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Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts

Monday, May 06, 2019

Comments on Ray Dalio's post on Monetary Policy 3 and MMT


Ray Dalio's comments are always well researched and interesting. For starters, I think, Principles for navigating Big Debt Crises is must read. (Its free PDF). His recent post on his LinkedIn blog is about Monetary Policy 3.0 and MMT

Some fundamental comments about present crisis:

  1. QE only creates a space for fiscal response: Central banks and governments alike misunderstood the role of monetary policy in the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis was different than others we have faced since Great Depression. Per my reading of Keynes (which seems to different than Keynesians and neo-Keynesians both), in such crises, the proper response has to be from fiscal side. The monetary policy merely creates space for the fiscal response or accommodates the fiscal response preventing untoward consequences. The response had to be holistic - a coordinated and sustained monetary and fiscal policy response.
  2. Fiscal policy amplification mechanism is broken: Broken may be a harsh word, we may choose "has become messy" in its place. The point is, fiscal policy needs an amplification mechanism. When government starts infrastructure spending, it needs some real value-creating sector to take it from there and start driving the economic engine. At present we do not have such "real value-creating sector" that can boost employments and wages generally. In 1980s we had tech, in 2000s we had internet, now we need something. In absence of a big driver, we need many small ones. If such capability is difficult to create in one sector it is quite difficult to create in more than one sectors too. The solution is to let inherent advantages play out.
  3. Inherent advantages are muzzled: Inherent advantages have stopped driving international trade since east asian crisis, and at a larger scale with China's entry to WTO. Instead, we have pegged exchange rates (soft/hard/overt/covert), manipulated tariff and non-tariff barriers, and, in general, non-transparent trade policy. Until that is fixed we cannot have trade based on pure competitive advantage.
  4. Small business innovations are indefensible: When people talk of China usurping Intellectual property they usually talk about submarine plans etc. But I am talking of something very basic. Check out new funding projects on kickstarter - innovative shoes, innovative bags, innovative pens, anything that takes your fancy. Just search on alibaba or just wait for few months you will see some products like those (invented by kickstarter entrepreneurs) in the market on mass scale. These products are not sold by those companies who invented them on kickstarter or such platforms. This is IP theft that hurts the most. It removes new business competitiveness right at its infancy.
  5. Trickle-up always works; trickle down some times: Monetary policy practitioners and academic economists in general prefer trickle down economics. But empirical evidence says reverse is true. Trickle-up works all the time. Thus, when there is a choice of bail out, we must lean to lower strata. (A) It is more fair and just, (B) better optics and (C) right incentives. But MAIN reason it works because it balances the bargaining power of both sides. Bail out the top and they lean on to regulation to prevent or constrict trickle down stifling the economy. Bail out the bottom and lo and behold all the incentives align beautifully.
  6. Certainty of employment and wages is the one super-indicator: The best solution to any crisis is to get certainty of employment and wages going, rest follows from that. Today we have almost full employment but it is uncertain. Wage predictability is also uncertain. That's why the lack of demand is so persistent.
  7. Interest Rates are like friction: Too much and too little friction are both bad. Sames goes for interest rates too much is bad, too little is ALSO bad.

Some comments about Monetary Policy 3:

  1. Debt financed Fiscal spending financed by QE: I don't agree with Ray Dalio that this was pursued after 2008 financial crisis. The fiscal spending was essentially going to the same group who could access the QE funds. Yes, there was fiscal deficit and increased fiscal spending and yes there was QE to finance it. But this is exactly the wrong kind of stimulus as I have written since 2009 itself.
  2. Giving $10,000 to one person Vs $100 to 100 persons Vs $1 to 10,000 people: Helicopter money is not easy to design. The behavioral response in each of three cases varies drastically.The range of outcomes possible is mind boggling.
  3. Spending conditions interfere political rights: If I am tasked to spend $10,000 can I give it to someone from my family to pay down her loan? Does that amount to spending? Should I buy something? What thing? These questions are difficult to answer, monitor and control. 
  4. A little inflation is necessary: People will spend when they can surely afford it (condition above - certainty of employment and wages) and it will get costlier tomorrow. Inflation is important, zero inflation may not be that great.

The examples of Monetary policy 3.0: 

The best part of the analysis is the historical perspective Ray Dalio gives. Sharp readers of this blog will immediately note that there are fundamental differences between the conditions in various situations described and those existing now. That is acceptable difference.

Particularly interesting is the Roosevelt response in 1930s. It still forms the basic template for solution today. However, we are at a slightly different position today than in 1930s. So we have to make more adjustments than Dalio may seem to suggest. [Dalio is NOT suggesting it - it appears simple but it is incredibly complex - politically, fiscally and economically]

In Sum

Do not understand these comments as put down of Ray Dalio (as if he cares what I think!). I admire the man because he is being honest and creating a framework to solve the crisis. Good intentions and honest efforts deserve praise - even if the guy making those efforts is one of the richest.


Wednesday, January 02, 2013

NYT Chart GDP, stock markets for key countries 2008-2012


Super chart from NYT about GDP, stock markets for key countries between 2008-2012. Following points of interest:
  1. Remarkable correlation between markets with different GDP movements. To me that points to singularity in source of money pushing the markets.
  2. Indonesian markets are substantially bullish. Someone must have made a ton of money there. Conversely, it signals time ripe for reversion.
  3. Britain stands out among those countries with declining or negative GDP and stands with US and Germany rather than Japan, Italy or Spain. Again remarkable correlation between Italy and Spain surprised that there is no time difference in the moves since their economic future will not be as coincidently timed as their markets.


Friday, August 06, 2010

Will Japanese Investment Overseas decline?

A consistent overseas investment by Japan was a critical phenomenon since the early 90s. Thanks to low interest rates at home and relatively benign economic growth outlook, Japanese were (to an extent) forced to invest overseas. 

Over the 90s Annaul Japanese overseas investment averaged $20 billion. In the first half of this decade, it inched up to about $ 30 billion. However, over the past five years it has accelerated from $50 billion to $ 100 billion in 2008. The net overseas investment reached a peak in 2008 and came off in 2009 according to recent report titled Japanese FDI: Recent Trends and Outlook Investment overseas by Japan institute of Overseas Investment.  It begets one question.

Will Japanese FDI reduces substantially or even reverses?
A lot of factors that contributed to Japanese investments have changed.
  • Japanese domestic economic climate may be about to change. We are not sure whether it will recover or fall into a depression, but it is unlikely that the economy will amble along directionless in the next decade.
  • The age profile and dependancy ratio has weakened over the years. At some point it will change from creating a pension and savings pool to using it. Thereafter we may see a draw on pensions and savings funds.
  • There is also a higher global uncertainty to deal with. 
So what?
With about $100 billion at stake, I was about to dismiss Japanese investments as marginal. These days scams and Ponzi schemes run into trillions. But that is not true. 
  • $ 100 billion is a substantially large FDI investment, it is almost size of a small country. 
  • There are bound to repercussions for a capital-starved world economy. World economy is capital starved with large-scale frauds and write-offs and thus a bit more vulnerable than otherwise. The sovereign balance sheets are stretched to the breaking point.  In many countries bond vigilantes are doing their proverbial dance of death. 
  • China may take up the slack with its large surplus. However, people are wary of Chinese influence.
In Sum
While it may not be earth-shattering, but changing preferences in Japanese investments is bound to have some impact on global economy. We need to understand it better.