Why is resolving Non-Performing Loans (NPL) is so difficult?

The management/resolution of NPLs has acquired renewed focus with banking sector under stress for many years. The Economist comments on it this time about Italy's NPL problem. More significant is the commentary on various approaches, IMF recommendations, KKR's Pillarstone initiative etc. making it a must read. But it misses some quite important issues with respect to NPLs in general.

Failure of NPL liquidation - some blame lies with Accountants

The PwCs, EYs, Deloittes and their ilk must take some blame. Many of the bad loans have accounting folly at its heart - some deliberate and some not, some before loans are made and some after. Time and again, accounting firms have washed their hands off their audit responsibility and liabilities arising therefrom. Recently some firm has sued PwC for their failure to report material issues. If auditors completely trust the company managements they are auditing, then the purpose of the audit is not satisfied. 

The shady entrepreneurs

The proportion of shady, shifty characters in this distressed assets pool is quite high. Some distressed loan assets are deliberately impaired on the books for tax fraud or money laundering. Data mining algorithms cannot detect this - even analyst cannot easily detect this. Such frauds have to be sniffed out - at least till Artifical intelligence becomes more robust.

Slow courts and costly Alternate Dispute resolution (Arbitration, mediation etc.) mechanisms

Invariably, a fair proportion of the distressed asset pool goes for legal resolution. NPL problems are higher in countries with weaker judicial controls, higher cost dispute resolution. The process of dispute resolution quickly unravels both the ability to pay and gives a remarkbly clear insight as to the intention to repay. However if the process is too slow and too costly, it defeats the purpose. This is a problem in Italy and also in India.

Much blame lies on Incompetent Banks

The substantial blame though must lie with the bankers:

1. Lack of accounting analysis skills: Many banks which make loans cannot make proper assessment of accounting statements. Data mining algorithms are good at assessing the "ability to pay". They cannot assess the "intention to pay". Lack of Intention to Pay has created many NPLs.
2. Illogical the use of collaterals: Banks are notorious in having collateral that is highly correlated with loan asset itself, over-valued or pledged in part to many. This is a childish mistake to make for a professional setup. At times, an intellectually superior form of syndicated lending (the whole syndicate holds one collateral) is used. When trouble strikes the legal disputes arise within the syndicate itself. 
3. Poorly-constructed contracts with borrowers: Such contracts make the payments unpredictable in quantum and timing thus surprising the borrower. It quickly cascades into penalties and surcharges and it goes downhill from there.
4. Too Centralized decision making as to loan eligibility: Most borrower eligibility tests are done centrally these days. Thus it leaves no incentive for the bank manager / officer to dig deeper into the borrower's records. It makes the incentives wrongly aligned.
5. Flawed loan portfolio construction: Loan portfolios are too correlated This is a result of too much market focus. Banks push certain products that they find easy to sell - consumer loans, credit cards, personal loans etc. When the lending starts concentrating they do not quickly take corrective actions to balance the portfolio. If the banks' entire portfolio comes under stress at the same time, it cascades into more distress.

Basics of borrower assessment

Any borrower assessment has two component - ability to pay AND the commitment or the intention to pay. Sometimes the last two differentiated. The ability to pay is well understood which refers to  the capacity to bear the repayment of the loans. The intention to pay tries to determine if the borrower intends to cheat or not. The commitment to pay points to whether the borrower intends to pay  but disputes the computation of the payment and hence may have withheld the payments - committed but not paying, or the borrower does not intend to pay at all and is finding loopholes to delay the foreclosure process.

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Of Free drinks and negative interest rate policy...

If soft drinks (Coke/Pepsi/tea/coffee etc.) were freely available would you tend to have more of it? Often I end up having one extra coke. If its tea/coffee I end up having even more. I will have to work it off that day through exercise or it will cause some harm in the long term. 

Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) is like that - if you already wanted Coke and it was easily available you end up having a little more Coke. Likewise, if you already wanted debt, and it was easily available at almost zero cost, then you will have a little more. But not a lot more - coz you have to work it off.

But what if you don't want them?

Say your doctor told you to not have soft drinks at all - no tea/coffee too. Now will you have that? NO? Even if I give you some money - say 2 cents - to have these soft drinks? Still NO? 

Well, me giving you some money is similar to Negative interest rate policy (NIRP). Or similar to one aspect of NIRP. You get a tiny advantage if you take on debt. Is it that difficult to understand why it doesn't work as central bankers hope?

But may be NIRP could work...

Now some will agree that ZIRP may not work, but, they say, NIRP could work. They point to the second aspect of NIRP which is that if you save you get taxed extra. Now if I have $100 in cash in a bank, next year I will have only $98 so next year I will be able to spend less than I can do today. Isn't that an incentive for spending now rather than next year? I say not always!

There are a few reasons:

1. If the trends are deflationary your $98 next year may be able to buy as much as $100 today - sometimes even more. If the efficient market hypothesis* were working prices would adjust to reflect the new purchasing power. NIRP would create some deflationary force as well. Yes, it is small but it is deflationary never the less. So unless the NIRP was creating an overwhelming inflationary force, it may push a precariously balanced economy into deflation. 
2. The NIRP tax does not affect those paying down an earlier debt. In fact, it encourages people to swap new debt for old debt. Debt repayment helps you avoid the tax. This is even more deflationary.
3. NIRP does not work if I anticipate unpredictable cash requirements - say because I want to keep some money to invest when prices correct, or I think my business loan may need to be repaid if my business does not do well in next quarter, or I expect health care costs etc. In fact, it works reverse - in such cases, I would be encouraged to save $102 or $104 just to keep a buffer.
4. NIRP may push those with huge cash balances to move cash abroad. Do you think Apple and Google will bring that extra cash into a country with NIRP? No way! They might move it to a destination where it will be easier to hold cash. So is this what you want to happen? NO! Who gets affected is the individual who keeps getting taxed extra.
5. I may not want debt or I may not want to spend at all. I have the clothes, I have the phones, computers, TV, house, car, swimming pool etc - all the goodies I can spend on when you nudged me to spend the last time. Now I have mostly everything I need. So why should I spend on something I am not excited about? Beats me!

* I don't think Efficient market hypothesis works on a "point-in-time" basis - though it works on an average basis.

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Hussman's timing may be wrong again!

John Hussman predicts epic stock crash in his recent newsletter. He says:

The financial markets are establishing an extreme that we expect investors will remember for the remainder of history, joining other memorable peers that include 1906, 1929, 1937, 1966, 1972, 2000 and 2007.

He follows up with another gem:

Enlightened members of the FOMC should even question the theoretical basis for their actions. The Phillips Curve is actually a scarcity relationship between unemployment and real wage inflation – basically, labor scarcity raises wages relative to the price of other goods (see Will The Real Phillips Curve Please Stand Up and the instructive chart from former Fed governor Richard Fisher in Eating our Seed Corn). That’s the only variant of the Phillips Curve that actually holds up in the data, and there is no evidence that this or other variants can be reliably manipulated through monetary changes.

Only long-term sustainable, predictable employment creates a turnaround. Till this I agree with him. Now comes the crucial issue of timing. Here he says:

They want to believe that the Federal Reserve has their backs; that as long as the Fed doesn’t explicitly hike interest rates, the market will move higher indefinitely. We saw one question last week that asked “What if the Fed doesn’t raise rates for another 20 years?” Let’s start with an aggressive, optimistic estimate. If we assume that despite conditions warranting two decades of zero interest rates, nominal GDP and corporate revenues will grow at their long-term historical norm of 6% annually over the coming 20 years, we would expect the total return of the S&P 500 to average about 5.5% annually over the next two decades (see Ockham’s Razor and the Market Cycle for the arithmetic behind these estimates). Even in this optimistic scenario, to imagine that this path would be smooth would have no basis in history, requiring the absence of any external shock for the entire period (and I’ve already demonstrated, I hope, that many of the worst market declines in history have been accompanied by Federal Reserve easing).

If Fed hikes, it will interfere with the risk equation causing "a breakdown in market internals" as Hussman calls it causing precipitation. But it is unlikely that Fed will hike. Fed may experiment with a token hike but may quickly reverse. Or, more likely, Fed will signal a prolonged pause (lasting more than a year or two). 

If Fed does not hike, things won't be as simple as 5.5% annual growth. It will be more. The past data behind this calculations comes from low monetary expansion era. When there is a flood of money, prices should inflate commensurately. Thus, if Fed does not hike,  S&P may average annual growth of ~10% or more for few years. 

Hence, S&P may double from here before Hussman's prediction comes true. We, no doubt, are establishing an extreme. We are confounded by its extremity.

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What we need to estimate effects of multi-country QE?

I was thinking about ways to estimate impact of QE on potential offered by different equity markets in general or asset markets in general.

Currently we do not have money inflow metrics (i.e. indexed price and volume data) for all asset classes. Nor do we have an exhaustive asset class database (types of asset classes e.g. art). Without these metrics it is difficult to construct a true impact of QE on global markets in general and specific markets in particular. Maybe someone can construct some sort of blended index.

I suspect when we do construct some quasi-indicators we will find that M3 has grown disproportionately with GDP and the difference can be explained by blended asset class inflation.

Once the global effect is understood, the specific country level effect can be understood using a parametrized gravity model. Such model will tell us how the excess liquidity will move. 

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Money Supply and GDP growth

Here is a chart I made showing money supply v/s GDP growth of top 4 developed economies. Tell me what do you think about this.

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Irrational Exuberance in Asia - Ghosts of Greenspan in India and China

William Pesek writes an interesting column about easy monetary policies (relatively) in Asia. The central point in the article is that there is a distinct need for reform in Asia; the reform is structural - fiscal and political in nature; the reform is ignored and monetary policy is being used to boost "sentiment"; this cannot last.

I agree with the undertone of the article though there are few distinctions I would draw:

1. The outline of reform in Asia Ex-Japan is well known. 
1. It is a well-trodden path by the developed economies. 
2. What is lacking is either the political will or weaker systems that need reform.
3. For political will there has to be some margin in growth. This margin was afforded by a developed country demand for developing country goods.
2. The other reason Central bankers of developing countries are a bit easy with the punch-bowl refills is because the principle strategy for growth is by tagging on to the developed country band-wagon and compete on differentials. 
1. This strategy requires competitive exchange rate mechanisms while maintaining investment-ability in countries assets.
2. The so-called monetary tightness / monetary reform have been triggered by either of these two requirements.
3. Thus, central bankers must keep relative position with developed country monetary policy and amongst each other. Thus if one developing country does QE then it becomes imperative for others to follow in order to maintain export competitiveness.
4. Changing track from this strategy is difficult during good times and becomes almost impossible when the developed markets are going through a weak economic growth phase.
5. Even Japan is attached to this strategy.

Thus the irrational exuberance carries forward from US monetary policy. It cannot be attributed to developing countries. What can be blamed on developing countries is their lack of will to develop an alternative model that can sustain the dreams and aspirations of their peoples.

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George Soros - remarks on the Euro

Rocking Jude pointed towards a recent George Soros Speech about EU crisis (among other things) via Business Insider, which I believe is a must read. Here are some diverse but important issues:

1. Soros highlights "you cannot reduce the debt burden by shrinking the economy, only by growing your way out of it." which I agree with. However, those forcing the governments to austerity may do well to remember that in the end, government enjoy a kind of legitimacy that they don't. So if push comes to shove, the politicians will roast them alive and announce a victory parade while they are at it. One of the  solution to a debt crisis is to eliminate the creditor. History bears witness to many such "eliminations" (a few of them quite physical).
2. The objective of the economic studies should not be search for Newtonian-like laws but rather seeking engineering objectives of "fail safe" and "factor of safety" into regulation, policy and economic system as a whole. The current risk management system is falling woefully short.
3. Two-level currency system: An ideal currency system, I think, may be a two level currency system. A currency at the national level should signal the relative prices of goods and services in the economy. An international currency should signal the confidence in the judgement exercised in national currency. The international currency therefore decides the relative prices of currencies and thus of everything.
4. The problem of EU is that at current position it is unsustainable. It has either to go forth (towards complete integration) or go back (break-up). Mustering the political will to forth in such climate is challenging as Soros highlights.

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Sticky Wages, Prices and effects of pouring money

Scott Sumner has a post about pouring of money - i.e. effects of expanding money supply. He disagrees with the metaphor that money pours into certain asset classes. While I agree with the principles behind Scott Sumner's post, I find most of times the metaphors send better signals for interpretation. But my main point is about prices and wages.

Prices and wages are embodiment of information - historical, present and future. If they change too quickly then the historical aspect is lost. For better or worse, our scale of value are anchored to the past. It does get influenced by present and to a less degree by expectations of future. But if we lose our anchor point or the reference scale then our mental models collapse and we lose our sense of reality. Thus, if we get paid $30,000 in year 1, $3,000 in year 2 and $3million in the next year, we will develop a sense of confusion.

Then comes the question of pouring. What pouring refers to is change in the relative value of asset classes. Imagine a spread of assets along a value spectrum, sort of a hierarchy (with sometimes assets jointly occupying a hierarchal position). 

If money increase does not modify the hierarchy then it does not impact much. If it does then it creates gainers and losers just because money is created. For example, if a really thirsty person would rather be just under the tap than away where water will eventually get to him. 

The argument therefore is whether the government or central bankers be allowed to create such distortion that has no grounding of productivity or real value creation.

One can argue that over long term the asset hierarchy goes back to a certain mean. But during the time a distortion is set in motion and the time we get back to time-tested mean we can extract advantage. Finance is prepping to do just that.

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Identifying Asset bubbles

Recently, Scott Sumner and Arnold Kling blogged about asset bubbles. Scott Sumner post is about bubble deniers and how cognitive bias affects our assessment of about predicting bubbles. Arnold Kling takes one central point out of the Sumner argument - how to define a bubble. I think he views Prof. Sumner's post narrowly but his own definition is fabulous. That got me thinking about predicting asset bubbles. Let me explain it. The underlying principle Mr. Kling uses is this:

Asset profitability = rental rate + appreciation - interest cost

The logic is, so long as the asset profitability is positive at given price, the price is justified and hence not in a bubble territory. Let me distill the equation a bit more. I am simplifying here but, rental rate represents income from asset, appreciation represents rate of price appreciation and interest cost represents cost of capital. We also need to remember that that the equation deal in expectations. So asset profitability is expected asset profitability, rental rate is expected rental rate and so on. Further, to be consistent with units, we have to use rates (first derivatives) everywhere. Thus we have,

Asset Profitability = rental rate + Rate of appreciation - weighted average cost of capital (or WACC)

Hence, the limiting condition for asset profitability is,

Rental rate + Rate of Appreciation > WACC

Mr. Kling suggests that prices are in bubble territory when

Rate of Appreciation > WACC (given Rental rate > = 0)

Interpreting the asset bubble condition
Please examine the equation for bubble condition. There is no variable called price. Is it a surprise that the equation, as distilled does not involve absolute prices  or price income ratio or other related variable at all? Well the equation leads us to very important conclusions.

First, we understand the influence of interest rate on asset bubbles. We understand why raising interest rate pricks bubbles. It increases the RHS of the bubble condition. Now raising interest rate or cost of debt by 1% will increase cost of equity by more than 1%. Thus WACC will increase in relative proportion. We must note that WACC is very difficult to determine at a macro level - for the entire market. WACC also increases when risk perception of the environment increases thus popping bubbles. That may be the reason why extraneous events that affect the risk perception for capital pops bubbles and cools asset prices.

Second, asset prices move within a spectrum. Do note the way equation is derived. It shows us how asset price rise, initiated by fundamentals, moves into bubble territory. At one end of the spectrum are assets that depreciate - like machinery. The decision to buy them depends on how much rental rate (or income from that assets) exceeds the WACC. If the rental rate covers the depreciation(1) then assets become profitable. At the other end of the spectrum are assets where Rate of Appreciation is greater than WACC. I expect price of every asset moves within such a spectrum, from the rental rate covering for WACC and depreciation on lower side to the bubble zone where rate of appreciation exceeds WACC.

Third, asset bubbles can be identified by relative prices. The equation helps us understand if the prices we pay are bubble prices or genuine prices for our point of view. We cannot determine if the market as a whole is in a bubble territory or not. To know if markets as whole are in bubble we again go back to two principles. First is the notion that it is difficult for a market participant to estimate market WACC. Second represents the ability to stack assets in order of hierarchy based on rental rate. For any given WACC we can determine relative price hierarchy and thus estimate if rate of appreciation is higher than WACC.


Note:
(1) Here we must understand the difference between financial definition of depreciation and effective depreciation that includes maintenance and upkeep costs. Firms use factory maintenance programs to reduce the effective rate of depreciation.

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