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Showing posts with label banks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label banks. Show all posts

Monday, May 11, 2020

Why is there is no lending in crisis?

On LinkedIn, Callum Thomas has shared a post detailing tightness in lending standards and gradual shifting to tight credit conditions.

Lending standards tighten at the exact wrong time in a crisis. Also in a crisis the ratings get downgraded en masse. When we want banks to lend, banks do not want to lend. When we want banks to stop lending, banks get busy making risky loans. This is one problem of banking regulation that has not received enough attention. 


Markets and particularly rating agencies need to appreciate the difference between Macro risk (where all aspects of the economy are impaired) v/s corporate risk (where particular company suffers impairment because of its own actions or inactions).

Credit cannot be pushed - it needs to be pulled. To achieve this, a better mechanism is interest subvention. It seems to be a much better tool when macros risks are prevalent.

An SPV which guarantees interest rate up to X% (ranging from 30-50% of lending rate - so for India it will guarantee 3% interest cost for US it could 0.75%) it should cause firms to pull credit and deploy it for productive uses.



Rahul Prakash Deodhar, Advocate, Bombay High Court is also a private investor. He can be reached at rahuldeodhar@gmail.com, on twitter at @rahuldeodhar or at his website www.rahuldeodhar.com.

Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms"

Monday, February 18, 2019

How Low interest rate can be bad for small business - 2


In a 2012 post with same title, How Low interest rate can be bad for small business, I had explained mechanics of how small businesses are denied capital BECAUSE of lower interest rates. This was summarized from my book Subverting Capitalism and Democracy. Over the years few readers have asked for further explanation. So here goes.

Demand for projects
Let us look at the following schematic.
Capital Quantum and return
The diagram shows the amount of capital demanded and its possible rate of return. The distribution is made from capital requirements of various businesses of various sizes. The financed part is the blue rectangle. The width of this rectangle and its location is determined by various factors.

Now our experience tells us following details - (1) smaller businesses have higher risk profile whereas larger businesses have lower risk profiles; (2) smaller businesses have smaller quantum requirement whereas larger businesses have diverse capital needs; (3) as a corollary projects with large quantum of capital requirement and low return are dominated by large corporations.

Therefore, let me quote what I said earlier:
How low interest rate leads to mal-investment
A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. Ideally, even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed.

However, in reality, lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures.

Typically, such irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Intelligent investors will find that this contradicts with the "diversification as risk management" strategy. But being with herd has a stronger lure and is treated as risk mitigation (though wrongly).

Further, at lower interest rates, debt starts being used as an instrument to amplify equity returns

Thus the second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy.


The Mechanics
When interest rates are low this rectangle starts more towards the left. This is space where there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. This space has irrational mega-projects of large businesses like debt financed share-buybacks etc. With the superior credit rating of large businesses these projects crowd out the smaller businesses.

As the interest rates rise the rectangle is pushed rightwards. In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios. 

Are few projects with consortium lending more risky?
The answer to this question is easy if you understand it from banks perspective and not from bank manager's perspective. From bank's perspective more the number of projects it finances the more the diversification possibility and thus lesser the risks.

But this has higher risks for bank manager who has to stick out her neck for each of these projects. From bank manager's perspective fewer the projects and more the number of borrowers approving the project as credit-worthy lesser the risk for bank managers. But this means more the risk for the bank (concentration risks).

In sum
The cumulative effect of all these is that at low interest rate the credit is denied to small borrowers at the expense of irrational mega-projects of large businesses. When the interest rates rise, as they always do, these projects turn bad and become a drag on the economy.

Monday, May 14, 2018

Interesting Readings May 14 2018 - Development Finance Institutions.


Deepak Nayyer talks about capabilities created in Development Financial institutions (DFIs) for longterm lending. 

These DFIs are very important in creating a capability for lending to special investments. India, till 2000, had developed the capabilities to lend to infrastructure, sector-wise capacity creation etc. We need the concentration of skills in one place. This way, special knowledge reduced the risk for lending.

The commercial banks decided to reduce the lending risks by consortium lending. That is a statistical approach to risk mitigation.

Now Deepak Nayyar wants to create a National Development Bank. That I think is a bad idea. Though there may be some merit in creating a network of professionals who can lend to industry and towards infrastructure. These professionals can be monitored using DIN-like number (Director identification number) and their investments performance tracked. These people may be employed with commercial banks but without sign-off from these persons, such loans will not be approved.

Note:
What we are creating is attribution chain. I have discussed the importance of attribution in both of my books - Subverting Capitalism and Democracy and Understanding Firms. Please use the links below to check out the books. 





Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Why does Lloyd Blankfein's interview with Fareed Zakaria sounds weird to me?

Fareed Zakaria interviewed Lloyd Blankfein, CEO of Goldman Sachs, for his GPS program. Here is the video. There are so many weird things with this one. But I came away ith a feeling that if Elizabeth Warren were to cross-examine him in Court, Lloyd Blankfein would be toast. But first watch this (transcript of full show here):


The interview basically talks about few key concepts:
  1. State of the Economy
  2. Accountability of top management of Banks - context of Wells Fargo scam.
  3. Closeness with Clintons
  4. Why wouldn't Hillary Clinton release the transcripts of the talks at Goldman Sachs
I found many weird things. Let us look at the interview in detail (highlights and in-quote comments are all mine).

I start from first question leaving hi's and hello's out.
ZAKARIA: From your vantage point, what does the economy look like? You know, how strong is growth? Because it still seems steady but tepid. 
BLANKFEIN: Well, it feels steady but tepid. But that being said, it is steady and there are a lot of advantages that the U.S. economy has. So for example, the consumer has deleveraged banks -- the banking system is in excellent shape. If you look at energy, there's a lot of tailwind in the U.S. economy and the fact of the matter is, we went through a big trauma, which included a banking system trauma and it took a while to work itself through. So the answer is, it's tepid but we're definitely growing and it's established, and the latter point is the more significant point. 
This is the first question. Nothing special here. Though as a CEO of Goldman Sachs I would have expected Blankfein to be sharper about his analysis. Instead he comes across as pedestrian.

"Banking is in excellent shape" is the wrong thing to say if you ask me, particularly in the world which wants your head. He could have said Banks are in much better position to support entrepreneurial activity - small businesses and the like, than the time just after the crisis. That will kickstart recovery.

Look at this first part:

ZAKARIA: A lot of people say, though, there's a lot of economic anxiety. People don't feel like these numbers are right, that unemployment is down, but at the same time, you know -- so for some reason, they remain as great sense of economic anxiety, what do you attribute that to? 
BLANKFEIN: Well, I'd say, there's economic anxiety but I'd say there's a more generalize anxiety and a very negative sentiment and I think it's fed and feeds into the political cycle. I have trouble explaining. If you look at the metrics, you talk about unemployment -- unemployment is not just down, we're virtually at full employment.   
Now, you'd say that there's some degree of underemployment or wage (earning) that was always the case. 
I'm not minimizing the consequence to people who should have -- who feel their jobs should be higher paid and legitimately so, and the legitimate issues about minimum wages, but at the end of the day, these problems always existed to some extent. They're less -- people should feel better than they may actually do. I'm not saying they should feel good or there aren't challenges to try to surmount or other objectives to strife for. But the sentiment is a lot worse than the economy.  [Mr. Blankfein, you just trivialized the problems facing normal people across the world who have never felt this way before]
If you knew all the numbers and you are teleported here from two years ago or three years ago and you're told where employment was, where the price of energy was. What the federal deficit was looking like is a percentage of GDP, the strength of the consumer, a lot of other metrics and you heard that. You would think that sentiment would be a lot better than it is today. 

Blankfein sounds like he meant people should stop whining. They are whining for no reason. The people are unhappy because their jobs (a) don't pay them as much as they think they deserve, (b) their jobs cannot be counted on as stable for forseable future, (c) they do not see Government or policy makers doing anything to help the situation AND more importantly (d) they see policy makers going to great lengths in aiding bankers to create more profit through dubious policies when they don't seem to need any help. In this context, Blankfein comes across very insensitive.

Under-employment was always the case? Really? Not correct! It is one thing to argue that the wages were unreasonably high and they have come to normal or that there was over-employment and now it has reverted to mean. But this plain denial. 

To how many did the comment "and I think it's fed and feeds into the political cycle" sounded like he started to blame the US FED and then turned it elsewhere? It did to me. I know it is sly to infer that. But if he wanted to say "anxiety is fed by the political cycle and also feeds the political cycle" then he should have been more clearer. He is CEO of Goldman Sachs, you should speak deliberately and precisely, and more so when you speak to the media. Didn't he get media training? He can't give excuses.


We continue:
ZAKARIA: The one thing that people are sure of still is that they are suspicious of the banks. If you listen to Donald Trump, you know, he varies on lots of different things but the one consistent thing he keeps hitting is that the banks are bad, that they're in cahoots, that they're -- you know, the big banks are part of the group of things he attacks, big media, big government, you know, the Clinton machine, the banks and he always gets wild cheers.   
BLANKFEIN: Well, I think you're being generous. I think it's not suspicious, it's outright accusations and it's not just Donald Trump, you know, frankly. I mean, I don't like telling -- I don't like the fact that I don't like saying it to you but, you know, we're not -- at times, people think of us as, you know, bankers is tone deaf. Believe me, I read the papers everyday and I hear it.  [what are you so stressed about? There is nothing you can't like telling the media that they are unfairly targetted]
Look, variety of reasons. Let me just start out. One of which is, I think, some of the behaviors that have been, you know, highlighted and visited, you know, are real and justify some negative response. And then, other parts of it are just a general -- and I don't want to minimize it so let me pause for a second and say, there has been -- bankers have played an important role in the system, generally, get rewarded for the risks they take. And some of those risks were poorly managed and some of the behaviors were not, you know, recorded as bad behavior. And so, there's a legitimate reaction to that, full stop.
[Ok, Good! That is true - good to admit it.]
Other things also -- let me tell you, bankers are no better at predicting the future than anybody else. And most of what we do are trying to get the future right, trying to make good decisions of how to allocate capital, trying to lend money to people who pay you back, trying to finance winners and not finance losers and guess what, you don't always get it right and you get drawn into the same mistakes and the same confusion that anybody would and everybody does in connection with their efforts to try to figure out what the future is going to be. [This has been debunked, ridiculed so many times cannot believe Blankfein is using this defence.]
So, good to have Blankfein admit that there are bad apples. These bad apples should be punished heavily - in accordance with law. That is where a leader would take it. Blankfein could also say because it is such a complex system ascribing blame is very difficult and it takes time. But Banks don't want bad apples in their system as much as the general public does. 

But then for weird reason, he starts defending bad behaviour. I doubt people think the "bad apples" Blankfein referred to were only people making mistakes. People know you are talking of the cheats. People simply want you to say "we are finding the cheats and sending them to jail". To the lawyer in me, this volunteering of information looks suspicious.

ZAKARIA: One of the criticisms people make about the banks which is playing itself out with this Wells Fargo affair is banks make mistakes. They do bad things. They do things they shouldn't have done and they pay fines in a sense admitting the wrongdoing, whether or not technically they do but nobody at the top gets held accountable. Goldman Sachs has paid fines. Do you think that's a fair criticism? 
BLANKFEIN: I would -- well, let me just say, first of all, I can't own or comment on Wells Fargo situation, you know, I could apply it in abstract. Everyone is looking for someone to hold accountable but sometimes -- the answer is -- look, the short answer is you would like to ascribe malevolence to everything that goes wrong. 
Now there is bad behavior. Someone has cheated or this fraud, well, that's the remedies for that and people go to jail for that. [Para added by me] 
But sometimes, people are just wrong. And they're wrong about things within their area of expertise because I may be in finance and you may be a political scientist but I have views about political science and I may be right, you may have views about where the financial markets are going, you may be right. You just don't know.  
And sometimes, what's going on here is that people are trying to prescribe malevolence for people who were wrong and the evidence that they were simply wrong is look how much money they lost. And at the end of the day, if you still think that their behavior was off, to be punished the way people are saying they should be punished, you still have to find some kind of a criminal intent. 
You know, to this day maybe the law shouldn't be this way. But stupidity is not a crime. Sometimes it's even a defense because if you're merely wrong and you didn't get it right, it's hard to ascribe criminality.
ZAKARIA: But some of the cases -- and again, I know you can't comment about Wells Fargo particularly but there are some cases where it wasn't just being wrong. 
BLANKFEIN: Sure. If there's bad behavior, then bad behavior should be punished. Look, there was nothing -- it was not criminality but there were civil wrongs in Goldman Sachs which we, you know, paid fines with respect to which we paid fines. And so that punishment -- but you're asking something different. You're asking -- 
ZAKARIA: I'm saying that the public sentiment seems to be and you see in the words of Elizabeth Warren which is why the people at the top not held accountable.  
BLANKFEIN: Well, I think people should be held accountable for what they're responsible for. In other words, if somebody has a duty and they didn't fulfill their duty, well, that's a civil wrong.  [Legally correct - but wrong context]
You can fine somebody. The idea, going further and saying there should be criminality, you still have to -- you still have to commit a crime to be a criminal. And to commit a crime, you still have to have some level of intent for what you're doing. So we're talking very abstractly here.  [Legally very smart]
And so I'm not saying look, I'm a citizen, also. Any time there's some malfeasance, I would love to see a head roll, but you have to -- can't -- but once the head starts to roll, it's no longer an abstraction for the person whose shoulders it was on. They have to really have -- there has to be a crime. [Para added here] 
And I -- listen, we were investigated. The people who investigated us, and others, presumably, you know, we were very, very -- a subject of a lot of focus. I would have to say that people looked at a lot of behaviors. And if there was no -- and I'm not talking about myself in particular; [Why did Blankfein want to add this disclaimer] I'm talking about the group -- and the outcome was, was there were people who -- who -- people in the community of people who -- in the enforcement community -- were not going easy. If they failed to bring a case, they felt that there was no case.

This is the part that stumped me. First Blankfein would have done well if he was legal expert. For someone who could't explain why growth is tepid or there is economic anxiety, he breezes through the legal minefield with remarkable ease. He could put a lawyer to shame with his precision. Yes, Mr. Blankfein, people make mistakes and no one in America is against mistakes. 

"People are prescribing malevolence for people" this statement is so ambiguous that it could be a a part of a master confession. It can leave the jury in the "did he or didn't he" zone. Let me clarify what people think. When people see toddler using a semi-automatic gun and kill 20 people, they don't blame the toddler, they blame the parents and the pro-gun lobbies blame the gun manufacturers. So when a whale trader makes $1billion wrong bets, they blame his supervisors and may not necessarily blame him. This is not negligence but criminal negligence and repurcussions are dire - jail. This is not a civil liability but a criminal one. And frankly US Justice Department has dropped the investigations of criminal liability for civil penalties. That looks dubious to people.

Blankfein uses the stupidity argument without being provoked. My ears pricked up when he volunteered that one.

What Blankfein is saying is, in law, called the difference between misfeasance and malfeasance. Misfeasance means a mistake, trying to do the right / acceptable thing but making a mistake leading to a loss. Malfeasance is trying to do the wrong / unacceptable thing and doing it well. Now it may so be that your law and your work are such that they look awfully similar. That is, a mistake while doing normal thing and well-executed bad /wrong thing looks the same. The question then is how to determine which is which. 

Or, it could be so that banks may be trying to do something bad/unacceptable AND made mistake  and thus blew up the system. In this case the liability is not only criminal but also vicarious - i.e. Firm is also liable. The behaviour of Justice Department let the banks off the hook on this major issue. Clearly, banks were doing something unacceptable - Goldman's internal emails themselves said that in so many words while shorting the derivatives.

The thing is if bad behaviour is being displayed repeatedly, you benefit from bad behaviour (get a bonus) when it doesn't explode into a crisis then you are part of the system when it does explode. So you go to jail along with the perp as a co-accused. Now imagine a series of mistakes leading all the way to the top, taking place repeatedly and all those making mistakes are getting rewarded . This is a conspiracy - the burden of proof shifts from prosecution to the accused. How many times will Blankfein say he made a mistake. At the end it will appear he was only making mistakes at Goldman Sachs - wonder why he kept getting all those bonuses.

ZAKARIA: I have to ask you about the relationship of Goldman Sachs to the Clintons. There was a front-page story in the New York Times alleging that there are very close connections, that Goldman Sachs has done all kinds of things, from give money to the Clinton Global Initiative to creating a partnership between the -- your foundation and the State Department when Hillary Clinton was in office, to, of course, holding fund-raisers for both Clintons at various points. 
How do you respond to that charge?  
BLANKFEIN: Well, Hillary Clinton was the -- was our -- was a New York senator. [Trying to avoid the usage of the word "our" ;)] We're largely a -- well, we're certainly a New York- headquartered firm. The -- when -- when Bill Clinton was in office, obviously, he was the president of the United States -- we're one of the larger banks; we have influence in the financial system; of course we engage. We engage with Senator Schumer. We engage with Governor Cuomo.  
I don't know how to -- we could have -- I know that, you know, in the conspiracy world -- theory-driven world in which we live in, you connect data points, but, heck, [hmm?] I have -- I go out and I meet with editors of newspapers. I meet with Republicans, leaders. I -- we -- it's necessary for us to do that. Part of what we do is -- part of our role requires not just that we're committed to [the word Blanfein used was "permitted" to not "committed to]-- our sense of duty requires that we explain the financial system and the ramifications of what official action would be. And of course we engage our political leaders.  [Finally he found the right angle to give the meeetings]
ZAKARIA: But the implication is that there was a tighter connection. Do you -- do you... 
BLANKFEIN: Well, I'll give you -- I'll give you an example of a tighter part of a connection. In the '08 political cycle, I held a fund-raiser for Hillary Clinton. And I could tell you, throughout our firm and other firms, so did a lot of people and so did a lot of people in our firm hold fund-raisers for people running against her. We had no -- I mean, you can -- you can go on and trace it. [No need to trace it but it would have been better to state this upfront] But, listen, if the fact is that we're identified with Hillary Clinton, who, as we say this, you know, the election is coming up and I'm sure this will -- this conversation will survive that moment, but as we sit here now, we don't know who will win the election. But it looks like the odds are favored Hillary Clinton. If the worst thing was that we had a history of having engaged positively with Hillary Clinton, that's not going to annoy me. [Fair point]

ZAKARIA: But do you personally support and admire Hillary Clinton?  
BLANKFEIN: Well, I've -- I'm supportive of Hillary Clinton, and I certainly -- yes, I do -- yes. So, flat out, yes. I do. That doesn't say that I agree with all her policies. I don't. And that doesn't say that I adopt everything that she's done in her political career or has suggested that she might do going forward. [Fair point]
But in terms of, you know, her intelligence, her, I think, her positioning not only in terms of her ideology but what I regard as a certain -- as a pragmatism that I saw demonstrated when she was our senator and in earlier stages of her political career, when she could cross the aisle and engage other people to get things done, I admire that, and it stands out a little today because it's a little -- because it's a little -- that kind of -- that kind of willingness to engage and compromise -- but let's just stop at engage -- that willingness to engage is a scarcer commodity these days. [Again a fair point]


This was a rather innocuous topic. The way Blankfein answers raises suspicion rather than questions themselves. The way to answer it was first admit there is a connection. Personally, raising funds and so forth, then talk about regular interaction with politicians to put forth our understanding of financial system and so on. Blankfein answers weirdly. I felt he was trying to avoid using the word "our" senator - when referring to Hillary. Why? I wonder.

I was surprised by his use of word "permitted". Clearly Fareed did not imply that he cannot meet Clinton. And Fareed probed rightly. So then comes the issue that Blankfein personally held fund-raiser for Hillary. Fareed says both but Blankfein admits only Hillary. Now if I was asked - this relationship would be the first thing to disclose. Also ties between Goldman (the firm) and the Clintons. Blankfein avoided the question on the Clinton foundation and his own foundation.

By the end though he is comfortable talking about general stuff - why I support Hillary and general stuff like that.

ZAKARIA: Why won't she release the transcripts? 
BLANKFEIN: OK, well, you'll have to ask her -- you have to ask her that. I would say -- and the answer is I don't know. [Why so defensive] 
But if it were me in her position, I would have wanted to reveal -- I'm not sure what she's afraid -- you know, these transcripts were her -- somebody who had left office as secretary of state giving a tour of her impressions of the world. They weren't given to Goldman Sachs -- you know, the press talks about Goldman Sachs partners. She spoke at our client meetings. These were meetings with -- with hundreds of people. Believe me, she was not saying -- I didn't think she was saying anything untoward. I don't recall specifically. [Again a hedge - hmm] But nothing that she said would have jarred me that she was going into some impermissible or revealing some secrets. I don't know what secrets she would have had about the financial market that she could have revealed.  [So myopic is Blankfein, doesn't think Hillary may be more smart than he understands]
ZAKARIA: There's a poll out, I think, a couple of months ago. Sixty percent of Americans worry that Hillary Clinton would not be able to properly regulate the financial industry because of her ties to it. What do you say?  
BLANKFEIN: You know, I don't know how to -- I don't know how to -- I'm not sure how to respond to that. People say that. I would say that the financial system today is so much more tightly regulated. The regulators in their seats are so vigilant and so tough and their reputations depend on that toughness. Everyone is -- it's not a place where everybody is disarmed; everybody is armed. And the consequences of any kind of breach are so severe, I think -- I think we've -- I think we've handled that aspect of it. [This is a repeated many times by bankers]
I think -- look at the, you know, it's something I -- you know, frankly, I'm scared to death of mistakes that are made in my organization, and guess what? The world wants me to be scared to death of that and they want me to be vigilant at the end of the day. And they've accomplished their purpose. They have me on edge all the time. [So you weren't vigilant? Weren't scared? And if you have confidence in your risk management systems then why should you be scared?]
My biggest -- I am not -- I don't live in fear that I'll do something wrong. I know I won't. Of course, there are accidents can happen, but I know I'll never do something wrong intentionally. [Again hedging himself] I live in fear that one of my tens of thousands of employees -- and for other people who run big companies, it's hundreds of thousands of employees -- will do something wrong and their bad behavior will be ascribed to me, not simply because I failed to supervise, but in this current milieu, it will be ascribed to me as if I intended that act that was accomplished by somebody in the organization, or even if it's multiple people in the organizations. 
And that's a very -- that's a very hot -- we're talking about an anxious economy. Guess what? You have an anxious industry. And guess -- you know, and I'll say, go further, I'm sure that people are happy that it's that way. [Interesting victim's position he is taking]
These were fairly innocuous questions to which parrotted answers were expected. But Blankfein is unbelievably circumspect. In the entire interview the tone of Fareed Zakaria is quite neutral. Fareed doesn't seem to incite anything. Yet, voluntarily Blankfein is quite shaken up. Why? So if this is the case now, imagine what will happen if Blankfein were to be interrogated (i.e. cross examined) in Court by Elizaebth Warren. She will roast him alive. No before the senate/congress because there he is not obliged to share everything. But in court where adverse inference can be drawn.

I thought for CEO of Goldman Sachs, Lloyd Blankfein did not look one bit of the industry captain he should have been. He looked like a normal trader opining on various things. This opinion I deduce from watching John Mack, CEO Morgan Stanley, in the teeth of the crisis, or Jamie Dimon during his various media interviews since the crisis. He sounds more like a lawyer - which itself makes me suspicious.

Time and again words of Peggy Noonan - protected and unprotected ring in my mind. These people do not have any sense of ground reality. That is both sad and catastrophic.

Wednesday, October 05, 2016

Counter intuitive = Low rates / ZIRP/NIRP policies are actually bad for economy

We are told that when interest rates are too low, they are encouraging entrepreneurs to take risk. So we have low interest rate policy LIRP, Zero interest rate policy, ZIRP and negative interest rate policy NIRP.

However, these policies impacts the business models differently. At one end are business models, like infrastructure projects, that cannot add threshold value in the initial years of the venture. The low interest rate regime, allows a valuable gestation period for such business models. Often, government artificially lowers interest rates for such projects. At the other extreme, there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. These business models, however, die out once the interest rates start rising. In between, there are experimental and innovative business models. Some of these use the low interest rate period to forge better, more robust models. Such businesses thrive later. Others, however, end up going bust. The role of banks is to identify each of these business models and fund them while appropriately mitigating the risks. 


How low interest rate leads to mal-investment 
A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. Ideally, even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed. 

However, in reality, lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures. Typically, such irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. 

First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Intelligent investors will find that this contradicts with the "diversification as risk management" strategy. But being with herd has a stronger lure and is treated as risk mitigation (though wrongly).

Further, at lower interest rates, debt starts being used as an instrument to amplify equity returns. With unchanged return on capital employed, you can have higher return on equity when return on debt reduces. Return on debt is function of interest rates and lower share it claims from the total returns made by the firms. 

Thus the second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy. 

In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios.

This is particularly true when there is some demand in the system.

What happens when there is no demand?
When there is no demand in the economy, low interest rates / ZIRP / NIRP etc are said to stimulate this demand. This, to my simplistic mind, sounds like offering desserts to the already overfed diner  (AOD) with the hope to eliminate world hunger. Let me explain.

We hope this AOD, when offered with a free desserts will take them and pass them along to the hungry. In this method we depend on the magnanimity of intentions of our already overfed diner. Then we presume he shall act on his instincts and find worthy hungry who can transmit the benefits to others. It is quite possible our Glutton may pass the desserts to his friends or family and each can be a little more fatter. Are we, then to wait for all the gluttons to be severly beefed up or porked up before the trickle down starts to the hungry?

It sound like bull-shit method to me. Particularly I cannot understand why you are preventing the hungry from feeding themselves - either by employing them or letting entrepreneurs do it by financing them with reasonably priced debt/credit. These entrepreneurs are left to finance their ventures with credit cards, overdrafts and other very high cost financings at considerable peril. Now since these financing schemes are not on the business side, they are paid out of the post-tax income generated by the firm (but they should have been tax deductable at firm stage itself). This is doubly onerous for the entrepreneurs. 

Treat Interest rate like friction
A better model is to think of interest rate like engineers think of friction. Some is good, too much is bad, too little is bad too. In fact friction analogy should be best suited for determining neutral rate of interest. 

Economist too think of interest rate as friction. To the economist - road mileage of the car represents growth, fuel represents capital availability or liquidity. The economists' metaphor of friction is flawed. They need to get their metaphor right.

Engineers will tell you - you need to maximize friction at the tyres and eliminate it from the engines. At the clutch and brakes too you need friction. So you need interest rates high at some places and low at some others. So Economists better figure out where you want low interest rates and where you want high interest rates. Note the question is where not when. 


In Sum
The hazards of the LIRP, ZIRP and NIRP far outweigh the benefits. These policies do not pass the smell test. We need a better understanding of interest rate as a tool for improving economic growth.


Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms". A version of this argument was made in Subverting Capitalism back in 2010 and also posted on this blog in 2012. Nothing, it appears, has changed.

Friday, August 19, 2016

Why is resolving Non-Performing Loans (NPL) is so difficult?

The management/resolution of NPLs has acquired renewed focus with banking sector under stress for many years. The Economist comments on it this time about Italy's NPL problem. More significant is the commentary on various approaches, IMF recommendations, KKR's Pillarstone initiative etc. making it a must read. But it misses some quite important issues with respect to NPLs in general.

Failure of NPL liquidation - some blame lies with Accountants
The PwCs, EYs, Deloittes and their ilk must take some blame. Many of the bad loans have accounting folly at its heart - some deliberate and some not, some before loans are made and some after. Time and again, accounting firms have washed their hands off their audit responsibility and liabilities arising therefrom. Recently some firm has sued PwC for their failure to report material issues. If auditors completely trust the company managements they are auditing, then the purpose of the audit is not satisfied. 

The shady entrepreneurs
The proportion of shady, shifty characters in this distressed assets pool is quite high. Some distressed loan assets are deliberately impaired on the books for tax fraud or money laundering. Data mining algorithms cannot detect this - even analyst cannot easily detect this. Such frauds have to be sniffed out - at least till Artifical intelligence becomes more robust.

Slow courts and costly Alternate Dispute resolution (Arbitration, mediation etc.) mechanisms
Invariably, a fair proportion of the distressed asset pool goes for legal resolution. NPL problems are higher in countries with weaker judicial controls, higher cost dispute resolution. The process of dispute resolution quickly unravels both the ability to pay and gives a remarkbly clear insight as to the intention to repay. However if the process is too slow and too costly, it defeats the purpose. This is a problem in Italy and also in India.

Much blame lies on Incompetent Banks
The substantial blame though must lie with the bankers:

  1. Lack of accounting analysis skills: Many banks which make loans cannot make proper assessment of accounting statements. Data mining algorithms are good at assessing the "ability to pay". They cannot assess the "intention to pay". Lack of Intention to Pay has created many NPLs.
  2. Illogical the use of collaterals: Banks are notorious in having collateral that is highly correlated with loan asset itself, over-valued or pledged in part to many. This is a childish mistake to make for a professional setup. At times, an intellectually superior form of syndicated lending (the whole syndicate holds one collateral) is used. When trouble strikes the legal disputes arise within the syndicate itself. 
  3. Poorly-constructed contracts with borrowers: Such contracts make the payments unpredictable in quantum and timing thus surprising the borrower. It quickly cascades into penalties and surcharges and it goes downhill from there.
  4. Too Centralized decision making as to loan eligibility: Most borrower eligibility tests are done centrally these days. Thus it leaves no incentive for the bank manager / officer to dig deeper into the borrower's records. It makes the incentives wrongly aligned.
  5. Flawed loan portfolio construction: Loan portfolios are too correlated This is a result of too much market focus. Banks push certain products that they find easy to sell - consumer loans, credit cards, personal loans etc. When the lending starts concentrating they do not quickly take corrective actions to balance the portfolio. If the banks' entire portfolio comes under stress at the same time, it cascades into more distress.


Basics of borrower assessment
Any borrower assessment has two component - ability to pay AND the commitment or the intention to pay. Sometimes the last two differentiated. The ability to pay is well understood which refers to  the capacity to bear the repayment of the loans. The intention to pay tries to determine if the borrower intends to cheat or not. The commitment to pay points to whether the borrower intends to pay  but disputes the computation of the payment and hence may have withheld the payments - committed but not paying, or the borrower does not intend to pay at all and is finding loopholes to delay the foreclosure process.

Wednesday, August 17, 2016

Is assessment of risk a function of interest rate?

The interest rate that can be charged by the bank has  two limits.

The Lower bound equals what the central bank charges the bank. Any lower and the bank will make a loss on its lending portfolio.

The Upper bound is the ability of the risk taker to bear the burden of return. Thus, if a bank lends to a business that makes 10% return on capital employed - it cannot charge more than 10% else it will be unviable for the borrower to seek the debt at all.

The Actual interest rate charged is determined by a combination of the following factors:

  1. An assessment of returns of the business based on the economy and her business 
  2. Income of the borrower in total 
  3. The value of the collateral pledged against the loan as a security should the borrower be unable to bear that return 
  4. The demand for loans AND/OR
  5. How well the other loans are doing (health of bank's loan portfolio) AND/OR
  6. A combination of these along with global factors
Spread
Bankers think of returns as spread they make on top of the lower bound, i.e. rate set by the central bank. 


Risk V/s Spread
Now, in the mind of the banker risk is correlated with the spread. When the banker perceives higher risk she fattens the spread. This "risk" we talk about is risk resulting to the banker. It does not mean risk of the borrower alone. So if the bankers' portfolio is turning bad, the banker will still increase the spread - partly to compensate for the loss she suffers and partly because she assesses the general economic environment to be more risky. Thus, even if the central bank reduces the benchmark interest rate, the banker is reluctant to pass it on if she can avoid it. This creates tighter conditions putting more stress on the borrower. This is why Scot Sumner argues the monetary conditions were actually tight when we were almost at ZIRP.

In an economy that is weak, it acts as a stronger head wind for borrowers. It reduces their ability to borrow and to service their current borrowing. They want to pay down their debt and reduce their loans. Therefore, the economy contracts further. The banks seem happy at first, but soon realise that other borrowers who are not prudent are pushed to default. The implication of this on the bank depends on the mechanics of the process - the proportion of those who default v/s those who pay back, the chronology in which it happens etc.

In the next phase, the economy recovers, predominantly with equity capital. Equity can absorb the losses since it is built for higher risk. The surviving firms and individuals are left with core strength to  thrive in intense competition and are more prudent with capital allocation. The banks thereafter can lend to these survivors to help them scale up.


What does this mean?
This means, 
  1. There is inherent value to competitiveness that signifies its ability to survive and repay the debt and repay the equity at decent returns. This ability reduces with increasing leverage by the borrowers. Thus when Anat Admati suggests investment banks have capped leverage ratios to 20 or 10 it makes sense.
  2. Banks' business model seems to encourage the use of debt only to amplify equity returns. It is fine in a way but if that is the objective then banks should reduce/cut lending at lot earlier than they do. Naturally, in times of distress when the return ON capital matters lesser than the return OF capital, banks get into big trouble. It seems they get confused about what is their business model. 
  3. Maybe, better than ZIRP, unleashing a new Government-backed Good Bank to pick up assets at distressed prices at lending rates with narrow and fixed spreads can work better. If the size of this bank is large enough in relation to the banking system, it may result in a lesser shock to the economy.






Tuesday, August 16, 2016

Of Free drinks and negative interest rate policy...

If soft drinks (Coke/Pepsi/tea/coffee etc.) were freely available would you tend to have more of it? Often I end up having one extra coke. If its tea/coffee I end up having even more. I will have to work it off that day through exercise or it will cause some harm in the long term. 

Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) is like that - if you already wanted Coke and it was easily available you end up having a little more Coke. Likewise, if you already wanted debt, and it was easily available at almost zero cost, then you will have a little more. But not a lot more - coz you have to work it off.

But what if you don't want them?
Say your doctor told you to not have soft drinks at all - no tea/coffee too. Now will you have that? NO? Even if I give you some money - say 2 cents - to have these soft drinks? Still NO? 

Well, me giving you some money is similar to Negative interest rate policy (NIRP). Or similar to one aspect of NIRP. You get a tiny advantage if you take on debt. Is it that difficult to understand why it doesn't work as central bankers hope?

But may be NIRP could work...
Now some will agree that ZIRP may not work, but, they say, NIRP could work. They point to the second aspect of NIRP which is that if you save you get taxed extra. Now if I have $100 in cash in a bank, next year I will have only $98 so next year I will be able to spend less than I can do today. Isn't that an incentive for spending now rather than next year? I say not always!

There are a few reasons:

  1. If the trends are deflationary your $98 next year may be able to buy as much as $100 today - sometimes even more. If the efficient market hypothesis* were working prices would adjust to reflect the new purchasing power. NIRP would create some deflationary force as well. Yes, it is small but it is deflationary never the less. So unless the NIRP was creating an overwhelming inflationary force, it may push a precariously balanced economy into deflation. 
  2. The NIRP tax does not affect those paying down an earlier debt. In fact, it encourages people to swap new debt for old debt. Debt repayment helps you avoid the tax. This is even more deflationary.
  3. NIRP does not work if I anticipate unpredictable cash requirements - say because I want to keep some money to invest when prices correct, or I think my business loan may need to be repaid if my business does not do well in next quarter, or I expect health care costs etc. In fact, it works reverse - in such cases, I would be encouraged to save $102 or $104 just to keep a buffer.
  4. NIRP may push those with huge cash balances to move cash abroad. Do you think Apple and Google will bring that extra cash into a country with NIRP? No way! They might move it to a destination where it will be easier to hold cash. So is this what you want to happen? NO! Who gets affected is the individual who keeps getting taxed extra.
  5. I may not want debt or I may not want to spend at all. I have the clothes, I have the phones, computers, TV, house, car, swimming pool etc - all the goodies I can spend on when you nudged me to spend the last time. Now I have mostly everything I need. So why should I spend on something I am not excited about? Beats me!

* I don't think Efficient market hypothesis works on a "point-in-time" basis - though it works on an average basis.







Tuesday, May 26, 2015

The Boring Banking Industry?

Two of the leading voices in finance Frances Coppola and Yves Smith are in a disagreement - sort of a pseudo-disagreement if you ask me - over whether banking should be boring or not. The question itself is the reason for the confusion. Banking should be boring was endorsed by Elizabeth Warren too.

I think Banking should be my kind of boring. By boring I mean two things - it should not be unnecessarily complex, and it should be capable to meet the complexity inherent in banking. Retail banking is not boring - for wrong reasons. It confounds the public with products that are too complex for their needs. At the same time, the back end that supports these products (read - corresponding asset liability matching mechanism, hedging etc.) is not as sophisticated. Investment banking on the other hand is too boring - meaning it does the complex shit right but it passes that shit to people who have no clue without retaining any skin in the game. 

Banking has multiple facets:
First there is a probability management that allows banks to take deposits for different terms and make loans for different terms and manage the asset-liability gap. This is similar to the insurance industry managing premiums and payouts. A smaller part of this is managing float which is a skill by itself. This is more like extremely short term trading.

The second aspect of banking is your ability to make loans that will pay a decent return without going bust. It is often known as the essence of banking. Borrowers whetting, background checks, credit history check etc. forms part of this aspect of banking.

Third aspect of banking is about sales of a variety of investment products. Here the retail staff of the bank tries to meet its sales targets by selling complex investment products to unsuspecting customers. The customers, most often, are meeting these sales-people to get some transaction done - they are not there to seek investment products.

Fourth aspect is support services which can be totally outsourced. This aspect covers your cheque-book issuances, mailing the account statements, keeping the personal records up to date. Issuing certificates for taxes, etc. On the asset side - it deals with record keeping, and procedural stuff. It is fairly automated and most customers can be empowered to do it themselves as well.

Understanding banking:
We cannot classify banking into retail and investment banking and expect to gain any new understand. We need to cut banking up into two chunks - transaction management and investment management.

Transaction management should be boring - like telephone exchanges or something. It should simply be WYSIWYG. It is also similar to McDonalds - it is basic and simple but you need to have skills to pull of the quick delivery at low cost. Meaning it is more a function of skill (can be acquired by repetition) than expertise (research, experience and insight are essential)

On the flip side, the investment management side should be complex. Now loans are debt investments and so is float. Selling investment products is as different from transaction management as chalk and cheese. You need experts to sell those products and ensure that they are not mis-sold. This part has been wrongly simplified. This part requires expertise.

What is boring?
Currently what is boring is selling investment products - which shouldn't be. Most people I know - yes most - do not understand the risks with any of the investment products they buy. It can be insurance policies, term deposits, mutual funds, debt funds, real estate or whatever.

Now basic risk management tells us that just because you buy different products does not mitigate your risks - sometimes your risks may go up. This risk compounding is not even understood by the practitioners let alone the customers. The sellers of these products, to use a popular phrase, get a salary to not understand them.

Now credit cards and over-drafts are not simple transaction management products. They are in fact loan products and deserve to be sold professionally. Most of the unnecessary complexity lies here. People who go for credit cards do not understand the terms of loan they are entering - and Warren has highlighted it time and again. Same goes with OD - while it is not as bad as credit card terms - hereto people do not understand what they are getting into.

There is quite a bit of complexity in term deposit side as well. If we really examine, most of the depositors do not make as much from their deposits as they should. The optimisation is never explained and never understood. It is in the interest of banks that depositors do not understand this - CASA (current account - savings account) helps keep the cost of capital low.

These cannot be boring - quite the opposite. These issues need to be explained - some by the banks selling these products, others by general education.

What is not boring?
Conversely, the transaction management is unnecessarily complicated. Real time settlement should have been a norm now - yet banks do enjoy settlement floats on many payment mechanisms. These represent the money the banks use after the debit the account and before they credit the account of the beneficiary.

One source of complications in transaction is authentication and identification. These cannot be eliminated as they exist to keep your bank account safe. However, all other sources of complexity are available for simplification.

Transaction fees are pretty complex, sometimes they are waived other times you get charged for using some facility during a holiday or something like that.


In sum
Banking is simple and complex at the same time - just not in the right places. It is time to rewire banking - simplify it just as much as required and no more.


Buy my books "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" and "Understanding Firms".






Sunday, November 30, 2014

To RBI: A Case against Rate Cut

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is under considerable pressure to reduce its benchmark interest rates in its upcoming monetary policy meeting. However, prudent monetary policy needs to keep rates at the current level rather than a premature easing for various reasons.

First, the present high inflation problem was caused by supply-side constraints combined with demand-side factors induced by rural wage growth. Over the past few months, rural wage growth has moderated and the government is also prudent and is not increasing MSPs. This has eased demand-side pressures and hence the recent inflation strength can be attributed primarily to supply side factors. 

Our strategy to counter supply-side inflation has been to boost supply through increased infrastructure investment coupled with measures to improve ease of doing business. To make it work, we must let supply overtake the latent demand by such a margin that any easing thereafter should unleash a positive demand catch-up spiral. The risk with a premature rate cut is that it creates demand even before supply-side catches up, in turn pushing the inflation trajectory higher. Therefore it is better to err on the side of caution and reduce rates later rather than risk another inflation spurt.

Second, higher interest rates combined with lower inflation augur well for positive real savings return. This has twin benefits. On one hand it redirects household incomes away from consumption into savings; and on the other hand it will creates a corpus of domestic saving that can be re-invested into the economy making Indian investments less dependent and more resilient to external / global shocks. 

Third, high asset prices, particularly real estate prices, are a more substantive burden on economic growth than interest rates. A premature cut can re-invigorate the real estate cycle, adding to the countries financial vulnerability. As the BIS has stated, central banks should focus not just on the business cycle, but also the financial cycle. Higher real interest rate will maintain a pressure on asset prices thereby creating beneficial conditions for sustainable economic growth.

Fourth, higher interest rates (more capital inflows) coupled with exchange rate sterilization measures are helping the RBI create a war chest to counter any external currency shocks. This was indeed the learning from the South East Asian crisis of 1990s – make hay while the sun shines. The RBI, rightly so, expects the near future to be tumultuous in light of US Fed tightening and changes in divergent monetary policies in developed countries. Higher rates will ensure that the RBI has enough dry powder in case of a global economic shock.

In sum, calling for the RBI to cut interest rates – just when the inflation battle is being won- is premature, short-sighted and tantamount to declaring a victory even before the enemy has been defeated. In a world where global central banks are creating conditions for future instability, the RBI should remain a beacon of stability.


Thursday, January 30, 2014

Banking and the Post Office

Double whammy of withdrawal of funds from emerging markets

In the past few trading sessions, there has been a considerable withdrawal of funds from the emerging markets. We can attribute this to two basic reasons.

Firstly, we have seen reduction of QE from $85 billion to $65 billion in the last four months. Secondly, we have seen an upward pressure on interest rates in the developed world. These two factors have combined to create A double whammy. At the time when funds are scarce, we have a reverse potential difference that is pulling money towards developed markets. This perverse situation will lead to substantial abatement of money flows from emerging markets to the developed markets.

In addition, there is already in place, an incentive to emerging markets sovereigns to invest in developed market treasuries for mercantilistic reasons.

I believe, these three forces will lead to substantial correction in equity markets in developing countries. Hence, we will see drastic correction in Indian equity markets. I also think, the same logic will hold for other developing countries.

I will be trying to close my open positions as soon as I can. Let us hope that we are able to ride out this turbulent phase. However, I do not think that this turbulence will last more than three months. Therefore, it is essential to get into the market say around end-April.




Tuesday, October 15, 2013

Money Supply - when and how QE becomes dangerous

To understand how money supply becomes dangerous, let us begin with our equation which is now modified as follows:

Just to reiterate, here:
M = Money supply
V = Velocity of Money
MA = Original money supply
VA = Velocity of the money supply
MB = Money supply added during QE
VB = Velocity of this expanded money supply
P = Price of good (product or service) "i"
Qi = Quantity of good (product or service) "i" sold
n = Total number of goods
M*V = Money Momentum
PI = Purchase Intensity

Makings of a recession or slowdowns
Before a slowdown we have MB equal to zero as there is no QE. When a slowdown strikes Qi reduces drastically. To compensate the reduction of Qi, central bank injects MB. In the ideal case the velocity VB should be positive and commensurate with MB (the quantum of additional money supply). Now as we discussed the exact mechanics of QE were designed to keep VB low so that injection of money does not cause runaway inflation.

To adjust to excess money supply, the purchase of some items increases. If such items are assets, then we have the hoarding vs. building problem we spoke about. The exact response of the economy depends on the mechanics of QE. However, either ways it plants the seeds for future problems.

When does QE turn bad
When the economy does finally recover, the right side of the equation starts gaining traction. To compensate, the two components on the left, VA and VB have to adjust (assuming no further QE is added). Now the nature of velocity is such that increments in micro-V (velocity at individual level) are more step-changes rather than smooth analogue. Therefore even when the Velocity in the equation is smoother than the micro-V, it increases quite drastically. The pace of increase of the velocity is remarkably higher than pace at which fundamental growth can take place - i.e. growth in "n"or "Q". The excess therefore spills over to "P" or the price leading to inflation. At such moment, there is required to be a mechanism to absorb excess liquidity. But then a precise mop does not exist that can mop at the right places. The result is that there is inflation in certain goods while others are relatively stable.

The argument the inflationists are making is two-fold - first that the increase in V post revival will be far too drastic to allow for commensurate growth in "n" or "Q" to temper the price rise and secondly the central banks will not be able to mop up the rest. In fact, Bernanke's QE strategy created the VA-VB split to allow for quick withdrawal i.e. the second kind of problem. However, this design kept VB low increasing the quantum stimulus required. In other words, Bernanke's design increases the first type of problem.

Lastly, higher the quantum of QE the more difficult it is to mop it up. Which means the economy will absorb it relatively quickly and this absorption will result into a high-inflation scenario.

The correlated bad effects
The US economy being the global leader and dollar being global reserve currency, there are correlated bad effects to deal with. When inflation gains traction, there is change in the value of holdings of other countries in US (dollar reserves which were necessary for currency management). If the change in value is substantial then there will be a possibility of renewed currency wars.

If the inflation increases beyond control then there is a risk of currency losing its function as carrier of information (of value). This triggers a wider crisis globally.

In Sum - Can we prevent bad after-effects of QE
We can but in all probability we won't looking at current politics. Avoiding the bad side-effects requires integrated monetary-fiscal approach. There is not much room for political compromise as most of the activities are almost imperative. We need the US politicians to be lot more saner than they actually are. But is it expecting too much? I don't know.

Note: This post is derived from my book Subverting Capitalism and Democracy. You can read the book at the link below.