Why does Lloyd Blankfein's interview with Fareed Zakaria sounds weird to me?

Fareed Zakaria interviewed Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs, for his GPS program. Here is the video. There are so many weird things with this one. But I came away ith a feeling that if Elizabeth Warren were to cross-examine him in Court, Lloyd Blankfein would be toast. But first watch this (transcript of full show here):

The interview basically talks about few key concepts:

1. State of the Economy
2. Accountability of top management of Banks - context of Wells Fargo scam.
3. Closeness with Clintons
4. Why wouldn't Hillary Clinton release the transcripts of the talks at Goldman Sachs

I found many weird things. Let us look at the interview in detail (highlights and in-quote comments are all mine).

I start from first question leaving hi's and hello's out.

ZAKARIA: From your vantage point, what does the economy look like? You know, how strong is growth? Because it still seems steady but tepid. 

BLANKFEIN: Well, it feels steady but tepid. But that being said, it is steady and there are a lot of advantages that the U.S. economy has. So for example, the consumer has deleveraged banks -- the banking system is in excellent shape. If you look at energy, there's a lot of tailwind in the U.S. economy and the fact of the matter is, we went through a big trauma, which included a banking system trauma and it took a while to work itself through. So the answer is, it's tepid but we're definitely growing and it's established, and the latter point is the more significant point. 

This is the first question. Nothing special here. Though as a CEO of Goldman Sachs I would have expected Blankfein to be sharper about his analysis. Instead he comes across as pedestrian.

"Banking is in excellent shape" is the wrong thing to say if you ask me, particularly in the world which wants your head. He could have said Banks are in much better position to support entrepreneurial activity - small businesses and the like, than the time just after the crisis. That will kickstart recovery.

Look at this first part:

ZAKARIA: A lot of people say, though, there's a lot of economic anxiety. People don't feel like these numbers are right, that unemployment is down, but at the same time, you know -- so for some reason, they remain as great sense of economic anxiety, what do you attribute that to? 

BLANKFEIN: Well, I'd say, there's economic anxiety but I'd say there's a more generalize anxiety and a very negative sentiment and I think it's fed and feeds into the political cycle. I have trouble explaining. If you look at the metrics, you talk about unemployment -- unemployment is not just down, we're virtually at full employment.   

Now, you'd say that there's some degree of underemployment or wage (earning) that was always the case. 

I'm not minimizing the consequence to people who should have -- who feel their jobs should be higher paid and legitimately so, and the legitimate issues about minimum wages, but at the end of the day, these problems always existed to some extent. They're less -- people should feel better than they may actually do. I'm not saying they should feel good or there aren't challenges to try to surmount or other objectives to strife for. But the sentiment is a lot worse than the economy.  [Mr. Blankfein, you just trivialized the problems facing normal people across the world who have never felt this way before]

If you knew all the numbers and you are teleported here from two years ago or three years ago and you're told where employment was, where the price of energy was. What the federal deficit was looking like is a percentage of GDP, the strength of the consumer, a lot of other metrics and you heard that. You would think that sentiment would be a lot better than it is today. 

Blankfein sounds like he meant people should stop whining. They are whining for no reason. The people are unhappy because their jobs (a) don't pay them as much as they think they deserve, (b) their jobs cannot be counted on as stable for forseable future, (c) they do not see Government or policy makers doing anything to help the situation AND more importantly (d) they see policy makers going to great lengths in aiding bankers to create more profit through dubious policies when they don't seem to need any help. In this context, Blankfein comes across very insensitive.

Under-employment was always the case? Really? Not correct! It is one thing to argue that the wages were unreasonably high and they have come to normal or that there was over-employment and now it has reverted to mean. But this plain denial. 

To how many did the comment "and I think it's fed and feeds into the political cycle" sounded like he started to blame the US FED and then turned it elsewhere? It did to me. I know it is sly to infer that. But if he wanted to say "anxiety is fed by the political cycle and also feeds the political cycle" then he should have been more clearer. He is CEO of Goldman Sachs, you should speak deliberately and precisely, and more so when you speak to the media. Didn't he get media training? He can't give excuses.

We continue:

ZAKARIA: The one thing that people are sure of still is that they are suspicious of the banks. If you listen to Donald Trump, you know, he varies on lots of different things but the one consistent thing he keeps hitting is that the banks are bad, that they're in cahoots, that they're -- you know, the big banks are part of the group of things he attacks, big media, big government, you know, the Clinton machine, the banks and he always gets wild cheers.   

