. But Non-Arbitrary: It depends on the amount of gold you have. If you want more gold, you better import more gold by giving some valuable service to the other countries  who have gold. Over time as the total amount of gold available starts reducing you need to offer more and more to the countries that have gold.
3. Though subject to Nature: If by chance you discover a gold mine, you will be filthy rich, though if you discover too much then it may unleash inflation. Spain is believed to have faced such inflation on the discovery of silver mines in the South American colonies.
4. Deflationary and restrictive: As economic activity grows it becomes too high compared to the total amount of gold available to back it. Thus it tends to slow the economic growth pace. (Don't know if that is good or bad).
5. Favours status quo, old money and advantageous to miserly: Since total value of gold you have increases with time, people tend to postpone purchases and hold on to gold. Spending happens when absolutely necessary.
6. Exploitation and Theft prone: A doctor can charge atrocious fees from a rich person because of bargaining power equations. Gold can also be stolen. Stealing credit cards is less useful.
2. Gold-backed money: Introduced to circumvent the deflationary gold currency, countries peg the value of their currency to the gold they can back it with. When people talk of gold standard they are referring to this type of money creation. 
1. Partly Government controlled: Government issues currency and states the total amount of gold they back it with. So a gold-to-dollar exchange rate is established. The government can improve its reserves and thus improve money creation. 
2. Non-arbitrary: In its pure form it is non-arbitrary and similar to gold-money.
3. Not purely nature driven but subject to shocks: Since the government has control over the amount of money and amount of gold, the money creation is not as whimsical as simply discovering a gold mountain. Governments can reset the exchange rate to compensate for some changes. But arbitrary government intervention results in shocks and disruptions.
4. Mostly deflationary: Governments cannot measure economic activity easily (yes GDP calculations are guess-work and there is no Santa Claus just in case you were wondering). That leaves money creation open to political whims and fancies and invites tampering of measurement of the economic health. Mostly governments are slow to acknowledge the real growth in economy since it is always backward looking. It realises the growth till the growth results in deflationary pressures then increases money supply and causes a spike.
5. Perception of money losing value as government reset gold rate: As total amount of product and services of value in the economy rise more than amount of gold to back it up, the government is forced to alter the gold-dollar exchange rate downward leading to people feeling that each dollar is worth lesser in terms of gold though purchasing power may be higher.
3. Government-created money: This is non-gold standard money. Simply speaking the government issues money and backs it with a promise. This is what people wrongly believe is the current regime. 
1. Full government control: The government has effective control over the process. This is a mixed bag. It depends on the government. 
2. Some central bank control: The exact control depends on how money is created, is it by using government bonds then bought to a certain extent by central banks or some other way (simply printing).
3. Depends on confidence in Government: Prudent governments enjoy advantages but if you are Zimbabwe then you will end up in trouble.
4. Inflation/deflation depends on policy: If a government print too much then it stokes inflation and too little results in deflation. Prudently executed (Milton Friedman's about 3% money supply growth) works fine.
5. Value of money depends on inflation: If the government is able to deal with money creation effectively then a mild inflation - say 2% may result. There is not too much loss in value and it can be notices only over long time frames when quality of life changes are also noticeable.
4. Money created by banks: Mostly commercial banks create money by giving loans. These loans do not exist as money. This is the most misunderstood money creation mechanism. It is distributed money creation, without extreme control. Bankers and regulators forget that its success depends on devising proper incentives. 
1. Less government control:No country uses this method exclusively. Both Government-created and bank-created money is deployed. Thus there is always government control of some sort. Also since government is also a borrower (a big one at that), it has control.
2. Part central bank control: Central bank exercises additional kind of controls in this mechanism. First, it can partner with government in its money creation process by buying government bonds etc. Second, it controls the lending to the banks and thus influences at what levels of risk do banks create money. The key word is influences and not dictates. Thus this process is often likened to "pushing at a string" (which is difficult, you can pull at a string pushing does nothing unless there is pulling at other end by the banks).
3. Control to banks: In this scenario, Banks can ALSO determine whether to create money or not. That decision is based on whether the person demanding the money will be able to repay it or not. If he can, it means he is creating value with this money and thus able to repay it. 
4. Decision at the point of demand of debt: The decision to create money is forward looking. It is made at the point the person makes a demand for the debt. That borrower is expecting to create future value. If by banks assessment that value can be generated ONLY then money is created.
5. Depends on incentives: After reading this if you wonder why banks lend for consumption goods or lend to uncreditworthy borrowers - it is because of incentives. The power to create money is substantial power and with bad incentives, it can cause systemic harm as seen in 2008 crisis.
6. Central bank oversight: Central banks have oversight duty to watch what kind of money is created by the banks. The nature of lending is supposed to be value-focussed. Some consumer lending at the time economy is entering a pro-longed boom phase can be advantageous. But in an economy which cannot sustain a prolonged growth phase, these are risky loans and their proportion needs to be limited.

