Comments on Ray Dalio's post on Monetary Policy 3 and MMT

Ray Dalio's comments are always well researched and interesting. For starters, I think, Principles for navigating Big Debt Crises is must read. (Its free PDF). His recent post on his LinkedIn blog is about Monetary Policy 3.0 and MMT. 

Some fundamental comments about present crisis:

1. QE only creates a space for fiscal response: Central banks and governments alike misunderstood the role of monetary policy in the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis was different than others we have faced since Great Depression. Per my reading of Keynes (which seems to different than Keynesians and neo-Keynesians both), in such crises, the proper response has to be from fiscal side. The monetary policy merely creates space for the fiscal response or accommodates the fiscal response preventing untoward consequences. The response had to be holistic - a coordinated and sustained monetary and fiscal policy response.
2. Fiscal policy amplification mechanism is broken: Broken may be a harsh word, we may choose "has become messy" in its place. The point is, fiscal policy needs an amplification mechanism. When government starts infrastructure spending, it needs some real value-creating sector to take it from there and start driving the economic engine. At present we do not have such "real value-creating sector" that can boost employments and wages generally. In 1980s we had tech, in 2000s we had internet, now we need something. In absence of a big driver, we need many small ones. If such capability is difficult to create in one sector it is quite difficult to create in more than one sectors too. The solution is to let inherent advantages play out.
3. Inherent advantages are muzzled: Inherent advantages have stopped driving international trade since east asian crisis, and at a larger scale with China's entry to WTO. Instead, we have pegged exchange rates (soft/hard/overt/covert), manipulated tariff and non-tariff barriers, and, in general, non-transparent trade policy. Until that is fixed we cannot have trade based on pure competitive advantage.
4. Small business innovations are indefensible: When people talk of China usurping Intellectual property they usually talk about submarine plans etc. But I am talking of something very basic. Check out new funding projects on kickstarter - innovative shoes, innovative bags, innovative pens, anything that takes your fancy. Just search on alibaba or just wait for few months you will see some products like those (invented by kickstarter entrepreneurs) in the market on mass scale. These products are not sold by those companies who invented them on kickstarter or such platforms. This is IP theft that hurts the most. It removes new business competitiveness right at its infancy.
5. Trickle-up always works; trickle down some times: Monetary policy practitioners and academic economists in general prefer trickle down economics. But empirical evidence says reverse is true. Trickle-up works all the time. Thus, when there is a choice of bail out, we must lean to lower strata. (A) It is more fair and just, (B) better optics and (C) right incentives. But MAIN reason it works because it balances the bargaining power of both sides. Bail out the top and they lean on to regulation to prevent or constrict trickle down stifling the economy. Bail out the bottom and lo and behold all the incentives align beautifully.
6. Certainty of employment and wages is the one super-indicator: The best solution to any crisis is to get certainty of employment and wages going, rest follows from that. Today we have almost full employment but it is uncertain. Wage predictability is also uncertain. That's why the lack of demand is so persistent.
7. Interest Rates are like friction: Too much and too little friction are both bad. Sames goes for interest rates too much is bad, too little is ALSO bad.

Some comments about Monetary Policy 3:

1. Debt financed Fiscal spending financed by QE: I don't agree with Ray Dalio that this was pursued after 2008 financial crisis. The fiscal spending was essentially going to the same group who could access the QE funds. Yes, there was fiscal deficit and increased fiscal spending and yes there was QE to finance it. But this is exactly the wrong kind of stimulus as I have written since 2009 itself.
2. Giving $10,000 to one person Vs $100 to 100 persons Vs $1 to 10,000 people: Helicopter money is not easy to design. The behavioral response in each of three cases varies drastically.The range of outcomes possible is mind boggling.
3. Spending conditions interfere political rights: If I am tasked to spend $10,000 can I give it to someone from my family to pay down her loan? Does that amount to spending? Should I buy something? What thing? These questions are difficult to answer, monitor and control. 
4. A little inflation is necessary: People will spend when they can surely afford it (condition above - certainty of employment and wages) and it will get costlier tomorrow. Inflation is important, zero inflation may not be that great.

The examples of Monetary policy 3.0: 

The best part of the analysis is the historical perspective Ray Dalio gives. Sharp readers of this blog will immediately note that there are fundamental differences between the conditions in various situations described and those existing now. That is acceptable difference.

Particularly interesting is the Roosevelt response in 1930s. It still forms the basic template for solution today. However, we are at a slightly different position today than in 1930s. So we have to make more adjustments than Dalio may seem to suggest. [Dalio is NOT suggesting it - it appears simple but it is incredibly complex - politically, fiscally and economically]

In Sum

Do not understand these comments as put down of Ray Dalio (as if he cares what I think!). I admire the man because he is being honest and creating a framework to solve the crisis. Good intentions and honest efforts deserve praise - even if the guy making those efforts is one of the richest.

From my side, I solved this crisis puzzle back in 2009 itself.

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Interesting Readings May 14 2018 - Development Finance Institutions.

Financing reindustrialization: bring back development banks

Deepak Nayyer talks about capabilities created in Development Financial institutions (DFIs) for longterm lending. 

These DFIs are very important in creating a capability for lending to special investments. India, till 2000, had developed the capabilities to lend to infrastructure, sector-wise capacity creation etc. We need the concentration of skills in one place. This way, special knowledge reduced the risk for lending.

The commercial banks decided to reduce the lending risks by consortium lending. That is a statistical approach to risk mitigation.

Now Deepak Nayyar wants to create a National Development Bank. That I think is a bad idea. Though there may be some merit in creating a network of professionals who can lend to industry and towards infrastructure. These professionals can be monitored using DIN-like number (Director identification number) and their investments performance tracked. These people may be employed with commercial banks but without sign-off from these persons, such loans will not be approved.

Note:

What we are creating is attribution chain. I have discussed the importance of attribution in both of my books - Subverting Capitalism and Democracy and Understanding Firms. Please use the links below to check out the books. 

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Revenue Deficit vs Fiscal deficit and Fiscal responsibility

"Ballooning Revenue Deficit is far more worrisome than nominal slippage in fiscal deficit" said Mythili Bhusnurmath in ET. Her views are correct. But how to curb Revenue deficit. Let us understand the terms a bit more in detail.

Revenue deficit is amount by which Revenue expenditures exceed Revenues. 

What are revenues or Revenue receipts?

Revenues can be tax or non-tax. Tax component includes share of tax of Union Government in general taxes and "cess" or specialized taxes accruing to Union Government alone. [Refer Note 1]. Non-tax revenues includes interest on loans to various entities (state governments, etc.),  profits and dividends from enterprises, duties and fines received, grants from multilateral agencies or other governments etc.

What are revenue expenditures?

Revenue expenditures includes:

1. Salaries and pension paid to government employees
2. Subsidies
3. defense expenditure (relates to national security)
4. Government procurement from stationery to vehicles to arms and ammunition for police (internal security)
5.  Expense required for running government schemes and programs
6. Interest paid on borrowings - domestic and external.
   

Fiscal Deficit is more like capital account deficit.

Capital Account Receipts side includes recovery of loans to States etc., receipts from disinvestment or privatization and borrowing (external and domestic). Capital expenditures includes investments in Public sector companies, investments in public projects, etc.

Further, accounting 101 will tell you that revenue deficit accumulates in the Fiscal side and it has to be financed through borrowing which sits on the capital account. The servicing of this borrowing is done through revenue expenditures. These twin deficits thus, are quite interlinked. Mathematically, it is true that we can reduce Fiscal deficit (FD) while Revenue Deficit (RD) remains high. But it is true only for small values of RD. But a more ideal situation is when FD is higher (though less than the 3%) and RD is zero or lower. Then, one presumes, your excess FD would be mostly because of high quality capital expenditure. This capital expenditure will yield more Revenues and thus lower RD in the future. [Refer Note 2].

The Problem

For past decade or more, reverse is true. Most of borrowing is used for revenue expenditures - i.e. payment of salaries to bureaucrats. In return, bureaucrats and government employees have stifled any possible revenue growth for citizen or companies thereby reducing the revenues. This widens the revenue deficit and pushes the system into a negative spiral.

It is clear that the present malaise is largely self-inflicted. Imposing FRBM target without first having a RD at zero or lower is a recipe for disaster. At present, government appears to throw disinvestment money after revenue expenses and that is very bad idea. It erodes the structure of the economy.

How to kickstart the positive spiral?

The government is now required to first ensure that RD is reduced to zero but using revenue receipts. That requires expansion of tax base which is impossible without taxing agriculture. Thereafter, using asset sales i.e. disinvestment or privatization route, reduce the lower quality borrowing. Most of the borrowing by the government should be directed towards investments that yield revenues in the future and thus create structural zero- revenue deficits or revenue surpluses. This is the improvement in quality of budget is what prudent observers seek.

Notes:

1. Indian federal structure implies that both center and states have power to tax and they have share in the tax. Most of the taxes are shared and go into "consolidated fund of India" for central share and "consolidated fund of the state" for state taxes.
2. Ideally, the any borrowing or loan or debt should create more revenue than expenses required to service it. To do that, borrowing must be invested in revenue boosting ventures. Companies borrow to buy new machine that can increase production. Similarly nations should invest in those assets that will increase profits for citizens and companies and thus improve tax receipts.

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RBI minutes of meeting - Was RBI unanimous in its monetary policy?

The Reserve Bank of India released the minutes of the third meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). In that meeting two important decisions were made. Firstly, the rates were left unchanged and second the stance was changed to "neutral" from "accommodative". While the first was in the deliberation set of the market, the second truly spooked the market. Markets were not expecting a change of policy stance. There was speculation about if the decision was, in fact, unanimous or not.

Well, the minutes do not give us that clarity. Indian mentality is to deliberate and discuss the differences and then once consensus is reached, the decision is "unanimous". The deliberations and differences are left out of the public statement. 

The statement includes this explanation as such:

3] According to Section 45ZL of the amended Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, the Reserve Bank shall publish, on the fourteenth day after every meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, the minutes of the proceedings of the meeting which shall include the following, namely:–

(a) the resolution adopted at the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee;

(b) the vote of each member of the Monetary Policy Committee, ascribed to such member, on resolutions adopted in the said meeting; and

(c) the statement of each member of the Monetary Policy Committee under sub-section (11) of section 45ZI on the resolution adopted in the said meeting.

In effect, the minutes of MPC are nothing but public statement or press release for the MPC and is duly sanitised. It does not state of any differences between the MPC members. Nevertheless, the committee seems to have been unanimous on both the aspects of the decision. The committee has made some important statements: [formatting changes for improved readability are mine]

On Inflation 

It is important to note three significant upside risks that impart some uncertainty to the baseline inflation path – 

• the hardening profile of international crude prices; 

• volatility in the exchange rate on account of global financial market developments, which could impart upside pressures to domestic inflation; and 

• the fuller effects of the house rent allowances under the 7th Central Pay Commission (CPC) award which have not been factored in the baseline inflation path.  

The focus of the Union budget on growth revival without compromising on fiscal prudence should bode well for limiting upside risks to inflation. 

On GVA growth 

GVA growth for 2016-17 is projected at 6.9 per cent with risks evenly balanced around it. Growth is expected to recover sharply in 2017-18 on account of several factors. 

First, discretionary consumer demand held back by demonetisation is expected to bounce back beginning in the closing months of 2016-17. 

Second, economic activity in cash-intensive sectors such as retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and transportation, as well as in the unorganised sector, is expected to be rapidly restored. 

Third, demonetisation-induced ease in bank funding conditions has led to a sharp improvement in transmission of past policy rate reductions into marginal cost-based lending rates (MCLRs), and in turn, to lending rates for healthy borrowers, which should spur a pick-up in both consumption and investment demand. 

Fourth, the emphasis in the Union Budget for 2017-18 on stepping up capital expenditure, and boosting the rural economy and affordable housing should contribute to growth. 

The Committee inflation and growth expectations are mapped as follows:

The forecasts do lend legitimacy to the neutral stance. The statement includes emphasis on "caliberated approach" to achieve the 4% target. Urjit Patel clarified that neutral stance implies that rates can move any direction. Thus, in effect turns out to be quite benign policy.

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Counter intuitive = Low rates / ZIRP/NIRP policies are actually bad for economy

We are told that when interest rates are too low, they are encouraging entrepreneurs to take risk. So we have low interest rate policy LIRP, Zero interest rate policy, ZIRP and negative interest rate policy NIRP.

However, these policies impacts the business models differently. At one end are business models, like infrastructure projects, that cannot add threshold value in the initial years of the venture. The low interest rate regime, allows a valuable gestation period for such business models. Often, government artificially lowers interest rates for such projects. At the other extreme, there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. These business models, however, die out once the interest rates start rising. In between, there are experimental and innovative business models. Some of these use the low interest rate period to forge better, more robust models. Such businesses thrive later. Others, however, end up going bust. The role of banks is to identify each of these business models and fund them while appropriately mitigating the risks. 

How low interest rate leads to mal-investment 

A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. Ideally, even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed. 

However, in reality, lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures. Typically, such irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. 

First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Intelligent investors will find that this contradicts with the "diversification as risk management" strategy. But being with herd has a stronger lure and is treated as risk mitigation (though wrongly).

Further, at lower interest rates, debt starts being used as an instrument to amplify equity returns. With unchanged return on capital employed, you can have higher return on equity when return on debt reduces. Return on debt is function of interest rates and lower share it claims from the total returns made by the firms. 

Thus the second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy. 

In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios.

This is particularly true when there is some demand in the system.

What happens when there is no demand?

When there is no demand in the economy, low interest rates / ZIRP / NIRP etc are said to stimulate this demand. This, to my simplistic mind, sounds like offering desserts to the already overfed diner  (AOD) with the hope to eliminate world hunger. Let me explain.

We hope this AOD, when offered with a free desserts will take them and pass them along to the hungry. In this method we depend on the magnanimity of intentions of our already overfed diner. Then we presume he shall act on his instincts and find worthy hungry who can transmit the benefits to others. It is quite possible our Glutton may pass the desserts to his friends or family and each can be a little more fatter. Are we, then to wait for all the gluttons to be severly beefed up or porked up before the trickle down starts to the hungry?

It sound like bull-shit method to me. Particularly I cannot understand why you are preventing the hungry from feeding themselves - either by employing them or letting entrepreneurs do it by financing them with reasonably priced debt/credit. These entrepreneurs are left to finance their ventures with credit cards, overdrafts and other very high cost financings at considerable peril. Now since these financing schemes are not on the business side, they are paid out of the post-tax income generated by the firm (but they should have been tax deductable at firm stage itself). This is doubly onerous for the entrepreneurs. 

Treat Interest rate like friction

A better model is to think of interest rate like engineers think of friction. Some is good, too much is bad, too little is bad too. In fact friction analogy should be best suited for determining neutral rate of interest. 

Economist too think of interest rate as friction. To the economist - road mileage of the car represents growth, fuel represents capital availability or liquidity. The economists' metaphor of friction is flawed. They need to get their metaphor right.

Engineers will tell you - you need to maximize friction at the tyres and eliminate it from the engines. At the clutch and brakes too you need friction. So you need interest rates high at some places and low at some others. So Economists better figure out where you want low interest rates and where you want high interest rates. Note the question is where not when. 

In Sum

The hazards of the LIRP, ZIRP and NIRP far outweigh the benefits. These policies do not pass the smell test. We need a better understanding of interest rate as a tool for improving economic growth.

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Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". A version of this argument was made in Subverting Capitalism back in 2010 and also posted on this blog in 2012. Nothing, it appears, has changed.

Should banks create money?

Bloomberg has a post about centralizing money supply - whole money, as they call it. It is not a very good idea. This is not the first time such suggestions have come up. As mentioned in the article, Irving Fisher first proposed a similar plan in the wake of the great depression. Since then many have proposed this idea but not many understand money creation.

Taxonomy of centralized money creation idea

The money creation ideas are varied:

1. Gold money: This is natural money creation. No one has any control over the money creation. Previously, gold, silver, diamonds, precious stones and other valuables (and sometimes sea shells too) were used. Many serendipitous discoveries of valuables created havoc with the money supply. Discovery of Potosi in South America and thereafter further discoveries of gold and silver had the effect of expanding Spanish money supply. 
1. Not under any control: Neither governments nor banks, no one has any control over the money creation process.
2. But Non-Arbitrary: It depends on the amount of gold you have. If you want more gold, you better import more gold by giving some valuable service to the other countries  who have gold. Over time as the total amount of gold available starts reducing you need to offer more and more to the countries that have gold.
3. Though subject to Nature: If by chance you discover a gold mine, you will be filthy rich, though if you discover too much then it may unleash inflation. Spain is believed to have faced such inflation on the discovery of silver mines in the South American colonies.
4. Deflationary and restrictive: As economic activity grows it becomes too high compared to the total amount of gold available to back it. Thus it tends to slow the economic growth pace. (Don't know if that is good or bad).
5. Favours status quo, old money and advantageous to miserly: Since total value of gold you have increases with time, people tend to postpone purchases and hold on to gold. Spending happens when absolutely necessary.
6. Exploitation and Theft prone: A doctor can charge atrocious fees from a rich person because of bargaining power equations. Gold can also be stolen. Stealing credit cards is less useful.
2. Gold-backed money: Introduced to circumvent the deflationary gold currency, countries peg the value of their currency to the gold they can back it with. When people talk of gold standard they are referring to this type of money creation. 
1. Partly Government controlled: Government issues currency and states the total amount of gold they back it with. So a gold-to-dollar exchange rate is established. The government can improve its reserves and thus improve money creation. 
2. Non-arbitrary: In its pure form it is non-arbitrary and similar to gold-money.
3. Not purely nature driven but subject to shocks: Since the government has control over the amount of money and amount of gold, the money creation is not as whimsical as simply discovering a gold mountain. Governments can reset the exchange rate to compensate for some changes. But arbitrary government intervention results in shocks and disruptions.
4. Mostly deflationary: Governments cannot measure economic activity easily (yes GDP calculations are guess-work and there is no Santa Claus just in case you were wondering). That leaves money creation open to political whims and fancies and invites tampering of measurement of the economic health. Mostly governments are slow to acknowledge the real growth in economy since it is always backward looking. It realises the growth till the growth results in deflationary pressures then increases money supply and causes a spike.
5. Perception of money losing value as government reset gold rate: As total amount of product and services of value in the economy rise more than amount of gold to back it up, the government is forced to alter the gold-dollar exchange rate downward leading to people feeling that each dollar is worth lesser in terms of gold though purchasing power may be higher.
3. Government-created money: This is non-gold standard money. Simply speaking the government issues money and backs it with a promise. This is what people wrongly believe is the current regime. 
1. Full government control: The government has effective control over the process. This is a mixed bag. It depends on the government. 
2. Some central bank control: The exact control depends on how money is created, is it by using government bonds then bought to a certain extent by central banks or some other way (simply printing).
3. Depends on confidence in Government: Prudent governments enjoy advantages but if you are Zimbabwe then you will end up in trouble.
4. Inflation/deflation depends on policy: If a government print too much then it stokes inflation and too little results in deflation. Prudently executed (Milton Friedman's about 3% money supply growth) works fine.
5. Value of money depends on inflation: If the government is able to deal with money creation effectively then a mild inflation - say 2% may result. There is not too much loss in value and it can be notices only over long time frames when quality of life changes are also noticeable.
4. Money created by banks: Mostly commercial banks create money by giving loans. These loans do not exist as money. This is the most misunderstood money creation mechanism. It is distributed money creation, without extreme control. Bankers and regulators forget that its success depends on devising proper incentives. 
1. Less government control:No country uses this method exclusively. Both Government-created and bank-created money is deployed. Thus there is always government control of some sort. Also since government is also a borrower (a big one at that), it has control.
2. Part central bank control: Central bank exercises additional kind of controls in this mechanism. First, it can partner with government in its money creation process by buying government bonds etc. Second, it controls the lending to the banks and thus influences at what levels of risk do banks create money. The key word is influences and not dictates. Thus this process is often likened to "pushing at a string" (which is difficult, you can pull at a string pushing does nothing unless there is pulling at other end by the banks).
3. Control to banks: In this scenario, Banks can ALSO determine whether to create money or not. That decision is based on whether the person demanding the money will be able to repay it or not. If he can, it means he is creating value with this money and thus able to repay it. 
4. Decision at the point of demand of debt: The decision to create money is forward looking. It is made at the point the person makes a demand for the debt. That borrower is expecting to create future value. If by banks assessment that value can be generated ONLY then money is created.
5. Depends on incentives: After reading this if you wonder why banks lend for consumption goods or lend to uncreditworthy borrowers - it is because of incentives. The power to create money is substantial power and with bad incentives, it can cause systemic harm as seen in 2008 crisis.
6. Central bank oversight: Central banks have oversight duty to watch what kind of money is created by the banks. The nature of lending is supposed to be value-focussed. Some consumer lending at the time economy is entering a pro-longed boom phase can be advantageous. But in an economy which cannot sustain a prolonged growth phase, these are risky loans and their proportion needs to be limited.

My suggestion

Out of the options, I prefer the last one - a combination of bank created and government created money. It is quite forward looking and takes place at the point of demand. It needs a lot of oversight and decentralisation. I have argued that IT systems have in fact centralized the loan decision making than allow the front-line managers to make them. This has resulted in an inaccurate assessment of borrowers and partly responsible for the 2008 crises. Amar Bhide also makes a case for intelligent decision making in his book "A call for judgement".

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Is assessment of risk a function of interest rate?

The interest rate that can be charged by the bank has  two limits.

The Lower bound equals what the central bank charges the bank. Any lower and the bank will make a loss on its lending portfolio.

The Upper bound is the ability of the risk taker to bear the burden of return. Thus, if a bank lends to a business that makes 10% return on capital employed - it cannot charge more than 10% else it will be unviable for the borrower to seek the debt at all.

The Actual interest rate charged is determined by a combination of the following factors:

1. An assessment of returns of the business based on the economy and her business 
2. Income of the borrower in total 
3. The value of the collateral pledged against the loan as a security should the borrower be unable to bear that return 
4. The demand for loans AND/OR
5. How well the other loans are doing (health of bank's loan portfolio) AND/OR
6. A combination of these along with global factors

Spread

Bankers think of returns as spread they make on top of the lower bound, i.e. rate set by the central bank. 

Risk V/s Spread

Now, in the mind of the banker risk is correlated with the spread. When the banker perceives higher risk she fattens the spread. This "risk" we talk about is risk resulting to the banker. It does not mean risk of the borrower alone. So if the bankers' portfolio is turning bad, the banker will still increase the spread - partly to compensate for the loss she suffers and partly because she assesses the general economic environment to be more risky. Thus, even if the central bank reduces the benchmark interest rate, the banker is reluctant to pass it on if she can avoid it. This creates tighter conditions putting more stress on the borrower. This is why Scot Sumner argues the monetary conditions were actually tight when we were almost at ZIRP.

In an economy that is weak, it acts as a stronger head wind for borrowers. It reduces their ability to borrow and to service their current borrowing. They want to pay down their debt and reduce their loans. Therefore, the economy contracts further. The banks seem happy at first, but soon realise that other borrowers who are not prudent are pushed to default. The implication of this on the bank depends on the mechanics of the process - the proportion of those who default v/s those who pay back, the chronology in which it happens etc.

In the next phase, the economy recovers, predominantly with equity capital. Equity can absorb the losses since it is built for higher risk. The surviving firms and individuals are left with core strength to  thrive in intense competition and are more prudent with capital allocation. The banks thereafter can lend to these survivors to help them scale up.

What does this mean?

This means, 

1. There is inherent value to competitiveness that signifies its ability to survive and repay the debt and repay the equity at decent returns. This ability reduces with increasing leverage by the borrowers. Thus when Anat Admati suggests investment banks have capped leverage ratios to 20 or 10 it makes sense.
2. Banks' business model seems to encourage the use of debt only to amplify equity returns. It is fine in a way but if that is the objective then banks should reduce/cut lending at lot earlier than they do. Naturally, in times of distress when the return ON capital matters lesser than the return OF capital, banks get into big trouble. It seems they get confused about what is their business model. 
3. Maybe, better than ZIRP, unleashing a new Government-backed Good Bank to pick up assets at distressed prices at lending rates with narrow and fixed spreads can work better. If the size of this bank is large enough in relation to the banking system, it may result in a lesser shock to the economy.

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What we need to estimate effects of multi-country QE?

I was thinking about ways to estimate impact of QE on potential offered by different equity markets in general or asset markets in general.

Currently we do not have money inflow metrics (i.e. indexed price and volume data) for all asset classes. Nor do we have an exhaustive asset class database (types of asset classes e.g. art). Without these metrics it is difficult to construct a true impact of QE on global markets in general and specific markets in particular. Maybe someone can construct some sort of blended index.

I suspect when we do construct some quasi-indicators we will find that M3 has grown disproportionately with GDP and the difference can be explained by blended asset class inflation.

Once the global effect is understood, the specific country level effect can be understood using a parametrized gravity model. Such model will tell us how the excess liquidity will move. 

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Irrational Exuberance in Asia - Ghosts of Greenspan in India and China

William Pesek writes an interesting column about easy monetary policies (relatively) in Asia. The central point in the article is that there is a distinct need for reform in Asia; the reform is structural - fiscal and political in nature; the reform is ignored and monetary policy is being used to boost "sentiment"; this cannot last.

I agree with the undertone of the article though there are few distinctions I would draw:

1. The outline of reform in Asia Ex-Japan is well known. 
1. It is a well-trodden path by the developed economies. 
2. What is lacking is either the political will or weaker systems that need reform.
3. For political will there has to be some margin in growth. This margin was afforded by a developed country demand for developing country goods.
2. The other reason Central bankers of developing countries are a bit easy with the punch-bowl refills is because the principle strategy for growth is by tagging on to the developed country band-wagon and compete on differentials. 
1. This strategy requires competitive exchange rate mechanisms while maintaining investment-ability in countries assets.
2. The so-called monetary tightness / monetary reform have been triggered by either of these two requirements.
3. Thus, central bankers must keep relative position with developed country monetary policy and amongst each other. Thus if one developing country does QE then it becomes imperative for others to follow in order to maintain export competitiveness.
4. Changing track from this strategy is difficult during good times and becomes almost impossible when the developed markets are going through a weak economic growth phase.
5. Even Japan is attached to this strategy.

Thus the irrational exuberance carries forward from US monetary policy. It cannot be attributed to developing countries. What can be blamed on developing countries is their lack of will to develop an alternative model that can sustain the dreams and aspirations of their peoples.

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Why RBI could not raise interest rate more than 25bps?

Yesterday the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) announced hike in Repo and reverse repo rates by 25bps each. Some commentators argued that RBI is behind the curve and should be aggressive in rate hikes. I disagree.

India is not entering the Volcker age

The question of aggressive RBI puts the Indian economy in some ways (not in magnitude) similar to US when Paul Volcker became the Fed chairman. There is high demand side pull and supply side needs catch up. But there is a key difference in India's position.

India needs investments in supply infrastructure

India needs more than INR 2 Trillion worth of investments to de-bottleneck the supply side. I am not talking about creating supply but simply reducing wastage and time lags to ensure supply gets to consumer. This investment is required in roads, cold-chains, food processing, storage and markets etc. This infrastructure is government responsibility. Either government create this infrastructure or create conditions in which private player can create it. Without this not much can be achieved on supply side.

Interest rate puts pressure on this investment

By increasing interest rates in arbitrary manner RBI will create uncertainty that will impact these investments in two ways. First, it will postpone the investments because of uncertain business environment. Secondly, it will increase the cost of capital and thus reduce profitability of these investments.

Hence, I believe, the RBI acted prudently to signal inflation concerns but allow markets to steadily adjust to higher interest environment.