BLANKFEIN: Well, I think you're being generous. I think it's not suspicious, it's outright accusations and it's not just Donald Trump, you know, frankly. I mean, I don't like telling -- I don't like the fact that I don't like saying it to you but, you know, we're not -- at times, people think of us as, you know, bankers is tone deaf. Believe me, I read the papers everyday and I hear it.  [what are you so stressed about? There is nothing you can't like telling the media that they are unfairly targetted]

Look, variety of reasons. Let me just start out. One of which is, I think, some of the behaviors that have been, you know, highlighted and visited, you know, are real and justify some negative response. And then, other parts of it are just a general -- and I don't want to minimize it so let me pause for a second and say, there has been -- bankers have played an important role in the system, generally, get rewarded for the risks they take. And some of those risks were poorly managed and some of the behaviors were not, you know, recorded as bad behavior. And so, there's a legitimate reaction to that, full stop.
[Ok, Good! That is true - good to admit it.]

Other things also -- let me tell you, bankers are no better at predicting the future than anybody else. And most of what we do are trying to get the future right, trying to make good decisions of how to allocate capital, trying to lend money to people who pay you back, trying to finance winners and not finance losers and guess what, you don't always get it right and you get drawn into the same mistakes and the same confusion that anybody would and everybody does in connection with their efforts to try to figure out what the future is going to be. [This has been debunked, ridiculed so many times cannot believe Blankfein is using this defence.]

So, good to have Blankfein admit that there are bad apples. These bad apples should be punished heavily - in accordance with law. That is where a leader would take it. Blankfein could also say because it is such a complex system ascribing blame is very difficult and it takes time. But Banks don't want bad apples in their system as much as the general public does. 

But then for weird reason, he starts defending bad behaviour. I doubt people think the "bad apples" Blankfein referred to were only people making mistakes. People know you are talking of the cheats. People simply want you to say "we are finding the cheats and sending them to jail". To the lawyer in me, this volunteering of information looks suspicious.

ZAKARIA: One of the criticisms people make about the banks which is playing itself out with this Wells Fargo affair is banks make mistakes. They do bad things. They do things they shouldn't have done and they pay fines in a sense admitting the wrongdoing, whether or not technically they do but nobody at the top gets held accountable. Goldman Sachs has paid fines. Do you think that's a fair criticism? 

BLANKFEIN: I would -- well, let me just say, first of all, I can't own or comment on Wells Fargo situation, you know, I could apply it in abstract. Everyone is looking for someone to hold accountable but sometimes -- the answer is -- look, the short answer is you would like to ascribe malevolence to everything that goes wrong. 

Now there is bad behavior. Someone has cheated or this fraud, well, that's the remedies for that and people go to jail for that. [Para added by me] 

But sometimes, people are just wrong. And they're wrong about things within their area of expertise because I may be in finance and you may be a political scientist but I have views about political science and I may be right, you may have views about where the financial markets are going, you may be right. You just don't know.  

And sometimes, what's going on here is that people are trying to prescribe malevolence for people who were wrong and the evidence that they were simply wrong is look how much money they lost. And at the end of the day, if you still think that their behavior was off, to be punished the way people are saying they should be punished, you still have to find some kind of a criminal intent. 

You know, to this day maybe the law shouldn't be this way. But stupidity is not a crime. Sometimes it's even a defense because if you're merely wrong and you didn't get it right, it's hard to ascribe criminality.

ZAKARIA: But some of the cases -- and again, I know you can't comment about Wells Fargo particularly but there are some cases where it wasn't just being wrong. 

BLANKFEIN: Sure. If there's bad behavior, then bad behavior should be punished. Look, there was nothing -- it was not criminality but there were civil wrongs in Goldman Sachs which we, you know, paid fines with respect to which we paid fines. And so that punishment -- but you're asking something different. You're asking -- 

ZAKARIA: I'm saying that the public sentiment seems to be and you see in the words of Elizabeth Warren which is why the people at the top not held accountable.  

BLANKFEIN: Well, I think people should be held accountable for what they're responsible for. In other words, if somebody has a duty and they didn't fulfill their duty, well, that's a civil wrong.  [Legally correct - but wrong context]

You can fine somebody. The idea, going further and saying there should be criminality, you still have to -- you still have to commit a crime to be a criminal. And to commit a crime, you still have to have some level of intent for what you're doing. So we're talking very abstractly here.  [Legally very smart]

And so I'm not saying look, I'm a citizen, also. Any time there's some malfeasance, I would love to see a head roll, but you have to -- can't -- but once the head starts to roll, it's no longer an abstraction for the person whose shoulders it was on. They have to really have -- there has to be a crime. [Para added here] 

And I -- listen, we were investigated. The people who investigated us, and others, presumably, you know, we were very, very -- a subject of a lot of focus. I would have to say that people looked at a lot of behaviors. And if there was no -- and I'm not talking about myself in particular; [Why did Blankfein want to add this disclaimer] I'm talking about the group -- and the outcome was, was there were people who -- who -- people in the community of people who -- in the enforcement community -- were not going easy. If they failed to bring a case, they felt that there was no case.

This is the part that stumped me. First Blankfein would have done well if he was legal expert. For someone who could't explain why growth is tepid or there is economic anxiety, he breezes through the legal minefield with remarkable ease. He could put a lawyer to shame with his precision. Yes, Mr. Blankfein, people make mistakes and no one in America is against mistakes. 

"People are prescribing malevolence for people" this statement is so ambiguous that it could be a a part of a master confession. It can leave the jury in the "did he or didn't he" zone. Let me clarify what people think. When people see toddler using a semi-automatic gun and kill 20 people, they don't blame the toddler, they blame the parents and the pro-gun lobbies blame the gun manufacturers. So when a whale trader makes $1billion wrong bets, they blame his supervisors and may not necessarily blame him. This is not negligence but criminal negligence and repurcussions are dire - jail. This is not a civil liability but a criminal one. And frankly US Justice Department has dropped the investigations of criminal liability for civil penalties. That looks dubious to people.

Blankfein uses the stupidity argument without being provoked. My ears pricked up when he volunteered that one.

What Blankfein is saying is, in law, called the difference between misfeasance and malfeasance. Misfeasance means a mistake, trying to do the right / acceptable thing but making a mistake leading to a loss. Malfeasance is trying to do the wrong / unacceptable thing and doing it well. Now it may so be that your law and your work are such that they look awfully similar. That is, a mistake while doing normal thing and well-executed bad /wrong thing looks the same. The question then is how to determine which is which. 

Or, it could be so that banks may be trying to do something bad/unacceptable AND made mistake  and thus blew up the system. In this case the liability is not only criminal but also vicarious - i.e. Firm is also liable. The behaviour of Justice Department let the banks off the hook on this major issue. Clearly, banks were doing something unacceptable - Goldman's internal emails themselves said that in so many words while shorting the derivatives.

The thing is if bad behaviour is being displayed repeatedly, you benefit from bad behaviour (get a bonus) when it doesn't explode into a crisis then you are part of the system when it does explode. So you go to jail along with the perp as a co-accused. Now imagine a series of mistakes leading all the way to the top, taking place repeatedly and all those making mistakes are getting rewarded . This is a conspiracy - the burden of proof shifts from prosecution to the accused. How many times will Blankfein say he made a mistake. At the end it will appear he was only making mistakes at Goldman Sachs - wonder why he kept getting all those bonuses.

ZAKARIA: I have to ask you about the relationship of Goldman Sachs to the Clintons. There was a front-page story in the New York Times alleging that there are very close connections, that Goldman Sachs has done all kinds of things, from give money to the Clinton Global Initiative to creating a partnership between the -- your foundation and the State Department when Hillary Clinton was in office, to, of course, holding fund-raisers for both Clintons at various points. 

How do you respond to that charge?  

BLANKFEIN: Well, Hillary Clinton was the -- was our -- was a New York senator. [Trying to avoid the usage of the word "our" ;)] We're largely a -- well, we're certainly a New York- headquartered firm. The -- when -- when Bill Clinton was in office, obviously, he was the president of the United States -- we're one of the larger banks; we have influence in the financial system; of course we engage. We engage with Senator Schumer. We engage with Governor Cuomo.  

I don't know how to -- we could have -- I know that, you know, in the conspiracy world -- theory-driven world in which we live in, you connect data points, but, heck, [hmm?] I have -- I go out and I meet with editors of newspapers. I meet with Republicans, leaders. I -- we -- it's necessary for us to do that. Part of what we do is -- part of our role requires not just that we're committed to [the word Blanfein used was "permitted" to not "committed to]-- our sense of duty requires that we explain the financial system and the ramifications of what official action would be. And of course we engage our political leaders.  [Finally he found the right angle to give the meeetings]

ZAKARIA: But the implication is that there was a tighter connection. Do you -- do you... 

BLANKFEIN: Well, I'll give you -- I'll give you an example of a tighter part of a connection. In the '08 political cycle, I held a fund-raiser for Hillary Clinton. And I could tell you, throughout our firm and other firms, so did a lot of people and so did a lot of people in our firm hold fund-raisers for people running against her. We had no -- I mean, you can -- you can go on and trace it. [No need to trace it but it would have been better to state this upfront] But, listen, if the fact is that we're identified with Hillary Clinton, who, as we say this, you know, the election is coming up and I'm sure this will -- this conversation will survive that moment, but as we sit here now, we don't know who will win the election. But it looks like the odds are favored Hillary Clinton. If the worst thing was that we had a history of having engaged positively with Hillary Clinton, that's not going to annoy me. [Fair point]

ZAKARIA: But do you personally support and admire Hillary Clinton?  

BLANKFEIN: Well, I've -- I'm supportive of Hillary Clinton, and I certainly -- yes, I do -- yes. So, flat out, yes. I do. That doesn't say that I agree with all her policies. I don't. And that doesn't say that I adopt everything that she's done in her political career or has suggested that she might do going forward. [Fair point]

But in terms of, you know, her intelligence, her, I think, her positioning not only in terms of her ideology but what I regard as a certain -- as a pragmatism that I saw demonstrated when she was our senator and in earlier stages of her political career, when she could cross the aisle and engage other people to get things done, I admire that, and it stands out a little today because it's a little -- because it's a little -- that kind of -- that kind of willingness to engage and compromise -- but let's just stop at engage -- that willingness to engage is a scarcer commodity these days. [Again a fair point]

This was a rather innocuous topic. The way Blankfein answers raises suspicion rather than questions themselves. The way to answer it was first admit there is a connection. Personally, raising funds and so forth, then talk about regular interaction with politicians to put forth our understanding of financial system and so on. Blankfein answers weirdly. I felt he was trying to avoid using the word "our" senator - when referring to Hillary. Why? I wonder.

I was surprised by his use of word "permitted". Clearly Fareed did not imply that he cannot meet Clinton. And Fareed probed rightly. So then comes the issue that Blankfein personally held fund-raiser for Hillary. Fareed says both but Blankfein admits only Hillary. Now if I was asked - this relationship would be the first thing to disclose. Also ties between Goldman (the firm) and the Clintons. Blankfein avoided the question on the Clinton foundation and his own foundation.

By the end though he is comfortable talking about general stuff - why I support Hillary and general stuff like that.

ZAKARIA: Why won't she release the transcripts? 

BLANKFEIN: OK, well, you'll have to ask her -- you have to ask her that. I would say -- and the answer is I don't know. [Why so defensive] 

But if it were me in her position, I would have wanted to reveal -- I'm not sure what she's afraid -- you know, these transcripts were her -- somebody who had left office as secretary of state giving a tour of her impressions of the world. They weren't given to Goldman Sachs -- you know, the press talks about Goldman Sachs partners. She spoke at our client meetings. These were meetings with -- with hundreds of people. Believe me, she was not saying -- I didn't think she was saying anything untoward. I don't recall specifically. [Again a hedge - hmm] But nothing that she said would have jarred me that she was going into some impermissible or revealing some secrets. I don't know what secrets she would have had about the financial market that she could have revealed.  [So myopic is Blankfein, doesn't think Hillary may be more smart than he understands]

ZAKARIA: There's a poll out, I think, a couple of months ago. Sixty percent of Americans worry that Hillary Clinton would not be able to properly regulate the financial industry because of her ties to it. What do you say?  

BLANKFEIN: You know, I don't know how to -- I don't know how to -- I'm not sure how to respond to that. People say that. I would say that the financial system today is so much more tightly regulated. The regulators in their seats are so vigilant and so tough and their reputations depend on that toughness. Everyone is -- it's not a place where everybody is disarmed; everybody is armed. And the consequences of any kind of breach are so severe, I think -- I think we've -- I think we've handled that aspect of it. [This is a repeated many times by bankers]

I think -- look at the, you know, it's something I -- you know, frankly, I'm scared to death of mistakes that are made in my organization, and guess what? The world wants me to be scared to death of that and they want me to be vigilant at the end of the day. And they've accomplished their purpose. They have me on edge all the time. [So you weren't vigilant? Weren't scared? And if you have confidence in your risk management systems then why should you be scared?]

My biggest -- I am not -- I don't live in fear that I'll do something wrong. I know I won't. Of course, there are accidents can happen, but I know I'll never do something wrong intentionally. [Again hedging himself] I live in fear that one of my tens of thousands of employees -- and for other people who run big companies, it's hundreds of thousands of employees -- will do something wrong and their bad behavior will be ascribed to me, not simply because I failed to supervise, but in this current milieu, it will be ascribed to me as if I intended that act that was accomplished by somebody in the organization, or even if it's multiple people in the organizations. 

And that's a very -- that's a very hot -- we're talking about an anxious economy. Guess what? You have an anxious industry. And guess -- you know, and I'll say, go further, I'm sure that people are happy that it's that way. [Interesting victim's position he is taking]

These were fairly innocuous questions to which parrotted answers were expected. But Blankfein is unbelievably circumspect. In the entire interview the tone of Fareed Zakaria is quite neutral. Fareed doesn't seem to incite anything. Yet, voluntarily Blankfein is quite shaken up. Why? So if this is the case now, imagine what will happen if Blankfein were to be interrogated (i.e. cross examined) in Court by Elizaebth Warren. She will roast him alive. No before the senate/congress because there he is not obliged to share everything. But in court where adverse inference can be drawn.

I thought for CEO of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein did not look one bit of the industry captain he should have been. He looked like a normal trader opining on various things. This opinion I deduce from watching John Mack, CEO Morgan Stanley, in the teeth of the crisis, or Jamie Dimon during his various media interviews since the crisis. He sounds more like a lawyer - which itself makes me suspicious.

Time and again words of Peggy Noonan - protected and unprotected ring in my mind. These people do not have any sense of ground reality. That is both sad and catastrophic.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms".

Can MTNL and BSNL be salvaged?

I happened to look at the websites of MTNL and BSNL for seeking out their annual reports and financials. Long ago, I don't remember exactly when I concluded that it is a waste to invest in public sector telecom companies - MTNL (BSNL is not listed). It was so far back in antiquity that I thought may be it is time to revisit the decision. After all MTNL is a nav-ratna company - meaning it is prized Government PSU. Alas I was horribly wrong.

Where are the financials?

MTNL or Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited is listed for 20 years at least. But I could find only 2 annual reports. No quarterly information was available on the site. The website links to some other mtnl sites but the links on the site did not work.

The first rule of getting investor interest is to make all financial and operational data available. I was expecting to look at ARPUs of land lines, mobile, their satellite network subscribers etc. 

Shameful numbers! 

The two annual reports reveal pathetic situation. MTNL has employee cost 76% of revenues. Yes 76% [Seventy-Six] - no it is not a typo. The report talks of legacy issues with the government employees who cannot be sacked and do not work. These numbers make BSNL cost structure of employee costs at 52% of revenue look respectable. 

As a comparable IDEA Cellular has employee expenditure of ~4% of Total revenue.

How to fix MTNL / BSNL?

So can these companies even be salvaged? I think we need radical reform.

1. Disclose all information - no matter how ugly. Go back and disclose everything. Let us have ARPUs, Segment-wise, detailed costs as much drill-down as possible. From these numbers someone may be able to gather the strengths of the companies.
2. Ground Realities - corruption and compromised staff: The sad reality is that the staff of MTNL works for private companies. They take bribes and ensure poor service quality thereby herding the customers in droves in the arms of private telecom service providers. I have also seen MTNL linesmen working for private land line operators in Mumbai. They take home dual incomes. 
3. Staff Costs are too high: MTNL costs at 76% of revenues and BSNL are at 53% wheresa idea cellular is at 4%. There cannot be any rational justification for this mess. More than MTNL, the government of India should take a decision and remove this staff. It will be difficult for MTNL to bear the burden of this. Let the staff be transferred to some other productive work - which they are incapable of. Just pay them and let them go. At least they won't damage the government elsewhere.
4. Asset sweating and location leverage: Both BSNL and MTNL have superb location from where they operate. These locations can work for telecom base stations, interconnection zones and network switches for all firms. Such operational asset sweating can release vital cash for operations.
5. Good Telco - Bad Telcos solution:  Create a new listed Telecom entity - say National Telecom and sell MTNL and BSNL assets to that entity and order closure of MTNL and BSNL under Companies Act. There is no reason to have two telecom companies in the same business with different geographic coverage.
6. Keep transparent pricing plans and decent customer service and customers will flock to PSUs. Those with customer service of private telcos will agree whole-heartedly. With complicated subscription plans and bill discrepancies private telcos are sitting ducks.
7. Telecom-Internet-TV Fibre bundles: The current landscape allows for one state-owned voice-focussed player. After 5 years there wont be any such opportunity. However the PSU Telco will have to quickly shift to data and preferably internet and TV offerings together. It will be easier for this entity to operationalise this than other private operators.

If you let me run these two, I can make them profitable in 3 years. 

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms".

Free Trade - or no free Trade - either ways it ain't free!

Econgirl commented about the latest free-trade issue.  It is a must read - continue down to the comments too! Then David Henderson commented about it on his blog and the comments where @econgirl responded to his question. All must read in the overall dialogue about free trade.

There are a few things that need consideration:

1. The losers of free-trade - how adaptable they remain after they lose: In many cases, these people are lost - this is a political price we are paying. Thus, a $10 gain per-consumer v/s say a total job loss of 10,000 people (hypothetical primary loss) usually it remains concentrated (think Detroit) and second and third order economic losses. Now in monetary terms, the gain-loss may be whatever, but when a group of people loses their livelihood without any margin or buffer to create new opportunities for themselves, then it makes for a difficult choice.
2. The initial condition is responsible for the losers being as many as they currently are: If the trade was always free, the adjustment would have taken place a long time ago, giving the population enough margin to adjust. However, the governments by their initial protectionist intervention create a bigger adjustment problem in the future. When a competency develops in a country, the government rallies behind the firms with the very policies which later accumulate into a bigger problem. The adjustment to new potential trade-based threat can be innovation or it can be defeat. The auto-industry failed to innovate - something Tesla did, Ford and GM should have done years ago. But those are victims of their own success. At present, China is funding auto-tech companies to bring out a competitor to Tesla. 
3. Free trade - v/s Fair trade: Indeed some countries do "dump" products on to other markets. At the same time, some countries do use "non-tariff barriers" for the protection of domestic industry. When is the "fire-sale" not dumping and when "non-tariff barriers" are not protectionist can only be answered on a case-by-case basis. This ambiguity is used to target Free-trade unfairly. 
4. Economic V/s moral - politics enters through morality: Can we allow some trade partner using slave labour to create losses in our country? Economics says why not, morality says no. Blood diamonds are an example. That is where politics comes in. So while overall benefits of free trade may be high - the morality over why the government should not choose one set over other is a strong political motive against change of status quo. Of course people selectively forget that it was government intervention that helped the problem to get bigger.

So in an ideal case:

• Free Trade is the default. Government has no business interfering in that unless some moral issue arises. The scope of these issues are pretty narrow - slavery etc.
• Countries should progressively move all policy towards sector neutrality - including trade policy. Thus, a government would be right to have 50% markup over all goods/services entering the country/sold in the country without discrimination.
• Then let this state continue and let governments step away from the issue altogether. (more on this in another post).

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Hussman's timing may be wrong again!

John Hussman predicts epic stock crash in his recent newsletter. He says:

The financial markets are establishing an extreme that we expect investors will remember for the remainder of history, joining other memorable peers that include 1906, 1929, 1937, 1966, 1972, 2000 and 2007.

He follows up with another gem:

Enlightened members of the FOMC should even question the theoretical basis for their actions. The Phillips Curve is actually a scarcity relationship between unemployment and real wage inflation – basically, labor scarcity raises wages relative to the price of other goods (see Will The Real Phillips Curve Please Stand Up and the instructive chart from former Fed governor Richard Fisher in Eating our Seed Corn). That’s the only variant of the Phillips Curve that actually holds up in the data, and there is no evidence that this or other variants can be reliably manipulated through monetary changes.

Only long-term sustainable, predictable employment creates a turnaround. Till this I agree with him. Now comes the crucial issue of timing. Here he says:

They want to believe that the Federal Reserve has their backs; that as long as the Fed doesn’t explicitly hike interest rates, the market will move higher indefinitely. We saw one question last week that asked “What if the Fed doesn’t raise rates for another 20 years?” Let’s start with an aggressive, optimistic estimate. If we assume that despite conditions warranting two decades of zero interest rates, nominal GDP and corporate revenues will grow at their long-term historical norm of 6% annually over the coming 20 years, we would expect the total return of the S&P 500 to average about 5.5% annually over the next two decades (see Ockham’s Razor and the Market Cycle for the arithmetic behind these estimates). Even in this optimistic scenario, to imagine that this path would be smooth would have no basis in history, requiring the absence of any external shock for the entire period (and I’ve already demonstrated, I hope, that many of the worst market declines in history have been accompanied by Federal Reserve easing).

If Fed hikes, it will interfere with the risk equation causing "a breakdown in market internals" as Hussman calls it causing precipitation. But it is unlikely that Fed will hike. Fed may experiment with a token hike but may quickly reverse. Or, more likely, Fed will signal a prolonged pause (lasting more than a year or two). 

If Fed does not hike, things won't be as simple as 5.5% annual growth. It will be more. The past data behind this calculations comes from low monetary expansion era. When there is a flood of money, prices should inflate commensurately. Thus, if Fed does not hike,  S&P may average annual growth of ~10% or more for few years. 

Hence, S&P may double from here before Hussman's prediction comes true. We, no doubt, are establishing an extreme. We are confounded by its extremity.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". 

Austerity V/s Stimulus, Government Spending and Greece

Sometimes it is worth repeating something that is actually right. Let me say this again:

Stimulus works best when you need to push-start the demand engine. Note that it implies that stimulus won't do the work of engine - it will only push-start it. The engine must be in working condition otherwise. 


Austerity works best when Government borrowing is crowding out private investment. Usually Government is borrowing too much because it is spending too much. New investment is required to put a new engine in place.


In Greece's case - their engine is not working and their Government is spending a bit more than required. A combination is required when economy stalls - i.e. Government must reallocate/realign the spending targeting it into essential things. It also needs to increase spending once the new "engines" are set up. 

In a nutshell - neither Austerity nor stimulus alone will work in Greece's case. A combination of sane reforms and practical stimulus is required. Till such time...

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What we need to estimate effects of multi-country QE?

I was thinking about ways to estimate impact of QE on potential offered by different equity markets in general or asset markets in general.

Currently we do not have money inflow metrics (i.e. indexed price and volume data) for all asset classes. Nor do we have an exhaustive asset class database (types of asset classes e.g. art). Without these metrics it is difficult to construct a true impact of QE on global markets in general and specific markets in particular. Maybe someone can construct some sort of blended index.

I suspect when we do construct some quasi-indicators we will find that M3 has grown disproportionately with GDP and the difference can be explained by blended asset class inflation.

Once the global effect is understood, the specific country level effect can be understood using a parametrized gravity model. Such model will tell us how the excess liquidity will move. 

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Why QE or Asset Purchase is bad idea?

In my humble bid to respond to Martin Wolf's post in FT, I must de-clutter the arguments. But first let us look at the questions:

1. Why suddenly does QE have to be of this large magnitude?
2. When does QE work? What are different types of liquidity problems that QE can solve?

To answer these questions we must understand how the asset bubble phase worked. Let us take two important policies that aided the previous boom. 

Two policies that aided the boom

First, we were in era of low interest rate and low inflation. Second, inflation, everywhere is measured by estimating changes in the price of basket of goods and services, no matter how exhaustive or qualitatively superior the basket is.

The question really is - what happens to a person who has a lot of money but he cannot put in a basket which is watched closely? Logically, he puts it into another basket. What if there is no other basket? Well, he creates another basket. This is exactly what happened over past three decades. 

People wanted to invest in assets that were included in inflation basket because the goods and services in the basket comprised important daily items. However, they realised that too much investment makes the central bank tighten the money supply by increasing interest rates or calling for higher reserve requirements.

So these people started investing in other baskets - let us call them basket 2. In many countries real estate was in this basket. This created substantial bubble in these asset classes. The level of bubble was so high that these investors baulked at the prices and were reluctant to invest. Some internal value compass was indicating a diversion from reality and presence of unprecedented risks.

So these people had money and no where to invest. So they created a new basket - basket 3. This comprised derivative of assets in basket 2. This reduced the risk associated with assets in basket 2 and calmed the frayed nerves of investors reluctant to invest directly. Now these people can invest, because the risk was, supposedly, reduced. 

The basic rule was to created tradable assets where this excess money can go to without stoking inflationary fires. This is what I call Asset-creator boom.

Two type of Assets

The asset creators initially scouted for most promising of productive assets. However, once all the investable assets were exhausted, they started creating paper assets. These paper assets are not productive and have same utility as coins or chips from a gambling house.

To complicate matters, the developments in this asset class were creating winners everywhere. Traditionally, the gambling house always wins, but here was a gamble where the clients were winning big. Naturally, the paper assets had same problem as that of gambling house chips. They are good enough till the gambling house is good enough to pay money for them. Once the doubts about gambling house start creeping in, there is bound to be trouble.

Since the economic policy remained in this zone for long time,  the quantum of these paper assets grew to large order of magnitude. In comparison, genuine productive assets grew at a modest pace - as they usually do.

The essence of QE

Usually, QE or infusion of liquidity, or asset purchase, is done when there is no buyer for assets and that stalls the economy. When this mechanism was invented or discovered, assets usually referred to productive assets. So even when the central banks buy these assets, the assets do produce something of value. Over time, people tend to appreciate the value of these assets and buy them back from the central bank. Thus QE works when the system has more good productive assets than bad assets.

This time, the central bankers are buying paper assets leading to two major issues. First, the quantum of purchases is going to be substantially large sometimes as much as the real economy itself. Second, no one is going to purchase these assets back from central bank later as they will realise that these are worthless. So, for all practical purposes these assets are destroyed or taken out of the system. Thus, the central bank asset purchase schemes put out a lot of money in the market while reducing the quantum of assets in the system. This is what leads to talk of inflation.

Problem of inflation

Now, we have too much money, pumped in by the central bank, chasing too few productive assets. Note that no one wants to hold the dummy assets any more. 

In our basket-3 type assets, there was a micro-thread connecting these assets to the productive assets. The thread was too weak and too thin that it escaped perception of investors. Hence there was no effect of basket-3 asset bubble on basket-1 goods and services. 

Today, investor want assets strongly linked to productive assets. Naturally, there is a good deal of impact on underlying goods and services. Thus price of these goods and services are becoming increasingly volatile. Inflation is all about changes in prices of these goods and services.

To have sane pricing of goods and services, we will need some equitable relation between total money in the system and total number of productive goods, services and assets. It means this excess money will have to be destroyed. To counter this excess money chasing core, productive assets, central banks have decided to pay interest on money it created, so that this excess money simply sits in a bank account doing nothing. This incentive prevents money from chasing any assets. Further, the central bank knows where the money is sitting so that it can quickly destroy it when it becomes troublesome. Alternatively, the currency will lose its value and adjust to new price equation.

The problem of sovereign debt

The ideal solution to our crisis was thus. The central bank creates excess money and gives it to investors. These investors, worried of the risk in the system, invest in government securities. This gives government enough money to deploy in programs that can promote real, productive growth of the economy. Meanwhile, as the growth returns, investors are more confident of what are good assets. They buy these assets from central bank thus returning the excess money.

This time, the excess money available with investors was truly large. The government could not come up with a credible list of projects that will build long term advantage of the country. Hence, investors have started demanding that the government either tighten their belts to meet their obligations or show how their spending will create future returns. Government has been able to do neither. Therefore, we see substantial demand that government undertake austerity measures. Government, on the other hand, believes that since the central bank purchased assets no questions asked, the investors should also purchase government bonds no questions asked. A sort of quid-pro-quo. But investors have not kept their end of the bargain.

One wonders, if this conditionality should have been embedded at the time of central bank asset purchase and if it was wise to believe that investors will uphold their end of the bargain. The question therefore remain, why did the central bank have to purchase bad assets at all? Why QE?

In sum

Nevertheless, that is the story of QE. Those are the reasons QE will not work. It is said that false money created from casinos should have been destroyed at the hands of the gamblers. By purchasing these gambling chips for real money, the central bankers have, in effect, sold the tax-payers and citizens short. Hence, QE is, for all practical purposes a bad idea.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

Elite Bonds are equivalent to sub-prime SIVs

Germany and France are mulling elite bonds - essentially government bonds issued by AAA rated countries of EU to finance sub-prime countries of EU.

I read this as equivalent to sub-prime SIVs at the height of Sub-Prime Crisis. At that time, sub-prime loans were bundled with prime loans to create a fiction of higher ratings. The assumption was that these individual component loans are not correlated.

I see the same problem with elite bonds though mechanism is a little different. A curtain is drawn over the component EU states to give illusion of AAA ratings to the Greek Debt. If we have learnt something from the sub-prime crisis this bond issue should fail. 

However, I don't think we have learnt any thing from it. So prepare for a Christmas surge in global equity markets.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

A Clear Policy on future bailouts

Senator Ron Paul is keen to get the Fed audited and closed. I don't know how that will pan out but I would seek clarity in one aspect of Fed's functioning. The bailout criteria needs to be defined and communicated.

We need a decision tree to understand how Fed will hereafter decide who gets bailed out. The current "case-to-case basis" and "threat to financial system" arguments are too esoteric. We need clear principles and guides to understand how such decision will be made in the future. There are four critical element of "Guidelines of future bailouts" plan:

1. We need clear understand of who can seek a bailout. Is it banks? Are insurance companies allowed? Who is allowed? Who is not? Why?
2. The next part is within this set, who are eligible for bailout, how will you choose? What self-help measures the company has to go through first before coming to Fed for the bailout? What if someone exceeds Fed's / other regulators benchmarks for leverage? Or pays excessive bonus? Will those companies get bailed out too?
3. How will the bailout amount be decided? Will it come entirely out of Fed gurantees? How about untouched bonus pools? How about unwinding risky position in hard-to-sell paper?
4. What happens after companies are bailed out? How will they be restructured? How will Fed ensure that those funding the bailout (US citizens) get control over the company?

It is right time to initiate the plan. We have Ben Bernanke at the end of his term. We have some green shoots so markets are reasonably calm to absorb and accomodate the rules of the game. I believe this will reduce uncertainty in the markets. I think it is a moral duty to explain to tax-payers how future bailouts, if any, will be decided. Moreover, I believe tough times lie ahead. It is better to be prepared with a plan - at least for things that we know we might need.