My suggestion

Out of the options, I prefer the last one - a combination of bank created and government created money. It is quite forward looking and takes place at the point of demand. It needs a lot of oversight and decentralisation. I have argued that IT systems have in fact centralized the loan decision making than allow the front-line managers to make them. This has resulted in an inaccurate assessment of borrowers and partly responsible for the 2008 crises. Amar Bhide also makes a case for intelligent decision making in his book "A call for judgement".

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Is assessment of risk a function of interest rate?

The interest rate that can be charged by the bank has  two limits.

The Lower bound equals what the central bank charges the bank. Any lower and the bank will make a loss on its lending portfolio.

The Upper bound is the ability of the risk taker to bear the burden of return. Thus, if a bank lends to a business that makes 10% return on capital employed - it cannot charge more than 10% else it will be unviable for the borrower to seek the debt at all.

The Actual interest rate charged is determined by a combination of the following factors:

1. An assessment of returns of the business based on the economy and her business 
2. Income of the borrower in total 
3. The value of the collateral pledged against the loan as a security should the borrower be unable to bear that return 
4. The demand for loans AND/OR
5. How well the other loans are doing (health of bank's loan portfolio) AND/OR
6. A combination of these along with global factors

Spread

Bankers think of returns as spread they make on top of the lower bound, i.e. rate set by the central bank. 

Risk V/s Spread

Now, in the mind of the banker risk is correlated with the spread. When the banker perceives higher risk she fattens the spread. This "risk" we talk about is risk resulting to the banker. It does not mean risk of the borrower alone. So if the bankers' portfolio is turning bad, the banker will still increase the spread - partly to compensate for the loss she suffers and partly because she assesses the general economic environment to be more risky. Thus, even if the central bank reduces the benchmark interest rate, the banker is reluctant to pass it on if she can avoid it. This creates tighter conditions putting more stress on the borrower. This is why Scot Sumner argues the monetary conditions were actually tight when we were almost at ZIRP.

In an economy that is weak, it acts as a stronger head wind for borrowers. It reduces their ability to borrow and to service their current borrowing. They want to pay down their debt and reduce their loans. Therefore, the economy contracts further. The banks seem happy at first, but soon realise that other borrowers who are not prudent are pushed to default. The implication of this on the bank depends on the mechanics of the process - the proportion of those who default v/s those who pay back, the chronology in which it happens etc.

In the next phase, the economy recovers, predominantly with equity capital. Equity can absorb the losses since it is built for higher risk. The surviving firms and individuals are left with core strength to  thrive in intense competition and are more prudent with capital allocation. The banks thereafter can lend to these survivors to help them scale up.

What does this mean?

This means, 

1. There is inherent value to competitiveness that signifies its ability to survive and repay the debt and repay the equity at decent returns. This ability reduces with increasing leverage by the borrowers. Thus when Anat Admati suggests investment banks have capped leverage ratios to 20 or 10 it makes sense.
2. Banks' business model seems to encourage the use of debt only to amplify equity returns. It is fine in a way but if that is the objective then banks should reduce/cut lending at lot earlier than they do. Naturally, in times of distress when the return ON capital matters lesser than the return OF capital, banks get into big trouble. It seems they get confused about what is their business model. 
3. Maybe, better than ZIRP, unleashing a new Government-backed Good Bank to pick up assets at distressed prices at lending rates with narrow and fixed spreads can work better. If the size of this bank is large enough in relation to the banking system, it may result in a lesser shock to the economy.

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Of Free drinks and negative interest rate policy...

If soft drinks (Coke/Pepsi/tea/coffee etc.) were freely available would you tend to have more of it? Often I end up having one extra coke. If its tea/coffee I end up having even more. I will have to work it off that day through exercise or it will cause some harm in the long term. 

Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) is like that - if you already wanted Coke and it was easily available you end up having a little more Coke. Likewise, if you already wanted debt, and it was easily available at almost zero cost, then you will have a little more. But not a lot more - coz you have to work it off.

But what if you don't want them?

Say your doctor told you to not have soft drinks at all - no tea/coffee too. Now will you have that? NO? Even if I give you some money - say 2 cents - to have these soft drinks? Still NO? 

Well, me giving you some money is similar to Negative interest rate policy (NIRP). Or similar to one aspect of NIRP. You get a tiny advantage if you take on debt. Is it that difficult to understand why it doesn't work as central bankers hope?

But may be NIRP could work...

Now some will agree that ZIRP may not work, but, they say, NIRP could work. They point to the second aspect of NIRP which is that if you save you get taxed extra. Now if I have $100 in cash in a bank, next year I will have only $98 so next year I will be able to spend less than I can do today. Isn't that an incentive for spending now rather than next year? I say not always!

There are a few reasons:

1. If the trends are deflationary your $98 next year may be able to buy as much as $100 today - sometimes even more. If the efficient market hypothesis* were working prices would adjust to reflect the new purchasing power. NIRP would create some deflationary force as well. Yes, it is small but it is deflationary never the less. So unless the NIRP was creating an overwhelming inflationary force, it may push a precariously balanced economy into deflation. 
2. The NIRP tax does not affect those paying down an earlier debt. In fact, it encourages people to swap new debt for old debt. Debt repayment helps you avoid the tax. This is even more deflationary.
3. NIRP does not work if I anticipate unpredictable cash requirements - say because I want to keep some money to invest when prices correct, or I think my business loan may need to be repaid if my business does not do well in next quarter, or I expect health care costs etc. In fact, it works reverse - in such cases, I would be encouraged to save $102 or $104 just to keep a buffer.
4. NIRP may push those with huge cash balances to move cash abroad. Do you think Apple and Google will bring that extra cash into a country with NIRP? No way! They might move it to a destination where it will be easier to hold cash. So is this what you want to happen? NO! Who gets affected is the individual who keeps getting taxed extra.
5. I may not want debt or I may not want to spend at all. I have the clothes, I have the phones, computers, TV, house, car, swimming pool etc - all the goodies I can spend on when you nudged me to spend the last time. Now I have mostly everything I need. So why should I spend on something I am not excited about? Beats me!

* I don't think Efficient market hypothesis works on a "point-in-time" basis - though it works on an average basis.

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Lesson from Grexit

Grexit teaches us something fundamental.

Two Approaches to debt

There are two fundamental approaches to debt.

First is the Capitalistic Approach. It says creditors must make investment with eye on risk and should their assessment be wrong, they must take hair-cut. The counter-burden on the debtor is that debtor is forced into austerity so that they make adequate efforts to get the creditors adequate return on their investment. Thus a debtor who made a risky investment is required to pass higher hurdle in the future to prove that his new investment is not as risky. Market adjusts the risk premium to reflect borrowers prudence. A prudent borrower gets lower interest burden while a profligate borrower is required to pay higher.

Second is the Creditor Protection Approach. It protects the creditors to greater extent. The protection afforded comes from various methods. In emergency government could assume private debt (as in EU crisis private debt was assumed by ECB, in 2007-08 crisis even privately owned equity was assumed by the US government). This approach is taken when the creditors are low-risk seeking pension funds or other instrument supporting social benefits. The counter-burden here is not on the debtor, it is on the Government bailing out the creditor. The bailout is only complete if the debt burden is reduced thus, here, the Government takes the hair-cut. This is an approach that promises debt jubilee.

The essentials

We may note that hair-cut is an essential ingredient of both approaches. The question is only as to who takes the hair-cut. When ECB assumed private debt, it assumed the hair-cut as well. Denying that renders the approach useless. This is from the creditor side.

Reducing debtor's burden is also essential feature, with different extent in each model. The Capitalistic Approach favours reducing as against eliminating the debt. Thus, the debtor continues to bear the debt that he can sustainably bear. Conversely, in Creditor Protection Approach the almost the entire debt is waived. So, Greece was right to ask for debt reduction.

The Grexit Model
The EU model fares poorly against either of these approaches. It does not have any essential elements and have worse aspects of both models. It is a sort of mixed model. 

The EU/ECB dilemma is that if Greece is allowed a Debt reduction, other PIIGS will be next in line. The current mixed approach will imply that ECB will be left holding the bag for all the PIIGS. Now in a normal sovereign, the central bank and sovereign are two facets of same entity. But in EU's case it is not so - primarily because the peoples of EU are not politically united. Thus, ECB is "owned" by Germany and other non-PIIGS a different sovereign than debtors. Can peoples of EU be politically mature to forge EU into a political union? If they do it will fructify the original EU dream.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". 

Why deflationary forces are so unrelenting?

Despite good GDP numbers and PMI data the deflation does seem to give up. Here are the reasons:

1. Incomes have fallen and are not rising again: Since 2009 there has been a fall in incomes resulting from retrenchment and layoffs and consequent oversupply. While employment numbers have improved (unemployment is falling), incomes are not rising. In fact they have settled well below their previous highs.
2. Consumption goods prices continue to fall: The fall came from two sources - improved productivity (from about 1990 to about 2000) and thereafter from combination of productivity gains and exchange rate dynamics. The QE era flooded the world with low-cost  capital leading to reduced interest rates across the world. This low-cost debt is transposing low-capital-cost-but-high-running-cost human employment with high-capital-cost-but-very-low-running-cost robots. Today the US consumption good prices are still at the mercy productivity gains and exchange rate dynamics but the pressures are more aggravated. The new productivity gain mechanisms are putting exceptional pressure on employment and wages. Further the exchange rate dynamics have morphed into all out currency wars.
3. Investment goods prices are deflating too:When you reduce the interest rate, you increase the prices of assets usually by setting the yield or return scale lower thereby pushing risk-averse investors into risky assets thereby inflating asset prices. Secondly, we coupled lower interest rates with ingenious financial engineering leading to improved credit availability which also advances demand from decades ahead and packs it into short timeframes. The converse is that there is prolonged period of lacklustre demand phase. I believe we are in that phase or may be entering that phase.

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Operational vs Financial leverage

Hugh Hendry made some points at the Milken Institute conference recently, I am sure you have already seen this but this is the link anyways. 

I want to highlight one comment he made. I paraphrase here "Germany has high operational leverage and when you have high operational leverage, you want to have very little financial leverage. That is why Germany is so averse to debt."

Then he mentioned Siemens vs. P&G. Interesting comment this.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms".

Global Public Debt

Economist has, as usual, a great interactive chart about public debt. Here are two snapshots from that showing marked increase in the debt as % of GDP across the last decade. The last picture is for 2011.

Now it is interesting to note the following:

1. Some resource driven countries seemed to have reduced their debt. Some in Arabian peninsula and Russia come to mind.
2. Europe and US have increased their debts, as expected. Japan continues to have high debt over the entire decade. This could be because of two reasons - GDP falling and debt rising.
3. Britain has had it worse. It went from green to deep red. The reason again could be both GDP falling and Debt rising.
4. Now I want to have a corresponding chart of investment in drivers of GDP. I bet between 2007 and 2011 nothing has happened in this chart.

Debt is as good as the ability to pay

Debt is good if the ability to pay exists. The quantum of debt is immaterial so long as ability to pay is reasonably certain. When large amount of debt exists but ability to pay does not exist (usually it is merely broken), then creditors often offer more debt to strengthen the ability to pay. One can argue that in this case the answer to debt is more debt. More correctly, the answer to debt is a strong ability to pay.

If more debt is taken on without improving the ability to pay then it is sure a road to bankruptcy. A good way to start the process is to write down the debt acquired since 2007-08 crisis. I am sure ample data exists to understand how much was given to whom. It is no business of the tax payer to bear these costs. Corresponding treasury bills can be settled by raising equivalent debt liability on the firms receiving the money.

I am sure some will think this to be illegal. But it is not. It is just belated government action and can be ratified by respective parliaments.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms".

Jeremy Grantham knows we were warned!

Years back in 2008, I wrote a post about how Shakespeare's Polonius (from Hamlet) had good advice for us investors. Today, Jeremy Grantham, in his quarterly newsletter, discovers that very advice.

Here is my post from 2008: "How to avoid the credit crunch?"

I was really surprised when I realised that entire credit crunch and related problems were highlighted and we were warned back in 16th century itself.

For Rating Agencies
See thou character. Give thy thoughts no tongue,
Nor any unproportioned thought his act.

For investors - particularly those who misguide people on CNBC
Give every man thy ear, but few thy voice;
Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment.

For US / UK and European Consumers
Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy,

For Mortgage dealers (they heeded but CDS borrowers didnt)
Neither a borrower nor a lender be;
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,

For all market operators
This above all: to thine ownself be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man

Here is the full advice:
Yet here, Laertes! aboard, aboard, for shame!
The wind sits in the shoulder of your sail,
And you are stay'd for. There; my blessing with thee!
And these few precepts in thy memory

See thou character. Give thy thoughts no tongue,
Nor any unproportioned thought his act.

Be thou familiar, but by no means vulgar.
Those friends thou hast, and their adoption tried,
Grapple them to thy soul with hoops of steel;
But do not dull thy palm with entertainment
Of each new-hatch'd, unfledged comrade. Beware
Of entrance to a quarrel, but being in,
Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee.

Give every man thy ear, but few thy voice;
Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment.

Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy,
But not express'd in fancy; rich, not gaudy;
For the apparel oft proclaims the man,
And they in France of the best rank and station
Are of a most select and generous chief in that.

Neither a borrower nor a lender be;
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.

This above all: to thine ownself be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.
Farewell: my blessing season this in thee!

- Shakespeare in Hamlet (Lord Polonius advice to son Lartes)

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

Die Creditor Die!

Felix Salmon links upon Krugman V/s Summers debate. One of the central point about the current crisis is that how can we solve the problem of excess debt by taking on even more debt? I propose to answer this question. We can't!

To put it simply, what the Keynesian remedy is to offset short term debt with a far longer term debt -  reducing the annual payout while retaining the liability for substantially long period. The process works when you can replace the current creditor (one who is rather short-term focused) with a visionary long term creditor (or someone whose liabilities tend to stretch out for equally longer term). The new creditor bails out the previous one backstopping the losses. The new creditor needs a pretty strong liability that they propose to take to match this super-long term assets.

But we realize the folly in this option immediately. The new type of creditor is absent. The conditions are not exactly conducive for emergence of this very long term liability holder. A typical condition could be found at the beginning of the baby-boomer generation.

In reality the visionary long term creditor is same as one has super-long term liabilities. Invisible hand forces them into heroism we attribute to altruist nature. Americans (and recently Europeans) love to imagine China in all its altruist glory donning this role. Folly again my friends. 

But there is another way to reduce this debt. Let the creditor die. It sounds horrible but it is one way that is still available. When the creditor dies so do the obligations and then we have a clean slate.

That is precisely why banks or creditors should not become too concentrated. History is rife with example of creditors impaled by the mob or forced to surrender their rights. It is in the interest of creditors that there are many of them, at least more than 1%. Alas, we have not heeded history. Creditors beware!

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

Impairing household balance sheets

The western household balance sheets are substantially large. But the recent crisis has brought about serious change in asset valuations. As the assets devalue and there is a corresponding impairment in the equity or debt side of the balance sheet.  If asset devaluation reduces your loans then balance sheet quality remains unaffected. For the US housing assets, the debt side was reduced. Hence while winding down of housing reduced the size of balance sheet it could not have impaired its quality. So the problem of US housing may have been lesser than anticipated from household balance sheet point of view.

The bailout, however, shifted this burden from bank balance sheets to government balance sheets. Now, government balance sheets are fed from household and corporate incomes. Thus what was earlier a housing loan problem is now a tax problem. In other words, the problem shifted from household balance sheet to household cash-flow.

On the credit card debt will be more tricky. Credit card debt will not be reduced in usual circumstances. The hit will be on equity side, thus severely impairing the balance sheets.

The cash-inflows are reducing while the outflows remain. The bailout has added a large chunk of committed cash out flow. Households will have to find matching inflows to offset this burden. Thus there is tremendous free cash flow problem.

Increasing government inefficiency, as government gets bigger, will only add to this burden. Unlike housing loan there is no jingle-mail option for taxes. Taxes, like death, are a certainty. So the bailout has shifted what was essentially a quality-neutral adjustment into a large impairment in balance sheet quality. 

So the western households will have to go through a severe pain before consumption returns to the pre-crisis level. This problem is going to haunt us for next half a decade unless we come up with some really radical solution.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon.