Why is there is no lending in crisis?

On LinkedIn, Callum Thomas has shared a post detailing tightness in lending standards and gradual shifting to tight credit conditions.

Lending standards tighten at the exact wrong time in a crisis. Also in a crisis the ratings get downgraded en masse. When we want banks to lend, banks do not want to lend. When we want banks to stop lending, banks get busy making risky loans. This is one problem of banking regulation that has not received enough attention. 

Markets and particularly rating agencies need to appreciate the difference between Macro risk (where all aspects of the economy are impaired) v/s corporate risk (where particular company suffers impairment because of its own actions or inactions).

Credit cannot be pushed - it needs to be pulled. To achieve this, a better mechanism is interest subvention. It seems to be a much better tool when macros risks are prevalent.

An SPV which guarantees interest rate up to X% (ranging from 30-50% of lending rate - so for India it will guarantee 3% interest cost for US it could 0.75%) it should cause firms to pull credit and deploy it for productive uses.

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Rahul Prakash Deodhar, Advocate, Bombay High Court is also a private investor. He can be reached at rahuldeodhar@gmail.com, on twitter at @rahuldeodhar or at his website www.rahuldeodhar.com.

Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms"

Comments on Ray Dalio's post on Monetary Policy 3 and MMT

Ray Dalio's comments are always well researched and interesting. For starters, I think, Principles for navigating Big Debt Crises is must read. (Its free PDF). His recent post on his LinkedIn blog is about Monetary Policy 3.0 and MMT. 

Some fundamental comments about present crisis:

1. QE only creates a space for fiscal response: Central banks and governments alike misunderstood the role of monetary policy in the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis was different than others we have faced since Great Depression. Per my reading of Keynes (which seems to different than Keynesians and neo-Keynesians both), in such crises, the proper response has to be from fiscal side. The monetary policy merely creates space for the fiscal response or accommodates the fiscal response preventing untoward consequences. The response had to be holistic - a coordinated and sustained monetary and fiscal policy response.
2. Fiscal policy amplification mechanism is broken: Broken may be a harsh word, we may choose "has become messy" in its place. The point is, fiscal policy needs an amplification mechanism. When government starts infrastructure spending, it needs some real value-creating sector to take it from there and start driving the economic engine. At present we do not have such "real value-creating sector" that can boost employments and wages generally. In 1980s we had tech, in 2000s we had internet, now we need something. In absence of a big driver, we need many small ones. If such capability is difficult to create in one sector it is quite difficult to create in more than one sectors too. The solution is to let inherent advantages play out.
3. Inherent advantages are muzzled: Inherent advantages have stopped driving international trade since east asian crisis, and at a larger scale with China's entry to WTO. Instead, we have pegged exchange rates (soft/hard/overt/covert), manipulated tariff and non-tariff barriers, and, in general, non-transparent trade policy. Until that is fixed we cannot have trade based on pure competitive advantage.
4. Small business innovations are indefensible: When people talk of China usurping Intellectual property they usually talk about submarine plans etc. But I am talking of something very basic. Check out new funding projects on kickstarter - innovative shoes, innovative bags, innovative pens, anything that takes your fancy. Just search on alibaba or just wait for few months you will see some products like those (invented by kickstarter entrepreneurs) in the market on mass scale. These products are not sold by those companies who invented them on kickstarter or such platforms. This is IP theft that hurts the most. It removes new business competitiveness right at its infancy.
5. Trickle-up always works; trickle down some times: Monetary policy practitioners and academic economists in general prefer trickle down economics. But empirical evidence says reverse is true. Trickle-up works all the time. Thus, when there is a choice of bail out, we must lean to lower strata. (A) It is more fair and just, (B) better optics and (C) right incentives. But MAIN reason it works because it balances the bargaining power of both sides. Bail out the top and they lean on to regulation to prevent or constrict trickle down stifling the economy. Bail out the bottom and lo and behold all the incentives align beautifully.
6. Certainty of employment and wages is the one super-indicator: The best solution to any crisis is to get certainty of employment and wages going, rest follows from that. Today we have almost full employment but it is uncertain. Wage predictability is also uncertain. That's why the lack of demand is so persistent.
7. Interest Rates are like friction: Too much and too little friction are both bad. Sames goes for interest rates too much is bad, too little is ALSO bad.

Some comments about Monetary Policy 3:

1. Debt financed Fiscal spending financed by QE: I don't agree with Ray Dalio that this was pursued after 2008 financial crisis. The fiscal spending was essentially going to the same group who could access the QE funds. Yes, there was fiscal deficit and increased fiscal spending and yes there was QE to finance it. But this is exactly the wrong kind of stimulus as I have written since 2009 itself.
2. Giving $10,000 to one person Vs $100 to 100 persons Vs $1 to 10,000 people: Helicopter money is not easy to design. The behavioral response in each of three cases varies drastically.The range of outcomes possible is mind boggling.
3. Spending conditions interfere political rights: If I am tasked to spend $10,000 can I give it to someone from my family to pay down her loan? Does that amount to spending? Should I buy something? What thing? These questions are difficult to answer, monitor and control. 
4. A little inflation is necessary: People will spend when they can surely afford it (condition above - certainty of employment and wages) and it will get costlier tomorrow. Inflation is important, zero inflation may not be that great.

The examples of Monetary policy 3.0: 

The best part of the analysis is the historical perspective Ray Dalio gives. Sharp readers of this blog will immediately note that there are fundamental differences between the conditions in various situations described and those existing now. That is acceptable difference.

Particularly interesting is the Roosevelt response in 1930s. It still forms the basic template for solution today. However, we are at a slightly different position today than in 1930s. So we have to make more adjustments than Dalio may seem to suggest. [Dalio is NOT suggesting it - it appears simple but it is incredibly complex - politically, fiscally and economically]

In Sum

Do not understand these comments as put down of Ray Dalio (as if he cares what I think!). I admire the man because he is being honest and creating a framework to solve the crisis. Good intentions and honest efforts deserve praise - even if the guy making those efforts is one of the richest.

From my side, I solved this crisis puzzle back in 2009 itself.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms"

How Low interest rate can be bad for small business - 2

In a 2012 post with same title, How Low interest rate can be bad for small business, I had explained mechanics of how small businesses are denied capital BECAUSE of lower interest rates. This was summarized from my book Subverting Capitalism and Democracy. Over the years few readers have asked for further explanation. So here goes.

Demand for projects

Let us look at the following schematic.

Capital Quantum and return

The diagram shows the amount of capital demanded and its possible rate of return. The distribution is made from capital requirements of various businesses of various sizes. The financed part is the blue rectangle. The width of this rectangle and its location is determined by various factors.

Now our experience tells us following details - (1) smaller businesses have higher risk profile whereas larger businesses have lower risk profiles; (2) smaller businesses have smaller quantum requirement whereas larger businesses have diverse capital needs; (3) as a corollary projects with large quantum of capital requirement and low return are dominated by large corporations.

Therefore, let me quote what I said earlier:

How low interest rate leads to mal-investment
A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. Ideally, even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed.

However, in reality, lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures.

Typically, such irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Intelligent investors will find that this contradicts with the "diversification as risk management" strategy. But being with herd has a stronger lure and is treated as risk mitigation (though wrongly).

Further, at lower interest rates, debt starts being used as an instrument to amplify equity returns. 

Thus the second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy.

The Mechanics

When interest rates are low this rectangle starts more towards the left. This is space where there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. This space has irrational mega-projects of large businesses like debt financed share-buybacks etc. With the superior credit rating of large businesses these projects crowd out the smaller businesses.

As the interest rates rise the rectangle is pushed rightwards. In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios. 

Are few projects with consortium lending more risky?

The answer to this question is easy if you understand it from banks perspective and not from bank manager's perspective. From bank's perspective more the number of projects it finances the more the diversification possibility and thus lesser the risks.

But this has higher risks for bank manager who has to stick out her neck for each of these projects. From bank manager's perspective fewer the projects and more the number of borrowers approving the project as credit-worthy lesser the risk for bank managers. But this means more the risk for the bank (concentration risks).

In sum

The cumulative effect of all these is that at low interest rate the credit is denied to small borrowers at the expense of irrational mega-projects of large businesses. When the interest rates rise, as they always do, these projects turn bad and become a drag on the economy.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms".

Why is the current easy-monetary policy ineffective?

Ben Inker, head of GMO's Asset Allocation team had a great article this quarter.

It has been the extended period of time in which extremely low interest rates, quantitative easing, and other expansionary monetary policies have failed to either push real economic activity materially higher or cause in ation to rise. The establishment macroeconomic theory says one or the other or both should have happened by now. It seems to us that there are two basic possibilities for why the theory was wrong. 

The first is a secular stagnation explanation of the type proposed by Larry Summers and others. 

The second possibility for why extraordinarily easy monetary policy has not had the expected effects on the economy and prices is an even simpler one: Monetary policy simply isn’t that powerful. is line of argument (which Jeremy Grantham has written about a fair bit over the years) suggests that the reason why monetary policy hasn’t had the expected impact on the real economy is that monetary policy’s connection to the real economy is fairly tenuous.

In this context, there are some important aspects.

First, monetary policy and economy are connected to each other by feedback loops. By now, every market participant knows that if there is any inflation up-tick the monetary policy will be tightened. This information prods the participants in asset classes where the inflation impact will be low. A look at inflation basket will tell us which are these sectors where price runs will not affect inflation. Exotic assets are in fashion for this reason. Art, diamonds, high-end real estate (trophy), luxury items etc all form part of this group.

Second, why does the low-cost debt not push investment for improving productivity for general items that form part of the inflation basket? The answer is there is no demand. When the market concludes that there is a substantial demand to justify the investment then the investments will come. There is no demand because there is excess capacity, predominantly in China for manufactured goods. This is the reason monetary policy is not effective. 

Monetary policy is effective when there is underlying demand is strong. Without demand monetary policy is just an enabling environment for nothing in particular.  That the monetary policy is not working is itself a data point. It is telling us that the masses do not have the purchasing power to fuel a demand pick-up. There are two reasons.

Most of these masses derive their incomes from the products that make up the inflation basket. If inflation remains subdued, their incomes remain subdued. The low-interest rate has reduced the cost of capital meaning it is cheaper to deploy robots instead of people. So in fact machines are replacing some jobs. These two factors currently suppress the purchasing power. To compensate, people want to build higher threshold of income-level before they start consuming normally. So, the general population is busy buttressing their purchasing power. 

The second reason is that the pre-crisis demand was inflated by debt. The low-cost debt created a hyper-demand which may never return. At the same time, the debts from the past consumption binge have come due. So the indebted families are busy working their debts off. If all the debts of the bottom 50% of the population were simply forgiven, it would have been cheaper than QE. But it would have immediately buttressed the purchasing power of the masses. 

It is a complicated explanation, but it cannot be simplified any more. When feedback systems are interacting, you will get complexity.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms".

Counter intuitive = Low rates / ZIRP/NIRP policies are actually bad for economy

We are told that when interest rates are too low, they are encouraging entrepreneurs to take risk. So we have low interest rate policy LIRP, Zero interest rate policy, ZIRP and negative interest rate policy NIRP.

However, these policies impacts the business models differently. At one end are business models, like infrastructure projects, that cannot add threshold value in the initial years of the venture. The low interest rate regime, allows a valuable gestation period for such business models. Often, government artificially lowers interest rates for such projects. At the other extreme, there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. These business models, however, die out once the interest rates start rising. In between, there are experimental and innovative business models. Some of these use the low interest rate period to forge better, more robust models. Such businesses thrive later. Others, however, end up going bust. The role of banks is to identify each of these business models and fund them while appropriately mitigating the risks. 

How low interest rate leads to mal-investment 

A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. Ideally, even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed. 

However, in reality, lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures. Typically, such irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. 

First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Intelligent investors will find that this contradicts with the "diversification as risk management" strategy. But being with herd has a stronger lure and is treated as risk mitigation (though wrongly).

Further, at lower interest rates, debt starts being used as an instrument to amplify equity returns. With unchanged return on capital employed, you can have higher return on equity when return on debt reduces. Return on debt is function of interest rates and lower share it claims from the total returns made by the firms. 

Thus the second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy. 

In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios.

This is particularly true when there is some demand in the system.

What happens when there is no demand?

When there is no demand in the economy, low interest rates / ZIRP / NIRP etc are said to stimulate this demand. This, to my simplistic mind, sounds like offering desserts to the already overfed diner  (AOD) with the hope to eliminate world hunger. Let me explain.

We hope this AOD, when offered with a free desserts will take them and pass them along to the hungry. In this method we depend on the magnanimity of intentions of our already overfed diner. Then we presume he shall act on his instincts and find worthy hungry who can transmit the benefits to others. It is quite possible our Glutton may pass the desserts to his friends or family and each can be a little more fatter. Are we, then to wait for all the gluttons to be severly beefed up or porked up before the trickle down starts to the hungry?

It sound like bull-shit method to me. Particularly I cannot understand why you are preventing the hungry from feeding themselves - either by employing them or letting entrepreneurs do it by financing them with reasonably priced debt/credit. These entrepreneurs are left to finance their ventures with credit cards, overdrafts and other very high cost financings at considerable peril. Now since these financing schemes are not on the business side, they are paid out of the post-tax income generated by the firm (but they should have been tax deductable at firm stage itself). This is doubly onerous for the entrepreneurs. 

Treat Interest rate like friction

A better model is to think of interest rate like engineers think of friction. Some is good, too much is bad, too little is bad too. In fact friction analogy should be best suited for determining neutral rate of interest. 

Economist too think of interest rate as friction. To the economist - road mileage of the car represents growth, fuel represents capital availability or liquidity. The economists' metaphor of friction is flawed. They need to get their metaphor right.

Engineers will tell you - you need to maximize friction at the tyres and eliminate it from the engines. At the clutch and brakes too you need friction. So you need interest rates high at some places and low at some others. So Economists better figure out where you want low interest rates and where you want high interest rates. Note the question is where not when. 

In Sum

The hazards of the LIRP, ZIRP and NIRP far outweigh the benefits. These policies do not pass the smell test. We need a better understanding of interest rate as a tool for improving economic growth.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". A version of this argument was made in Subverting Capitalism back in 2010 and also posted on this blog in 2012. Nothing, it appears, has changed.

Should banks create money?

Bloomberg has a post about centralizing money supply - whole money, as they call it. It is not a very good idea. This is not the first time such suggestions have come up. As mentioned in the article, Irving Fisher first proposed a similar plan in the wake of the great depression. Since then many have proposed this idea but not many understand money creation.

Taxonomy of centralized money creation idea

The money creation ideas are varied:

1. Gold money: This is natural money creation. No one has any control over the money creation. Previously, gold, silver, diamonds, precious stones and other valuables (and sometimes sea shells too) were used. Many serendipitous discoveries of valuables created havoc with the money supply. Discovery of Potosi in South America and thereafter further discoveries of gold and silver had the effect of expanding Spanish money supply. 
1. Not under any control: Neither governments nor banks, no one has any control over the money creation process.
2. But Non-Arbitrary: It depends on the amount of gold you have. If you want more gold, you better import more gold by giving some valuable service to the other countries  who have gold. Over time as the total amount of gold available starts reducing you need to offer more and more to the countries that have gold.
3. Though subject to Nature: If by chance you discover a gold mine, you will be filthy rich, though if you discover too much then it may unleash inflation. Spain is believed to have faced such inflation on the discovery of silver mines in the South American colonies.
4. Deflationary and restrictive: As economic activity grows it becomes too high compared to the total amount of gold available to back it. Thus it tends to slow the economic growth pace. (Don't know if that is good or bad).
5. Favours status quo, old money and advantageous to miserly: Since total value of gold you have increases with time, people tend to postpone purchases and hold on to gold. Spending happens when absolutely necessary.
6. Exploitation and Theft prone: A doctor can charge atrocious fees from a rich person because of bargaining power equations. Gold can also be stolen. Stealing credit cards is less useful.
2. Gold-backed money: Introduced to circumvent the deflationary gold currency, countries peg the value of their currency to the gold they can back it with. When people talk of gold standard they are referring to this type of money creation. 
1. Partly Government controlled: Government issues currency and states the total amount of gold they back it with. So a gold-to-dollar exchange rate is established. The government can improve its reserves and thus improve money creation. 
2. Non-arbitrary: In its pure form it is non-arbitrary and similar to gold-money.
3. Not purely nature driven but subject to shocks: Since the government has control over the amount of money and amount of gold, the money creation is not as whimsical as simply discovering a gold mountain. Governments can reset the exchange rate to compensate for some changes. But arbitrary government intervention results in shocks and disruptions.
4. Mostly deflationary: Governments cannot measure economic activity easily (yes GDP calculations are guess-work and there is no Santa Claus just in case you were wondering). That leaves money creation open to political whims and fancies and invites tampering of measurement of the economic health. Mostly governments are slow to acknowledge the real growth in economy since it is always backward looking. It realises the growth till the growth results in deflationary pressures then increases money supply and causes a spike.
5. Perception of money losing value as government reset gold rate: As total amount of product and services of value in the economy rise more than amount of gold to back it up, the government is forced to alter the gold-dollar exchange rate downward leading to people feeling that each dollar is worth lesser in terms of gold though purchasing power may be higher.
3. Government-created money: This is non-gold standard money. Simply speaking the government issues money and backs it with a promise. This is what people wrongly believe is the current regime. 
1. Full government control: The government has effective control over the process. This is a mixed bag. It depends on the government. 
2. Some central bank control: The exact control depends on how money is created, is it by using government bonds then bought to a certain extent by central banks or some other way (simply printing).
3. Depends on confidence in Government: Prudent governments enjoy advantages but if you are Zimbabwe then you will end up in trouble.
4. Inflation/deflation depends on policy: If a government print too much then it stokes inflation and too little results in deflation. Prudently executed (Milton Friedman's about 3% money supply growth) works fine.
5. Value of money depends on inflation: If the government is able to deal with money creation effectively then a mild inflation - say 2% may result. There is not too much loss in value and it can be notices only over long time frames when quality of life changes are also noticeable.
4. Money created by banks: Mostly commercial banks create money by giving loans. These loans do not exist as money. This is the most misunderstood money creation mechanism. It is distributed money creation, without extreme control. Bankers and regulators forget that its success depends on devising proper incentives. 
1. Less government control:No country uses this method exclusively. Both Government-created and bank-created money is deployed. Thus there is always government control of some sort. Also since government is also a borrower (a big one at that), it has control.
2. Part central bank control: Central bank exercises additional kind of controls in this mechanism. First, it can partner with government in its money creation process by buying government bonds etc. Second, it controls the lending to the banks and thus influences at what levels of risk do banks create money. The key word is influences and not dictates. Thus this process is often likened to "pushing at a string" (which is difficult, you can pull at a string pushing does nothing unless there is pulling at other end by the banks).
3. Control to banks: In this scenario, Banks can ALSO determine whether to create money or not. That decision is based on whether the person demanding the money will be able to repay it or not. If he can, it means he is creating value with this money and thus able to repay it. 
4. Decision at the point of demand of debt: The decision to create money is forward looking. It is made at the point the person makes a demand for the debt. That borrower is expecting to create future value. If by banks assessment that value can be generated ONLY then money is created.
5. Depends on incentives: After reading this if you wonder why banks lend for consumption goods or lend to uncreditworthy borrowers - it is because of incentives. The power to create money is substantial power and with bad incentives, it can cause systemic harm as seen in 2008 crisis.
6. Central bank oversight: Central banks have oversight duty to watch what kind of money is created by the banks. The nature of lending is supposed to be value-focussed. Some consumer lending at the time economy is entering a pro-longed boom phase can be advantageous. But in an economy which cannot sustain a prolonged growth phase, these are risky loans and their proportion needs to be limited.

My suggestion

Out of the options, I prefer the last one - a combination of bank created and government created money. It is quite forward looking and takes place at the point of demand. It needs a lot of oversight and decentralisation. I have argued that IT systems have in fact centralized the loan decision making than allow the front-line managers to make them. This has resulted in an inaccurate assessment of borrowers and partly responsible for the 2008 crises. Amar Bhide also makes a case for intelligent decision making in his book "A call for judgement".

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". 

Is assessment of risk a function of interest rate?

The interest rate that can be charged by the bank has  two limits.

The Lower bound equals what the central bank charges the bank. Any lower and the bank will make a loss on its lending portfolio.

The Upper bound is the ability of the risk taker to bear the burden of return. Thus, if a bank lends to a business that makes 10% return on capital employed - it cannot charge more than 10% else it will be unviable for the borrower to seek the debt at all.

The Actual interest rate charged is determined by a combination of the following factors:

1. An assessment of returns of the business based on the economy and her business 
2. Income of the borrower in total 
3. The value of the collateral pledged against the loan as a security should the borrower be unable to bear that return 
4. The demand for loans AND/OR
5. How well the other loans are doing (health of bank's loan portfolio) AND/OR
6. A combination of these along with global factors

Spread

Bankers think of returns as spread they make on top of the lower bound, i.e. rate set by the central bank. 

Risk V/s Spread

Now, in the mind of the banker risk is correlated with the spread. When the banker perceives higher risk she fattens the spread. This "risk" we talk about is risk resulting to the banker. It does not mean risk of the borrower alone. So if the bankers' portfolio is turning bad, the banker will still increase the spread - partly to compensate for the loss she suffers and partly because she assesses the general economic environment to be more risky. Thus, even if the central bank reduces the benchmark interest rate, the banker is reluctant to pass it on if she can avoid it. This creates tighter conditions putting more stress on the borrower. This is why Scot Sumner argues the monetary conditions were actually tight when we were almost at ZIRP.

In an economy that is weak, it acts as a stronger head wind for borrowers. It reduces their ability to borrow and to service their current borrowing. They want to pay down their debt and reduce their loans. Therefore, the economy contracts further. The banks seem happy at first, but soon realise that other borrowers who are not prudent are pushed to default. The implication of this on the bank depends on the mechanics of the process - the proportion of those who default v/s those who pay back, the chronology in which it happens etc.

In the next phase, the economy recovers, predominantly with equity capital. Equity can absorb the losses since it is built for higher risk. The surviving firms and individuals are left with core strength to  thrive in intense competition and are more prudent with capital allocation. The banks thereafter can lend to these survivors to help them scale up.

What does this mean?

This means, 

1. There is inherent value to competitiveness that signifies its ability to survive and repay the debt and repay the equity at decent returns. This ability reduces with increasing leverage by the borrowers. Thus when Anat Admati suggests investment banks have capped leverage ratios to 20 or 10 it makes sense.
2. Banks' business model seems to encourage the use of debt only to amplify equity returns. It is fine in a way but if that is the objective then banks should reduce/cut lending at lot earlier than they do. Naturally, in times of distress when the return ON capital matters lesser than the return OF capital, banks get into big trouble. It seems they get confused about what is their business model. 
3. Maybe, better than ZIRP, unleashing a new Government-backed Good Bank to pick up assets at distressed prices at lending rates with narrow and fixed spreads can work better. If the size of this bank is large enough in relation to the banking system, it may result in a lesser shock to the economy.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". 

Of Free drinks and negative interest rate policy...

If soft drinks (Coke/Pepsi/tea/coffee etc.) were freely available would you tend to have more of it? Often I end up having one extra coke. If its tea/coffee I end up having even more. I will have to work it off that day through exercise or it will cause some harm in the long term. 

Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) is like that - if you already wanted Coke and it was easily available you end up having a little more Coke. Likewise, if you already wanted debt, and it was easily available at almost zero cost, then you will have a little more. But not a lot more - coz you have to work it off.

But what if you don't want them?

Say your doctor told you to not have soft drinks at all - no tea/coffee too. Now will you have that? NO? Even if I give you some money - say 2 cents - to have these soft drinks? Still NO? 

Well, me giving you some money is similar to Negative interest rate policy (NIRP). Or similar to one aspect of NIRP. You get a tiny advantage if you take on debt. Is it that difficult to understand why it doesn't work as central bankers hope?

But may be NIRP could work...

Now some will agree that ZIRP may not work, but, they say, NIRP could work. They point to the second aspect of NIRP which is that if you save you get taxed extra. Now if I have $100 in cash in a bank, next year I will have only $98 so next year I will be able to spend less than I can do today. Isn't that an incentive for spending now rather than next year? I say not always!

There are a few reasons:

1. If the trends are deflationary your $98 next year may be able to buy as much as $100 today - sometimes even more. If the efficient market hypothesis* were working prices would adjust to reflect the new purchasing power. NIRP would create some deflationary force as well. Yes, it is small but it is deflationary never the less. So unless the NIRP was creating an overwhelming inflationary force, it may push a precariously balanced economy into deflation. 
2. The NIRP tax does not affect those paying down an earlier debt. In fact, it encourages people to swap new debt for old debt. Debt repayment helps you avoid the tax. This is even more deflationary.
3. NIRP does not work if I anticipate unpredictable cash requirements - say because I want to keep some money to invest when prices correct, or I think my business loan may need to be repaid if my business does not do well in next quarter, or I expect health care costs etc. In fact, it works reverse - in such cases, I would be encouraged to save $102 or $104 just to keep a buffer.
4. NIRP may push those with huge cash balances to move cash abroad. Do you think Apple and Google will bring that extra cash into a country with NIRP? No way! They might move it to a destination where it will be easier to hold cash. So is this what you want to happen? NO! Who gets affected is the individual who keeps getting taxed extra.
5. I may not want debt or I may not want to spend at all. I have the clothes, I have the phones, computers, TV, house, car, swimming pool etc - all the goodies I can spend on when you nudged me to spend the last time. Now I have mostly everything I need. So why should I spend on something I am not excited about? Beats me!

* I don't think Efficient market hypothesis works on a "point-in-time" basis - though it works on an average basis.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". 

To RBI: A Case against Rate Cut

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is under considerable pressure to reduce its benchmark interest rates in its upcoming monetary policy meeting. However, prudent monetary policy needs to keep rates at the current level rather than a premature easing for various reasons.

First, the present high inflation problem was caused by supply-side constraints combined with demand-side factors induced by rural wage growth. Over the past few months, rural wage growth has moderated and the government is also prudent and is not increasing MSPs. This has eased demand-side pressures and hence the recent inflation strength can be attributed primarily to supply side factors. 

Our strategy to counter supply-side inflation has been to boost supply through increased infrastructure investment coupled with measures to improve ease of doing business. To make it work, we must let supply overtake the latent demand by such a margin that any easing thereafter should unleash a positive demand catch-up spiral. The risk with a premature rate cut is that it creates demand even before supply-side catches up, in turn pushing the inflation trajectory higher. Therefore it is better to err on the side of caution and reduce rates later rather than risk another inflation spurt.

Second, higher interest rates combined with lower inflation augur well for positive real savings return. This has twin benefits. On one hand it redirects household incomes away from consumption into savings; and on the other hand it will creates a corpus of domestic saving that can be re-invested into the economy making Indian investments less dependent and more resilient to external / global shocks. 

Third, high asset prices, particularly real estate prices, are a more substantive burden on economic growth than interest rates. A premature cut can re-invigorate the real estate cycle, adding to the countries financial vulnerability. As the BIS has stated, central banks should focus not just on the business cycle, but also the financial cycle. Higher real interest rate will maintain a pressure on asset prices thereby creating beneficial conditions for sustainable economic growth.

Fourth, higher interest rates (more capital inflows) coupled with exchange rate sterilization measures are helping the RBI create a war chest to counter any external currency shocks. This was indeed the learning from the South East Asian crisis of 1990s – make hay while the sun shines. The RBI, rightly so, expects the near future to be tumultuous in light of US Fed tightening and changes in divergent monetary policies in developed countries. Higher rates will ensure that the RBI has enough dry powder in case of a global economic shock.

In sum, calling for the RBI to cut interest rates – just when the inflation battle is being won- is premature, short-sighted and tantamount to declaring a victory even before the enemy has been defeated. In a world where global central banks are creating conditions for future instability, the RBI should remain a beacon of stability.

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Welfare v/s Austerity - India's issue

Many people including some experts, attribute Indian growth of about 5% to the welfare schemes of the UPA government. Their honest belief is that UPA government's welfare schemes helped alleviate some of the harshness of the global economic slowdown. They also point to Chinese stimulus as something to emulate. Thereby they believe Modi's promised subsidy rationalisation (euphemism for reducing welfare) is not a good idea. I disagree. 

First, there is a difference between global issues and Indian condition. Global economic engines have stalled, while India's remain switched off for want of fuel (investment and clarity in policy making). 

Second, fixing the engines requires fuel which is currently diverted to subsidies. Thus, if there were an ideal subsidy level, current burden is most likely higher than this level. Therefore, naturally, to bring sanity back this will have to be rolled back. 

Finally, what is required is to push-start the engines is additional effort which will eat away more subsidy than generally required. Thus, push-starting this engine will cause subsidy to dip below this ideal levels. The blame for this does not lie with present government but with UPA which killed the engine long time ago.

Fix the engines and Indian engines can hum along for quite a while creating economic growth and surplus necessary to smoothen the income disparity in later years. Acche din aane wale hain!

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Double whammy of withdrawal of funds from emerging markets

In the past few trading sessions, there has been a considerable withdrawal of funds from the emerging markets. We can attribute this to two basic reasons.

Firstly, we have seen reduction of QE from $85 billion to $65 billion in the last four months. Secondly, we have seen an upward pressure on interest rates in the developed world. These two factors have combined to create A double whammy. At the time when funds are scarce, we have a reverse potential difference that is pulling money towards developed markets. This perverse situation will lead to substantial abatement of money flows from emerging markets to the developed markets.

In addition, there is already in place, an incentive to emerging markets sovereigns to invest in developed market treasuries for mercantilistic reasons.

I believe, these three forces will lead to substantial correction in equity markets in developing countries. Hence, we will see drastic correction in Indian equity markets. I also think, the same logic will hold for other developing countries.

I will be trying to close my open positions as soon as I can. Let us hope that we are able to ride out this turbulent phase. However, I do not think that this turbulence will last more than three months. Therefore, it is essential to get into the market say around end-April.

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How Low interest rate can be bad for small business

Summarized from the book (click to buy)

We are told that when interest rates are too low, they are encouraging entrepreneurs to take risk.

However, this impacts the business models differently. At one end are business models, like infrastructure projects, that cannot add threshold value in the initial years of the venture. The low interest rate regime, allows a valuable gestation period for such business models. Often, government artificially lowers interest rates for such projects. At the other extreme, there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. These business models, however, die out once the interest rates start rising. In between, there are experimental and innovative business models. Some of these use the low interest rate period to forge better, more robust models. Such businesses thrive later. Others, however, end up going bust. The role of banks is to identify each of these business models and fund them while appropriately mitigating the risks. 

How low interest rate leads to mal-investment 

A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. Ideally, even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed. 

However, in reality, lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures. 

Typically, such irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Intelligent investors will find that this contradicts with the "diversification as risk management" strategy. But being with herd has a stronger lure and is treated as risk mitigation (though wrongly).

Further, at lower interest rates, debt starts being used as an instrument to amplify equity returns.  

Thus the second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy. 

In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios. 

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LIBOR and US Dollar

The ongoing Libor scandal is interesting to watch for other reasons as well.

First, Libor is benchmark against all the debt-risk is priced. Ok, Us treasury yields are the main benchmark, but Libor performs quite similar function. What the scandal tells us is than since last so many years this benchmark was flawed. Therefore, real Libor must be something different and hence the risk linked to it must be adequately readjusted.

Second, how will you readjust the risk without knowing what the benchmark should be. In geometry a similar problem occurs when there is a change of origin. When axes or origin are/is changed the coordinates make no sense unless you know the coordinates of new origin as per the old axis. It creates a hell lot of confusion in the geometry class when this concept is taught. Same confusion can be caused in debt markets as well. Bankers will need to reprice the debt.

Same is true with US Dollar

We really don't know what is the real value of dollar but we know value of all other currencies relative to the dollar. So watch the Libor scandal unravel will point us to important lessons for dollar. So watch carefully!

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How lower Interest Rate create Malinvestments?

Hayek argues about lose monetary policy resulting in malinvestments. But it is important to know how.In essence, there are three components to the argument.

First, interest rate represent the hurdle or minimum threshold return a business must produce. The return on capital is measure of the strength of business model and execution skill of the firm. The higher the return more capable the firm, stronger its business model, better its execution. (Note: does not indicate causality but simply co-existence).

Second, credit flows to those with history. Bankers or creditors in general, prefer to lend to large firms because of reputation, size and volume of credit that can quickly be deployed. In a low interest rate environment, bankers will prefer to loan a project of a large firm with ROCE of 5% rather than lend to 30 small firms with ROCE of 15%. This behaviour stifles the flow of credit to vibrant smaller enterprises, thus restricting new innovations. Because of this low-cost finance availability, it is possible that large corporates create unjustified barriers to entry (for example, dealer credit) to prevent new entrants. Further, it also creates anemic large projects that not only falter at the first sign of trouble, but also impose amplified collateral damage to the banking and credit system as a whole.

Based on my experience, the investment relevance - interest rate curve is a bell-shaped curve. If interest rates are too low then they result in malinvestments. If they are too high they strangle the economy. In between is a sweet spot policy makers should aim for.

Third, interest rate regime sets the benchmark for risk. Every investor, particularly those like mutual funds or pension funds, has a minimum expected return. This return is adjusted in keeping with planned expenses, payout of costs already incurred, adjustment for inflation etc. This minimum expected return is not a fancy number we expect to see, but rather a minimum threshold to ensure you cover your costs.

To hit this minimum return, investors now need to take more risks. In other words, we have modified the risk calibration. Each modification creates a portfolio churn, sometimes increasing the risk within the portfolio, sometimes reducing the risks as signaled by the interest rate regime changes. This is a form of mal-investment.

However, lower interest rates do help longer gestation vibrant projects. Infrastructure (or rather appropriate infrastructure) comes under this classification. Thus, a low interest rate environment can be used to create a longer term strategic advantage. Clearly, such process must involve stricter policy oversight and control.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon