Why is there is no lending in crisis?

On LinkedIn, Callum Thomas has shared a post detailing tightness in lending standards and gradual shifting to tight credit conditions.

Lending standards tighten at the exact wrong time in a crisis. Also in a crisis the ratings get downgraded en masse. When we want banks to lend, banks do not want to lend. When we want banks to stop lending, banks get busy making risky loans. This is one problem of banking regulation that has not received enough attention. 

Markets and particularly rating agencies need to appreciate the difference between Macro risk (where all aspects of the economy are impaired) v/s corporate risk (where particular company suffers impairment because of its own actions or inactions).

Credit cannot be pushed - it needs to be pulled. To achieve this, a better mechanism is interest subvention. It seems to be a much better tool when macros risks are prevalent.

An SPV which guarantees interest rate up to X% (ranging from 30-50% of lending rate - so for India it will guarantee 3% interest cost for US it could 0.75%) it should cause firms to pull credit and deploy it for productive uses.

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Rahul Prakash Deodhar, Advocate, Bombay High Court is also a private investor. He can be reached at rahuldeodhar@gmail.com, on twitter at @rahuldeodhar or at his website www.rahuldeodhar.com.

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Time Travel effect of Debt

Generally in Time Travel movies the actors go back in time to change some minor thing to alter the future dramatically. Debt does this in reverse.

Debt pulls value from future and alters the present in such a manner that more value is created in the future than estimated.

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Should banks create money?

Bloomberg has a post about centralizing money supply - whole money, as they call it. It is not a very good idea. This is not the first time such suggestions have come up. As mentioned in the article, Irving Fisher first proposed a similar plan in the wake of the great depression. Since then many have proposed this idea but not many understand money creation.

Taxonomy of centralized money creation idea

The money creation ideas are varied:

1. Gold money: This is natural money creation. No one has any control over the money creation. Previously, gold, silver, diamonds, precious stones and other valuables (and sometimes sea shells too) were used. Many serendipitous discoveries of valuables created havoc with the money supply. Discovery of Potosi in South America and thereafter further discoveries of gold and silver had the effect of expanding Spanish money supply. 
1. Not under any control: Neither governments nor banks, no one has any control over the money creation process.
2. But Non-Arbitrary: It depends on the amount of gold you have. If you want more gold, you better import more gold by giving some valuable service to the other countries  who have gold. Over time as the total amount of gold available starts reducing you need to offer more and more to the countries that have gold.
3. Though subject to Nature: If by chance you discover a gold mine, you will be filthy rich, though if you discover too much then it may unleash inflation. Spain is believed to have faced such inflation on the discovery of silver mines in the South American colonies.
4. Deflationary and restrictive: As economic activity grows it becomes too high compared to the total amount of gold available to back it. Thus it tends to slow the economic growth pace. (Don't know if that is good or bad).
5. Favours status quo, old money and advantageous to miserly: Since total value of gold you have increases with time, people tend to postpone purchases and hold on to gold. Spending happens when absolutely necessary.
6. Exploitation and Theft prone: A doctor can charge atrocious fees from a rich person because of bargaining power equations. Gold can also be stolen. Stealing credit cards is less useful.
2. Gold-backed money: Introduced to circumvent the deflationary gold currency, countries peg the value of their currency to the gold they can back it with. When people talk of gold standard they are referring to this type of money creation. 
1. Partly Government controlled: Government issues currency and states the total amount of gold they back it with. So a gold-to-dollar exchange rate is established. The government can improve its reserves and thus improve money creation. 
2. Non-arbitrary: In its pure form it is non-arbitrary and similar to gold-money.
3. Not purely nature driven but subject to shocks: Since the government has control over the amount of money and amount of gold, the money creation is not as whimsical as simply discovering a gold mountain. Governments can reset the exchange rate to compensate for some changes. But arbitrary government intervention results in shocks and disruptions.
4. Mostly deflationary: Governments cannot measure economic activity easily (yes GDP calculations are guess-work and there is no Santa Claus just in case you were wondering). That leaves money creation open to political whims and fancies and invites tampering of measurement of the economic health. Mostly governments are slow to acknowledge the real growth in economy since it is always backward looking. It realises the growth till the growth results in deflationary pressures then increases money supply and causes a spike.
5. Perception of money losing value as government reset gold rate: As total amount of product and services of value in the economy rise more than amount of gold to back it up, the government is forced to alter the gold-dollar exchange rate downward leading to people feeling that each dollar is worth lesser in terms of gold though purchasing power may be higher.
3. Government-created money: This is non-gold standard money. Simply speaking the government issues money and backs it with a promise. This is what people wrongly believe is the current regime. 
1. Full government control: The government has effective control over the process. This is a mixed bag. It depends on the government. 
2. Some central bank control: The exact control depends on how money is created, is it by using government bonds then bought to a certain extent by central banks or some other way (simply printing).
3. Depends on confidence in Government: Prudent governments enjoy advantages but if you are Zimbabwe then you will end up in trouble.
4. Inflation/deflation depends on policy: If a government print too much then it stokes inflation and too little results in deflation. Prudently executed (Milton Friedman's about 3% money supply growth) works fine.
5. Value of money depends on inflation: If the government is able to deal with money creation effectively then a mild inflation - say 2% may result. There is not too much loss in value and it can be notices only over long time frames when quality of life changes are also noticeable.
4. Money created by banks: Mostly commercial banks create money by giving loans. These loans do not exist as money. This is the most misunderstood money creation mechanism. It is distributed money creation, without extreme control. Bankers and regulators forget that its success depends on devising proper incentives. 
1. Less government control:No country uses this method exclusively. Both Government-created and bank-created money is deployed. Thus there is always government control of some sort. Also since government is also a borrower (a big one at that), it has control.
2. Part central bank control: Central bank exercises additional kind of controls in this mechanism. First, it can partner with government in its money creation process by buying government bonds etc. Second, it controls the lending to the banks and thus influences at what levels of risk do banks create money. The key word is influences and not dictates. Thus this process is often likened to "pushing at a string" (which is difficult, you can pull at a string pushing does nothing unless there is pulling at other end by the banks).
3. Control to banks: In this scenario, Banks can ALSO determine whether to create money or not. That decision is based on whether the person demanding the money will be able to repay it or not. If he can, it means he is creating value with this money and thus able to repay it. 
4. Decision at the point of demand of debt: The decision to create money is forward looking. It is made at the point the person makes a demand for the debt. That borrower is expecting to create future value. If by banks assessment that value can be generated ONLY then money is created.
5. Depends on incentives: After reading this if you wonder why banks lend for consumption goods or lend to uncreditworthy borrowers - it is because of incentives. The power to create money is substantial power and with bad incentives, it can cause systemic harm as seen in 2008 crisis.
6. Central bank oversight: Central banks have oversight duty to watch what kind of money is created by the banks. The nature of lending is supposed to be value-focussed. Some consumer lending at the time economy is entering a pro-longed boom phase can be advantageous. But in an economy which cannot sustain a prolonged growth phase, these are risky loans and their proportion needs to be limited.

My suggestion

Out of the options, I prefer the last one - a combination of bank created and government created money. It is quite forward looking and takes place at the point of demand. It needs a lot of oversight and decentralisation. I have argued that IT systems have in fact centralized the loan decision making than allow the front-line managers to make them. This has resulted in an inaccurate assessment of borrowers and partly responsible for the 2008 crises. Amar Bhide also makes a case for intelligent decision making in his book "A call for judgement".

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Is assessment of risk a function of interest rate?

The interest rate that can be charged by the bank has  two limits.

The Lower bound equals what the central bank charges the bank. Any lower and the bank will make a loss on its lending portfolio.

The Upper bound is the ability of the risk taker to bear the burden of return. Thus, if a bank lends to a business that makes 10% return on capital employed - it cannot charge more than 10% else it will be unviable for the borrower to seek the debt at all.

The Actual interest rate charged is determined by a combination of the following factors:

1. An assessment of returns of the business based on the economy and her business 
2. Income of the borrower in total 
3. The value of the collateral pledged against the loan as a security should the borrower be unable to bear that return 
4. The demand for loans AND/OR
5. How well the other loans are doing (health of bank's loan portfolio) AND/OR
6. A combination of these along with global factors

Spread

Bankers think of returns as spread they make on top of the lower bound, i.e. rate set by the central bank. 

Risk V/s Spread

Now, in the mind of the banker risk is correlated with the spread. When the banker perceives higher risk she fattens the spread. This "risk" we talk about is risk resulting to the banker. It does not mean risk of the borrower alone. So if the bankers' portfolio is turning bad, the banker will still increase the spread - partly to compensate for the loss she suffers and partly because she assesses the general economic environment to be more risky. Thus, even if the central bank reduces the benchmark interest rate, the banker is reluctant to pass it on if she can avoid it. This creates tighter conditions putting more stress on the borrower. This is why Scot Sumner argues the monetary conditions were actually tight when we were almost at ZIRP.

In an economy that is weak, it acts as a stronger head wind for borrowers. It reduces their ability to borrow and to service their current borrowing. They want to pay down their debt and reduce their loans. Therefore, the economy contracts further. The banks seem happy at first, but soon realise that other borrowers who are not prudent are pushed to default. The implication of this on the bank depends on the mechanics of the process - the proportion of those who default v/s those who pay back, the chronology in which it happens etc.

In the next phase, the economy recovers, predominantly with equity capital. Equity can absorb the losses since it is built for higher risk. The surviving firms and individuals are left with core strength to  thrive in intense competition and are more prudent with capital allocation. The banks thereafter can lend to these survivors to help them scale up.

What does this mean?

This means, 

1. There is inherent value to competitiveness that signifies its ability to survive and repay the debt and repay the equity at decent returns. This ability reduces with increasing leverage by the borrowers. Thus when Anat Admati suggests investment banks have capped leverage ratios to 20 or 10 it makes sense.
2. Banks' business model seems to encourage the use of debt only to amplify equity returns. It is fine in a way but if that is the objective then banks should reduce/cut lending at lot earlier than they do. Naturally, in times of distress when the return ON capital matters lesser than the return OF capital, banks get into big trouble. It seems they get confused about what is their business model. 
3. Maybe, better than ZIRP, unleashing a new Government-backed Good Bank to pick up assets at distressed prices at lending rates with narrow and fixed spreads can work better. If the size of this bank is large enough in relation to the banking system, it may result in a lesser shock to the economy.

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Of Free drinks and negative interest rate policy...

If soft drinks (Coke/Pepsi/tea/coffee etc.) were freely available would you tend to have more of it? Often I end up having one extra coke. If its tea/coffee I end up having even more. I will have to work it off that day through exercise or it will cause some harm in the long term. 

Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) is like that - if you already wanted Coke and it was easily available you end up having a little more Coke. Likewise, if you already wanted debt, and it was easily available at almost zero cost, then you will have a little more. But not a lot more - coz you have to work it off.

But what if you don't want them?

Say your doctor told you to not have soft drinks at all - no tea/coffee too. Now will you have that? NO? Even if I give you some money - say 2 cents - to have these soft drinks? Still NO? 

Well, me giving you some money is similar to Negative interest rate policy (NIRP). Or similar to one aspect of NIRP. You get a tiny advantage if you take on debt. Is it that difficult to understand why it doesn't work as central bankers hope?

But may be NIRP could work...

Now some will agree that ZIRP may not work, but, they say, NIRP could work. They point to the second aspect of NIRP which is that if you save you get taxed extra. Now if I have $100 in cash in a bank, next year I will have only $98 so next year I will be able to spend less than I can do today. Isn't that an incentive for spending now rather than next year? I say not always!

There are a few reasons:

1. If the trends are deflationary your $98 next year may be able to buy as much as $100 today - sometimes even more. If the efficient market hypothesis* were working prices would adjust to reflect the new purchasing power. NIRP would create some deflationary force as well. Yes, it is small but it is deflationary never the less. So unless the NIRP was creating an overwhelming inflationary force, it may push a precariously balanced economy into deflation. 
2. The NIRP tax does not affect those paying down an earlier debt. In fact, it encourages people to swap new debt for old debt. Debt repayment helps you avoid the tax. This is even more deflationary.
3. NIRP does not work if I anticipate unpredictable cash requirements - say because I want to keep some money to invest when prices correct, or I think my business loan may need to be repaid if my business does not do well in next quarter, or I expect health care costs etc. In fact, it works reverse - in such cases, I would be encouraged to save $102 or $104 just to keep a buffer.
4. NIRP may push those with huge cash balances to move cash abroad. Do you think Apple and Google will bring that extra cash into a country with NIRP? No way! They might move it to a destination where it will be easier to hold cash. So is this what you want to happen? NO! Who gets affected is the individual who keeps getting taxed extra.
5. I may not want debt or I may not want to spend at all. I have the clothes, I have the phones, computers, TV, house, car, swimming pool etc - all the goodies I can spend on when you nudged me to spend the last time. Now I have mostly everything I need. So why should I spend on something I am not excited about? Beats me!

* I don't think Efficient market hypothesis works on a "point-in-time" basis - though it works on an average basis.

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Its not a Chinese sell-off!

For the past week, global markets have taken a fancy to the slowing of Chinese economy. It could be envy of watching a defiant surge in Chinese markets without any hiccup what so ever. This story, it appears, has nothing to do with China and more to do with Yellen. China somehow was an opportune discovery. 

The American economy, its size, and its global linkages make it core factor in asset price calculations. The US is a primary exporter of capital to most of the important markets of the world. It is also usually the most important sizeable end-consumer for many including China. Comparatively China is less inter-connected.

A US asset price rerating will affect everyone.

There is a risk hierarchy of assets explicit or implicit in the mind of the investor.  When other central banks do such a thing their Government bonds move along the asset risk-hierarchy but other assets do not get impacted. When the Fed modifies the interest rates the whole hierarchy moves up - it affects all the asset classes. With the impending rate hike by one of the biggest economies in the world we are looking at asset price rerating across the world. 

Hike pushes investors into action

Generally a reduction in rates allows existing investor more room as prices tend to increase in case of the rate cut. However, when the Fed hikes the interest rates, the riskier asset prices depreciate. This effect tends to push marginal investors into selling thereby creating an opportunity for broader sell off. 

The current sell-off seems more likely to be such a sell-off. It is unlikely that this sell-off has anything to do with China. China unfortunately slowed down at that very time and to top it off indulged into some anti-market moves that further spooked the markets. Naturally that has prolonged and aggravated the current sell-off.

Meaning of slowing China

China is highly export driven economy. The GDP contribution from investments was growing substantially. Post the 2008 crises two things happened - China increased the investment spending - investment to GDP ratio was ~ 40%, and did it in face of tapering consumption demand. The underlying assumption being that China hoped developed market demand will take-off in coming years.

Had demand returned China GDP would still look robust. It means developed world demand has not returned - despite reasonable GDP growth in developed economies. THAT to my mind is a bigger scare than simply China slowing down. 

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Why deflationary forces are so unrelenting?

Despite good GDP numbers and PMI data the deflation does seem to give up. Here are the reasons:

1. Incomes have fallen and are not rising again: Since 2009 there has been a fall in incomes resulting from retrenchment and layoffs and consequent oversupply. While employment numbers have improved (unemployment is falling), incomes are not rising. In fact they have settled well below their previous highs.
2. Consumption goods prices continue to fall: The fall came from two sources - improved productivity (from about 1990 to about 2000) and thereafter from combination of productivity gains and exchange rate dynamics. The QE era flooded the world with low-cost  capital leading to reduced interest rates across the world. This low-cost debt is transposing low-capital-cost-but-high-running-cost human employment with high-capital-cost-but-very-low-running-cost robots. Today the US consumption good prices are still at the mercy productivity gains and exchange rate dynamics but the pressures are more aggravated. The new productivity gain mechanisms are putting exceptional pressure on employment and wages. Further the exchange rate dynamics have morphed into all out currency wars.
3. Investment goods prices are deflating too:When you reduce the interest rate, you increase the prices of assets usually by setting the yield or return scale lower thereby pushing risk-averse investors into risky assets thereby inflating asset prices. Secondly, we coupled lower interest rates with ingenious financial engineering leading to improved credit availability which also advances demand from decades ahead and packs it into short timeframes. The converse is that there is prolonged period of lacklustre demand phase. I believe we are in that phase or may be entering that phase.

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What we need to estimate effects of multi-country QE?

I was thinking about ways to estimate impact of QE on potential offered by different equity markets in general or asset markets in general.

Currently we do not have money inflow metrics (i.e. indexed price and volume data) for all asset classes. Nor do we have an exhaustive asset class database (types of asset classes e.g. art). Without these metrics it is difficult to construct a true impact of QE on global markets in general and specific markets in particular. Maybe someone can construct some sort of blended index.

I suspect when we do construct some quasi-indicators we will find that M3 has grown disproportionately with GDP and the difference can be explained by blended asset class inflation.

Once the global effect is understood, the specific country level effect can be understood using a parametrized gravity model. Such model will tell us how the excess liquidity will move. 

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Bank Deposits, Savings and function of Money

We will divert from our series a bit and get to an important aspect of Money which is its function.  However, Money performs two functions.

Raison d'etre of money
Money came into being to facilitate exchange of goods. Money split the old time barter (which was one transaction) into two transactions (goods-I-have for money and money for goods-I-want). This allowed for both transactions to achieve market efficiencies. Enabling transaction is the first function of Money. So money is medium of exchange. In this process Money conveys information about prices of goods. When the prices change, it conveys information about changes to the product or the environment or some other thing. This information function of money is as important as the second.

Second function of money is that of a store of value. Value of money means its purchasing power. Bank deposits are storing value. Technically, money should not be performing this function. But this function is inadvertently taken up by money when the information about the product or money itself changes the price levels and hence the purchasing power. Thus, for example, after exchanging goods-I-have for money, when I was having money with me, the price of goods-I-want halved. That means the purchasing power of money increased and thus money became more valuable.

Thus when we hold money and there is change in the information available leading to change in prices, the function of money is that of store of value.

What should money do?

1. Money should enable transactions - so it must not hinder your transactions (by credit card not being available). Or by becoming so valuable itself that people want to post-pone their transaction to get a better deal.
2. It should convey information about prices so that you can compare and match your funds, needs and compare alternative purchases (apples vs apples vs oranges etc). This information must be reasonably stable. So if I understand that price of a shirt is about $25 then tomorrow it cannot be $150 or $5 because that will create confusion. But it can be say $23 or $27 and it would not be much of problem.
3. Money has no business being store of value by itself. However, the fact remains that money remains the only way to measure value. We do not have other unit to measure it.

Douglas Rushkoff (starting about 23 min) on money should push transactions.

Use of money and current and deposit accounts

So actually, money in our current account is actually money to be used for transaction as a medium of exchange while the money we have in time-deposits or other deposit accounts is actually money as a store of value. Now if you ask any lay person, if the amount of money in both the accounts reflects this functional segregation and you will find it does not. The way we use money mixes up the two functions of money.

One way to clarify the usage is to make it clear that current account is your money awaiting transaction while deposit account is your investment into the bank. This segregation will make it clear to users what exactly they are using money as. Thus, banks should provide the analysis of expenses from the account and that should indicate a certain current account balance. The rest should be into deposit accounts.

Now, from the level of deposit insurance available to the bank, there should be disclosure about the amount of your money protected by deposit insurance. When deposit insurance is applied it must be applied to current account first and then to deposit account.

Purchasing power of the money

In an ideal case the purchasing power of the money should remain perfectly the same. If the purchasing power remains exactly the same the productivity gains will result in lowering of prices which is also termed as deflation. Now we also do not want that because in a deflationary scenario, holding money becomes lucrative as its value only increases and this affinity for money creates a hindrance in transactions. As we discussed, ideally money should not hinder transactions in any way.

To overcome this, we settle for a slight inflation. If we do it right, then the inflationary force exactly balances out the productivity gains and therefore results in no change in the prices. But such ideal outcome is not possible. So the policy maker must err in his judgement. A better side to err (it is debatable) is on the side on inflation but only ever so slight inflation.

George Selgin on Good Deflation and Bad Deflation

In Sum
The function of money and our appreciation of the function itself has policy implication. We must understand the function of money before we understand monetary policy itself.

Note: This post is derived from my book Subverting Capitalism and Democracy. You can read the book at the link below.

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George Soros - remarks on the Euro

Rocking Jude pointed towards a recent George Soros Speech about EU crisis (among other things) via Business Insider, which I believe is a must read. Here are some diverse but important issues:

1. Soros highlights "you cannot reduce the debt burden by shrinking the economy, only by growing your way out of it." which I agree with. However, those forcing the governments to austerity may do well to remember that in the end, government enjoy a kind of legitimacy that they don't. So if push comes to shove, the politicians will roast them alive and announce a victory parade while they are at it. One of the  solution to a debt crisis is to eliminate the creditor. History bears witness to many such "eliminations" (a few of them quite physical).
2. The objective of the economic studies should not be search for Newtonian-like laws but rather seeking engineering objectives of "fail safe" and "factor of safety" into regulation, policy and economic system as a whole. The current risk management system is falling woefully short.
3. Two-level currency system: An ideal currency system, I think, may be a two level currency system. A currency at the national level should signal the relative prices of goods and services in the economy. An international currency should signal the confidence in the judgement exercised in national currency. The international currency therefore decides the relative prices of currencies and thus of everything.
4. The problem of EU is that at current position it is unsustainable. It has either to go forth (towards complete integration) or go back (break-up). Mustering the political will to forth in such climate is challenging as Soros highlights.

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Krugman, Ferguson and/on Zakaria

Fareed Zakaria is one of the most insightful host and journalist. In this episode, the presents the two sides of Austerity vs. Stimulus debate. I have already presented my thoughts about Austerity vs. Stimulus.

I want to make a few comments.

First, only certainty can fight uncertainty. In times of uncertainty, like today, the objective of policy is to increase certainty. So a roadmap for reform and policy changes for 10 years and a political consensus (bipartisan or multi-party political consensus as applicable in each nation) and commitment is essential. So Niall Ferguson is spot on with this point. I believe any reasonable certainty will work rather than a specific austerity oriented certainty.

Second, we can kill certainty by acting without a plan - or let me rephrase - by appearing to act without a plan. Conversely, just by acting decisively you can create certainty. I believe the US president should split his speech into two parts - the unchanging goals and course correcting strategies. In both aspects he should communicate decisive action communicating certainty. A plan will definitely help.

Third, Krugman is correctly pointing out that stimulus has not reached the masses. The objective of stimulus, to my mind, was to create income certainty. Whatever the reason, the stimulus has failed to achieve this objective. In this aspect, I think Keynes is being misunderstood and then derided for what may be out-of-context interpretation of his ideas.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon