Real Estate forecast - I told you so edition

Back in the middle of 2007 it was clear that property markets across the world are overheating. However, ground realities, in terms of property off-take were yet to show visible signs of a slowdown. During a presentation to top management of an Indian public-sector bank, I advocated enhancing the credit standards for lending to real estate developers. I had mentioned that a slowdown in Indian real estate markets is imminent and while timing cannot be correctly ascertained, we (me and my employer) believed that it could be sooner rather than later. My presentation was met with intense skepticism and hostility. The real estate loan portfolio, the bank recently declared, has lost all its capital and not much hope exists of any recovery. In the details I find that almost all the loans since 2007 have gone bad.

Now, apart from a little trumpeting "I told you so", there are important lessons. First, from a credit side, an early warning is a boon. It presents an opportunity for actionable strategy. The bank in question could have easily adjusted its loan portfolio by tightening the credit norms and intensively screening the borrowers. For short term equity investments, the early warning is nearly meaningless.

In the later part of the 2007, I made another forecast about Chinese real estate developers, this time for equity investment. The firms, some mentioned in the Bloomberg report above, were showing robust growth and off-take. Yet, by all measures, a slowdown in Chinese residential market was imminent. The question was of timing. The early warning is difficult to interpret in case of equities. It was generally agreed to reduce exposure to these companies. Yet, the timing of it all remained an issue.

The idea in ST equities is to forecast the trigger. Clearly, for property developers, the trigger is capital availability. For real estate developers, the first step of a slowdown shows constraints in long term capital availability. In the later stages, short term funding becomes difficult to tie-up. Leading to panic selling of sale-able units leading to softening of prices.

The 2007-call turned out ok because of global slowdown of 2008 pulling out capital thus leading to correction in real estate developer stocks. However, recently, S&P Cut China Property Developers to ‘Negative’ - Bloomberg. It means developers may suffer even more in coming months.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

Investments in India - building long term advantage

India has always admired the high Chinese domestic investment. Policy makers have also talked of striving for higher investment-led GDP growth in India. Contrast that with a fall in investment numbers and we seem to have a problem. 

In light of huge global over-capacities, particularly in metals etc., is it right for India to invest in similar capacities? I believe this is not a right way of deploying resources at the moment. For a start, it is advisable to invest in things that the world cannot provide, either because it is too local or because the global investment climate does not allow it. In both these cases there is a huge opportunity.

In terms of local investments, infrastructure is paramount. In fact investment can be directed at easily accessing the idle global capacity. Thus transportation infrastructure, namely ports, highways, ware-houses and terminals, railways etc., makes a good case for itself. Such infrastructure will also unleash local supply-chain efficiency reducing cost of goods while maintaining better quality. Agricultural produce, on which 55% of Indian population still depends, will be main beneficiary. Long ago, my colleagues at CRISIL did a study that indicated it was possible to double farm incomes by improving supply chain. I believe we underestimated the impact on incomes and possibly the doubling can be achieved with today's income.

Second dimension that needs impetus is information. For a country that is a leader in IT, we have poor information infrastructure. We can plan for unique products effectively. Small cars, unique food items (like spices, fruits and flowers unique to our climate etc.), IT services etc. can be strengthened. Rather than recreate redundant infrastructure, we must deploy investments to strengthen our advantages.

The impetus, at the moment, must come from the government. Almost all areas where India has advantage, save for IT, we have no policy backing. Organized industry hardly has any presence in such areas. Primarily, that is due to lack of clarity from government and proper strategic direction among private players. Let us hope things change and we make right investment and create sustainable value than create redundant supply that will wither the value away.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

How Low interest rates create mal-investment?

Interest rate identifies the minimum return that the business must generate. In a way, it is a fitness test for the business. It signals to the entrepreneur if he/she is truly adding value to the economy or if they are better off doing something else. Thus in a way, interest rate represents a threshold above which businesses should operate. This is Hayekian view of interest rates. 

Low interest rates and value addition 

When interest rates are too low, they are encouraging entrepreneurs to take risk. This impacts the business models differently. 

At one end are business models, like infrastructure projects, that cannot add threshold value in the initial years of the venture. The low interest rate regime, allows a valuable gestation period for such business models. Often, government artificially lowers interest rates for such projects. 

At the other extreme, there are weak business models, those that are viable only in low return scenario. In a low-interest rate regime, even such business models get funded. These business models, however, die out once the interest rates start rising. In between, there are experimental and innovative business models. Some of these use the low interest rate period to forge better, more robust models. Such businesses thrive later. Others, however, end up going bust. 

The role of banks is to identify each of these business models and fund them while appropriately mitigating the risks.

 

How low interest rate leads to mal-investment 

A bank takes risk by investing in a venture. Interest rate is also a reward bankers get, for taking the risk. This is another way of framing the value addition threshold principle. Yet, the difference in the two has implications for the economy. 

Banks are conditioned to finance lowest risk assets that are available to them. Debt simply happens to be a low risk asset. So if banks have the opportunity to invest in assets more liquid and less risky, banks will move away from debt. Even in lower interest rate scenario, those projects with best risk-return trade-off should get financed. However, anecdotally, lower interests rates actually lead to mal-investment, to borrow Hayek’s term. This is other aspect of the reputation problem we discussed earlier. 

Lower yielding large borrowings backed by reputed corporates get access to financing more easily than new ventures. This means, irrational mega-projects or mal-investments of large corporates get financed at the cost of genuine investments of new ventures. Typically, irrational mega-projects consume a lot of credit requiring load syndication. This has twin benefits for bankers. First, there is a higher degree of comfort in being with the herd. Secondly, bankers do not have to go through credit appraisal of many small entities of questionable risk profile. This makes them assign a lower risk to these projects than appropriate. Despite the low interest rates, the risk with new ventures is always higher. Further, debt is not a very liquid asset at the lender-borrower level. 

The second blow to new ventures comes from crowding out. It implies that even in a low interest rate environment, small businesses and entrepreneurs may not have access to lower cost capital. Therefore this impacts the long-term strength of the economy. In high interest rate scenario, the irrational mega-projects seem less promising. Hence, contrary to popular belief, it may be easier for smaller businesses to compete in high interest rate scenarios.

This post is excerpted from my book "subverting Capitalism & Democracy.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

Greece and the labors of Hercules

Greek government is considered to be down and out. But may not be though a rescue is certainly a herculean task. The difficulty of Greek situation is not the economics, but the intersection of problems of different dimensions, primarily political and economic.

Problems with economics

Political parties need to understand that the first task is to get the greek economy moving. It means unemployment must reduce, demand, preferably localized demand and supply needs to get moving. Usually, housing and construction are good bets to create localized demand-supply dynamics going. However, in the recent crisis, this very sector was at the center of the recession. Hence the onus of recovery should lie with some other sector. Probable alternatives could be tourism (outside demand, localized supply), infrastructure (hopefully localized) etc.

However, even with full employment and reasonably stable demand Greek government may not be able to pay back the debt. That means some hair-cuts are required. This is also aligned correctly with incentives. Lack of due-diligence from borrowers is no excuse and they must take a hair-cut.

Problem with politics

The problem of politics is vastly bigger than the economic problem. The greeks do not trust their government. This fact is manifested in their tax-evasive behavior. A population that does not trust a body they themselves elected, implies that something is broken in the greek political system. That needs to be fixed.

Once the political system starts fixing itself, tax reforms need to be undertaken. It is my guess that most of tax evasion stems from tax confusion and subsequent concessions (wrongfully targeted). A simplification of taxes will improve the collection.

The problems with political system may also indicate problems with legal system (including law and order). Usually that translates as "corrupt people are set free in the courts". This needs to change. The people who have defrauded the nation should be brought to justice. As we start seeing these changes, the political climate will improve and system may begin to correct itself.

In sum

The political problem is worse of the lot. Fixing it may be more complicated - indeed a Herculean task. The whole, financing elections and bargaining power of those financiers may be threatened. Such problems are present in almost all democracies of the world. If a greek revolution takes place it will change the political future of the world. Greece, that once gave us democracy, may give us the next solution.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.

Mechanics of Asset Bubbles

This is my 250th post on this blog. Thank you for being kind and patient readers.

Barry Ritholtz has a post titled Checklist: How to Spot a Bubble in Real Time | The Big Picture. He puts across a list of conditions that we can watch to spot bubbles. While I agree with the post as a whole I would like to make some modifications to it from investor's thinking point of view. Barry himself is an investor so the end objective of the post is same as mine, to find opportunity to make money.

Let us delve into the mechanics of asset bubbles. All bubbles eventually burst. To understand nature of bubble burst however we must understand bubbles. The nomenclature "bubbles" is misleading when compared to their bursting behavior. Asset bubbles are more like balloons rather than bubbles. Some deflate gradually, some burst open when pricked by risks, others inflate to the point of no return. It is important for investors to identify the bubble and understand when it may burst.

Asset bubbles have three central elements. First being spotting inflating asset prices. The second refers to spotting risks that may cause bubble to burst. The third refers to spotting the timing of bubble bursts. Barry's post deals with all three however, I believe, they are mixed up in his list. 

Spotting possibilities of bubbles

To know if there is a possibility of a bubble we need to consider a few indicators:

1. Standard deviation of valuations: As standard deviations increase beyond 2, we should start considering a possibility of bubbles.
2. Elevated returns: The returns in the markets are high and, more importantly, consistently high. The consistency bit is a flag.
3. Unusually low volatility: The low volatility is another, albeit important, side of consistency in high returns. Volatility is an indicator of doubt. It indicates how much the market believes in higher asset prices. Higher volatility indicates that markets are testing the reasonableness of prices. It may be possible to have reasonably consistent annual returns but  still have high volatility throughout the year. 
4. Robust trading volume: It is difficult to imagine a healthy increasing volumes accompanied by low volatility but such conditions do exists during bubble period. The number of houses bought, number of people who trade in equity markets, etc.
5. Increase in employment: Driven by the bullish forecasts the bubble-prone sector goes into a hiring overdrive.
6. Increase in credit growth: Credit is a measure of low-risk-seeking capital. When all investors think the sector is low-risk quantum of credit flows to the sector increases seeds future bubbles.

Risks to bubbles

While above indicators reveal the possibility of a bubble, they do not specifically indicate the risks that may cause the bubble to burst. The risks emerge from causes of bubbles to their effects.

1. Perverse Incentives: These are difficult to track down before the burst but is eventually obvious. A diligent investor needs to understand the "why" behind the behavior of participants in that sector.
2. Unintended consequences: The frontiers of regulations (or de-regulations) often harbor seeds of bubbles. The problem with regulations in particular is that it can be reversed in a spur-of-the-moment decision by relevant authorities leaving investors in the lurch.
3. Excess Leverage: As the popular opinion of low-risk permeates through the financial world, firms are encouraged to take on more debt increasing their leverage. Increasing equity prices also puts pressure on management to deliver high returns. Managers rejig the capital structure to increase return on equity for the same return on capital. The easiest way to achieve this is by increasing leverage.
4. New products: Barry refers to only financial products however any product that teases regulatory acceptability can create risks. Financial products are more potent because they tend to affect multiple sectors and economy as a whole. Naturally, financial products have been at the forefront of biggest bubbles in history.

Understanding timing of bubble bursts

A few behaviors are prominently visible during the late stage of bubble formations. Typically,

1. Declining credit spreads: While I am using Barry's headings, the central idea he points to is bigger than credit spreads. During late-bubble phase, the price or yield or return distribution and risk distribution do not match. In normal times, higher risk implies lower prices and higher-but-volatile returns expectations while lower risks implies higher prices and lower but more stable return expectations. In other words risk-return equations become asymmetrical.
2. Declining credit standards: This is another face of risk-return asymmetry we discussed above. Firms with strained balance sheets get easy access to credit. It also indicates lower default rates on credit side and further acceleration in credit growth in the sector. The latest credit investments may be difficult to recover and hence are as good as write-offs.
3. Tortured Rationalizations: Almost all bubbles have advocates who have strong beliefs that they validate using unverifiable, anecdotal but mismatched data or new metrics that have no history. Be it eye-balls, estimating number of millionaires as proxy for premium housing demand, etc.
4. Trading volume spike: We note that high and steadily increasing volumes are marks of bubbles but accelerating volumes - spikes - indicate that end is near.
5. Interest rate changes: A credit-driven bubble is sensitive to interest rate changes. However, the sector may not react at the turn of interest rate policy. So when the central bank raises rates after a long cycle of declining rates, there seems to be no effect on the bubble sector. It is after two or three rate hikes that suddenly things start to fall apart.

While spotting bubbles is difficult, the difficulty can be reduced. Bubble-spotting is iterative process and takes a while to establish the conditions for bursting of bubble.

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My book "Subverting Capitalism & Democracy" is available on Amazon and Kindle.